University of Denver

Digital Commons @ DU
Electronic Theses and Dissertations

Graduate Studies

11-1-2013

Making Sense: Rhetoric, Perception, and Materiality
Aaron P. Donaldson
University of Denver

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/etd
Part of the Communication Commons, and the Rhetoric and Composition Commons

Recommended Citation
Donaldson, Aaron P., "Making Sense: Rhetoric, Perception, and Materiality" (2013). Electronic Theses and
Dissertations. 168.
https://digitalcommons.du.edu/etd/168

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate Studies at Digital Commons @ DU. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

MAKING SENSE: RHETORIC, PERCEPTION, AND MATERIALITY

_________

A Dissertation
Presented to
the Faculty of Arts and Humanities
University of Denver

_________
In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy

_________
by
Aaron P. Donaldson
November 2013
Advisor: Dr. Christina Foust

Author: Aaron P. Donaldson
Title: MAKING SENSE: RHETORIC, PERCEPTION, AND MATERIALITY
Advisor: Dr. Christina Foust
Degree Date: November 2013
Abstract
This dissertation dwells on the intersections of language-use and perception. The
premise is that language makes literal sense and this reality has profound implications for
those Burke called “symbol-using/mis-using animals.” Communication scholars have
long accepted a model of communication that positions language as “constitutive
articulate contact” as opposed to a discrete means of transmission (Stewart, 1994), but a
great deal of work remains to be done in terms of developing the implications for
individuals and their language-use.
Chapter One explores the stances embraced by rhetorical materialists struggling to
describe how language matters. The first chapter fields a series of critiques that
essentially argue that a “grounding logic” is needed to organize our understanding of the
processes of linguistic sense making. Embodied-embedded cognition serves as that
“guiding logic.”
Chapter Two explores Embodied-embedded cognition, a counter-perspective to
cognitivism – the approach that positions sense-making in a dualistic environment where
the sense-able stuff of the “real world” and the sense-maker considering that world are
different. Embodied-embedded cognition suggests an “enactive” view of worlding that
recruits that attitudes and actions of the sense-maker in determining what ultimately
becomes real.
ii

Chapter Three ties these two conversations together through the use of metaphor,
arguing that metaphors make sense. Metaphors can be looked at metaphorically, as a form
of “grasping” at the world that is remarkably creative as well as abundant. This
perspective on metaphors vindicates the stances of embodied embedded thinkers and
rhetorical materialists alike that argue that language matters.
Chapters Four and Five speculate on some implications for public speaking
pedagogy and ethics. Teaching language as a form of “grasping” changes fundamentally
the kind of practice that is necessary to improve. Likewise, noting that the language that
we employ has a literal effect on perception transforms the ethical implications of our
speaking.
Chapter Five concludes by suggesting a logic of non-violence as a practical and
productive response to the ethical demands placed on symbol-users.
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Section One: Preface
The first section of this dissertation, chapters One through Three, identifies a
“Copernican shift” in the fields of communication studies and cognitive neuroscience
alike. The phrase, borrowed from popular neuroscientist David Eagleman (2011), refers
to the moment that Copernicus was able to prove using homemade telescopes that there
are indeed objects orbiting the distant planet Jupiter. Eventually this revolutionized the
geo-centric view of the universe that dominated astronomical inquiry to that point. The
Earth fell from “the center” of the universe and became, instead, embedded in an
awesomely large and infinitely complex system of interrelating bodies. Many of these
bodies, like the gas giant Jupiter itself, could be said to be more like systems than discrete
things, which of course only further troubled our ability to understand the cosmos. So
significant was this shift, that the full complexity of the Copernican model of astronomy
still, in many ways, frustrates those interested in understanding the heavens.
Eagleman takes up the phrase to lend perspective to a similarly awesome shift in
cognitive neuroscience (explored in Chapter Two) that has accelerated radically since the
advent of functional neural resonance technology. The early model of the brain as the
seat of the self, including those notions which situated a “little person” (Descartes’
cogito) somewhere inside the brain, are rapidly giving way to new understandings of the
brain as an ever-changing part of a massively complex, interrelated system. It turns out
that while one can still call the brain “systematically organized,” the bodies, actions,
interactions, and environments that surround the brain have profound effects on the
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brain’s functioning and organization. This new model comes replete with several
daunting implications. Rather than approaching thinking as something that one person (an
individual) does, embodied-embedded cognition situates thinking as a kind of embedded
dividual technique that is in many ways tied to the flowing world around it.
In this dissertation, I attempt to take this Copernican shift in cognitive science into
the realm of rhetoric. I begin in Chapter One with a discussion about a third shift – this
time between two competing models of language-use as understood by communication
studies scholars. This shift, identified by Stewart (1994), situates language not as a means
of transmitting discrete packages of “facts,” but instead as a very literal form of
constitutive articulate contact. Stewart’s analysis starts with the so called “symbol model”
which frames language as somehow different from or exterior to the world of “real facts”
that language attempts to name. The “shift” comes when communication scholars instead
conceive of language as contact. A model that positions language as contact embeds
language in the “one world” – a semi-coherent sphere – inhabited by human beings (p.
136). The “one world,” Stewart explains
consists of everything that affects us and everything that we affect. Humans
cannot depart from their ‘worlds’ or even project themselves into ontological
outer space; all human awareness is situated (to adopt a spatial frame) or historical
(to adopt a temporal frame), and the space-time sphere is our ‘world. (ibid)
The question at the center of this dissertation, “how does language matter?”
comes with a wide array of answers that I attempt to unpack in Chapter One. The
materialist debates between rhetorical thinkers who have adopted the model of language
as articulate contact beg questions of determinacy and contingency that have no clear-cut
2

answers. The matter rendered by language becomes, in Kenneth Burke’s words, “literal,”
and the “literal” mattering that is on going among and within symbol users is impossible
to pin down.
Like the Copernican view of the universe, the view of language as articulate
constitutive contact may be widely accepted, but the full significance of the shift between
models is still well beyond the abilities of contemporary theorists, including this one, to
fully grasp. It is towards that lofty end that I offer in Chapter Three an examination of
metaphor as a potent site of symbolic mattering. So if the guiding question of this
dissertation is “how does communication matter?”, in Chapter Three I will argue that it
matters, in part, through and with metaphor.
Language theorists (the most notable of which are Lakoff and Johnson and
Kenneth Burke) have long drawn on metaphor as a tool that demonstrates the blurred
lines between language and cognition. In the case of Lakoff and Johnson, the
“perceptual” characteristics of language (which is inherently metaphoric) have generated
interest among embodied-embedded thinkers (Glenberg, 2008). Stewart identifies
Burke’s move from a “persuasive” (symbolic) understanding of communication to one
rooted in “identification” as positively central to the shift between the “transmission” and
“language-as-contact” models. Burke famously advocated metaphors as one of the Four
Master Tropes, situating perspective-taking amongst the most substantive stuff of the
generative human capacity he called “symbolicity.” Burke also argued that metaphors
could thus be drawn on as a form of heuristic. Metaphor not only inevitably generates
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human existence, but also enables us to take perspectives on the perspectives that we take
– this kind of exploration Burke argued could be profoundly enlightening. As Burke’s
notion of “trained incapacity” suggests, all enlightenment necessarily comes fraught with
as many embarrassments as opportunities. And thus Burke advocated for a poetic
perspective, a perspective that floats, transiently and restlessly, between perspectives, as
the best possible hope for critical symbolic creatures.
My examination attempts to take a poetic perspective with regards to metaphor
use itself. I emphasize the importance of these ubiquitous components of symbolicity in
rendering the “sensible/able” world of humans. One of the reasons that metaphors excite
embodied-embedded cognition theorists so much is because they are rooted in opposition.
Metaphors, like senses, are perspective-driven kinds of meaning making that manifest
their influence in ways both explicit and hidden. More often than not humans do not
select the metaphoric framings drawn upon to think about or explain the world, but these
framings can still be interrogated and explored. What’s more, innumerable alternate
perspectives are not only inherently available to symbol-users but also creatively
adoptable and adaptable. As the authors I canvas in Chapter Two argue so, too, with
sensation.
Varying metaphoric understandings of the world and variable sensory adaptation
alike can matter profoundly different worlds to otherwise “similar” people. The language
we use changes, literally, what one can and cannot see or otherwise sense or experience.
Phenomena like race, class, and gender, for example, are literal and incredibly real to
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human beings. At the same time it can also be argued that these phenomenon do not exist
“naturally” outside of our understanding of them. Class is not “stuff” in the universe,
rather it is stuff that makes-class-sense.
This kind of matter is not “only in our heads.” Substances generated by
symbolicity like race, class, gender, sex, identity, credibility, to name only a few, all exact
very material influence on the so-called “physical” world (a notion that embodiedembedded cognition and constitutive contact models of language alike trouble
significantly). I draw on the example of rainbows to explain how something can both be
“real” and “perspectival” at the same time. Rainbows are both everywhere and nowhere
at once. They are a “trick” of the sense-making abilities of our eyes. In fact, all sight is
imbued with such trickery, this is how perception works to stitch together our sensible
affective sphere into the seemingly unified whole of experience. By examining the
ubiquity, potency, possibility, and consequences of metaphor-use I hope to begin the
daunting project of exploring the importance of the “tricks” of symbolicity.
If I can successfully articulate the role that metaphor plays in rendering the
sensible/able landscape for symbol-users, then the “I” at the center of the personal
universe should tumble into an infinitely complex system of interrelation. “The way
people are,” be they villains or fools, will have much more to do with the practical
components of the experiencer’s symbolic rendering than with the substance or “natural
character” of those people. Our treatments of others and of our world become literal
treatments that transform, materially, the universe as we come to know it. In the
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dissertation’s second section, I attempt to come to grips with the entailments for
pedagogy and ethics.

6

Chapter One: What Matters? Rhetorical “Mattering” as Alternative to the
“Transmission Model” of Communication
While the stuff of language may seem intangible, “abstract,” or “only”
conceptual, a growing number of rhetorical and neuro-cognitive thinkers alike are
arguing – or more accurately emphasizing - that language is one of the most concrete,
material aspects of our being. Many of the distinctions that those of us in Westernized
traditions have grown accustomed to when thinking of language, primarily those which
separate thinking from doing, are melting away; and what results is a fundamentally
different understanding of rhetoric: one that is not only material, but potently and
spontaneously transformative.
Chapter One briefly examines an important shift in communication studies, the
move from a “symbolic” or “transmission” model of speech towards an understanding of
communication as “articulate constitutive contact,” and then traces the ontological
consequences as rhetoricians have interpreted them. The first section summarizes a
communication studies tradition that prioritizes the power of language to make sense over
its ability to deliver meaning. This tradition challenges and heavily dilutes the
representational characteristics of symbols and meaningful objects or events, and
emphasizes the tacit and/or active acceptances of speakers and audiences alike.
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Understanding this transition is important in that it situates communication as “contact,”
a concept I hope to expand upon throughout this work.
To adequately review this transition, I then survey various rhetorical thinkers who
are attempting to locate and account for the implications for matter as we understand it as
well as for the resultant “new matter” that language (I eventually interchangeably
incorporate Burke’s term “symbolicity”) produces in this new model. I argue that
materialist rhetoric (stemming as it did from Marxism) was, at its onset, primed for a
discussion about “new materialism.” This conversation is now moving to the fore in
rhetorical thought as evidenced by a recent “(re)turn” toward affect and embodiment, as
well as by the advent of “neurorhetorics.” While a growing number of rhetorical thinkers
are taking on the challenges posed by sense-making language, what is still missing is a
robust ontological framework: one that makes sense of the body’s ability to make sense
with symbolic thought.
This language-as-sense model responds to two critiques in the rhetorical
materialist tradition as I see it. The first critique targets what I dub the “transcendent”
interpretations of rhetorical substance (represented in the works of Cloud, McGee, Black,
Charland, and to an extent Greene), and argues that they leave fundamental questions
about the experiential mattering of rhetoric unexplored. While many of these influential
thinkers have developed useful individual-based concepts for understanding how societal
surfaces like “human rights” or identities can come to be, the particulars of the lived
experiences that individuals have (which are without a doubt inordinately important)
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have, until only very recently, remained underdeveloped. The second critique targets what
I’m calling the “embodied” scholars (rhetorical scholars who, like me, are attempting to
figure the body as participatory in meaning making, including Blair, Dickinson, Condit,
Ott, and, to another extent, Greene). The hallmark of this second group will be their
collective interest in the imminent moments of every day life; but I argue that this group,
too, leaves fundamental questions about the experiential mattering of rhetoric unexplored.
These interpretations of rhetorical materiality do well to turn to embodiedembedded logics that drive theories of affect, but they continue to struggle to account for
the processes by which language operates within them. In other words, rhetoric since the
“affective turn” still needs an explanation of language’s role in embodied-embedded
sense making. This is true in part because embodied-embedded cognition (as a branch of
cognitive science) itself has yet to fully tackle the challenges posed by language, and it is
to this tradition, too, that I will ultimately attempt to speak.
I begin however with an exploration of the meanings behind the word “matter.”
Throughout this project I attempt to illuminate the influence language wields in rendering
the world as humans know it by playing on many of the potential meanings of terms like
“mattering,” and “making sense.” While we often use these words metaphorically, one
big point that I hope to drive home is the notion that the metaphoric conceptualizations
that we engage to make sense of the world – actually make sense. When we talk of
matter, when we think about matter, we are mattering matter. We might even say that
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when we are making sense of a situation with deliberation what we are also doing is
mattering.
This word, matter, has many uses: What is Dark Matter?, That doesn’t matter!,
All matter consists of atoms., What’s the matter with Sam? I hope to use the word
problematically throughout. It may not always be clear which usage I’m relying upon, the
point being that it always must be “physical” and “conceptual.” Most importantly, I want
to emphasize matter-as-verb as it is invoked when framing thinking as a literal mattering.
This discussion will also hopefully prove fruitful in that it will emphasize two facets of
the dissertation writ-large. First, the efforts being made across the literature that I engage
to interrogate so called dualist notions of matter that separate matter and subject benefit
from a problematic use of matter in that they are, in my eyes, insisting upon breaking
down the distinctions between “real” and “conceptual” matter. Second, I want to explore
ecological notions of matter that suggest a process of co-constitution – each time we
“make sense” of something in our minds we give that thing form. We “see” it in ways
that leave legacies in our sensing which culminate over time in embodied forms of nonrational understanding. The understanding that one arrives at ultimately must draw upon
the matter that has literally been placed in his/her mind.
What “Matters?”
Even in an age that values the theoretical implications of post structuralism, the
influence of a dualist model which positions matter as discrete, constant, isolated, and
most significantly external is remarkably persistent. Dualist enlightenment thinking

10

renders subjects as encountering matter and, in theory at least, as capable of objectively
removing themselves from its study. Asking, “what matters” from this perspective is
pretty straightforward. Matter is defined by rigid boundaries that set it apart from the
non-mattering stuff of language, thought, whimsy, imagination or emotion. In this case
matter can be thought of as a noun - as people, places, or things - that can be externally
validated or observed: so “that matters” or “this matters.”
I hope to “loosen” the meaning of matter, as Butler (1993) has, to account not
only for the noun status (it is after all an inordinately important fantasy 1); but, more
importantly, to include the various shapes of verb that the word might take. Butler frames
matter “not as site or surface, but as a process of materialization that stabilizes over time
to produce the effect of boundary, fixity, and surface” (xviii). When one attempts to
grapple with the fact that sensorial experience consists not of discrete bodies engaging
each other—but rather of a dizzying array of systematic contact points, judgments,
associations, expectancy-laden re-engagement and further reductions (the foundational
argument of embodied-embedded logic which will be explored in Chapter Two)—it
becomes clear that the actions of the subject are positively central in what comes to be.
Emotions, affects, imaginings, and the stuff of thought itself, in this view are felt, sensed,
mattered into consciousness by the sensing and reducing brain. Language is an ever1
We live our lives as though bodies are discrete, as though matter is hardly changing, as though the “I”
that engages this text right now is the same as the “I” that sat afraid in its chair on the first day of
kindergarten – but incredibly none of these things are true. Yet each of these fantasies (the difference
between “you” and “I” in a room, the fluidity and perceptual basis of matter, and the ongoing cellular
and electrical reconstruction of the self) can be considered essential to basic human function.
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present hum that works constantly to matter the world (as it is and as it is not) right in
front of our faces. From this perspective, the ‘real world’ exists as a fluidly changing
product of our own creative enaction.
As an example, consider rainbows. Rainbows are problematic for dualistic
thinkers, and not only because they cannot be touched, weighed, or discretely measured.
Most problematic for our purposes here is how particular one must be to sense rainbows at least rainbows as humans know them. When people use eyes like ours to look from a
particular standpoint across light reflecting from invisible beads of water in the sky (or
off of various crystals or glass surfaces), with a sufficient light source wherever it needs
to be at that particular moment, only then do rainbows matter. Rainbows, it could be said,
are entirely perspectival. Perspectivity confounds notions of materiality that would
situate a rainbow as there whether we were or not. Instead, for many animals on this
planet rainbows very literally are not, ever, there or anywhere. And, technically, in the
case of homo sapiens, there are potentially billions of rainbows the world over at any
given moment – but because no one is where they need to be to perceive and make sense
of those unseen rainbows, they do not matter at all.
Rather than suggesting that rainbows are not real, or “merely an illusion,” I
advocate thinking of them as mattering in the minds of humans who view and share
them. There, in the brains and perceptions of each of us, they matter profoundly. They
excite expectant neuronal processes which make them appear beautiful. Rainbows are
mythical, they are metaphorical, and they are political. All of these modes of mattering do
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not have substance, so to speak, in the “external” sense of the word, but they are still
substantial in the neural workings of our brains. In other words, rainbows emphasize the
verb-mattering, while diminishing the noun-matter. Humans do not make sense of
rainbows because rainbows are; we make sense of rainbows because they matter to our
eyes, to our brains, to our hearts, and likewise through our symbolicity.
The transition of matter from noun to verb implicates every notion one might
have of “making sense” of the world. When we ask rhetorically “does that make sense?”
we are typically positing the question in the abstract, without really realizing (let alone
emphasizing) that in our asking – it (whatever “it” might be) just has. The kind of sense
made is really what we are after. Is it certain sense? Uncertain sense? Confused sense?
Embarrassedly confused sense? Angry sense? Hateful sense? Enthralling sense? All of
these senses become because we move, not only via our bodies but also (arguably much
more so) via our symbolicity. From this perspective we can understand how humans,
endowed with symbolicity, can “make sense” of things like economies, governments,
stereotypes, relationships and identities in ways that can and will matter profoundly from profoundly good to profoundly tragic.
This active understanding of language mattering is not lost on communication
scholars. The Platonic tradition, which famously understands rhetoric as more-or-less
ornamental and superfluous, has long stood at the center of a critique that alternatively
positions language as “constitutive articulate contact” (Stewart, 1994). Rather than
emphasizing a transitory nature of meaning, rather than positioning symbols as vessels
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carrying meaning across or between bodies which either are or are not then persuaded,
constitutive thinkers try to come to terms with how subjects make sense of the words they
encounter. This does not mean that constitutive thinkers dismiss the transitive capacities
of language entirely; after all, terms and linguistic orientations certainly do seem to
convey an incredible amount of schematic information. But instead of emphasizing
language’s ability to “carry” that information between bodies my perspective views
“conveyance” as tactile and sensible in the very literal sense of each word.
The main implication of active mattering falls within debates over rhetorical
materialism. Materialist thinkers have long recognized the “constitutive” nature of
language-use, but what they have been lacking is a more comprehensive model that
animates the interpretation of the culturally and socially arranged schematic
confrontations and relations which ultimately matter to symbol users. In order to attempt
to trace out such a logic, I must first outline the “Copernican shift” in communication
studies as I see it.
From Symbols to Constitutive Articulate Contact
The symbol model of communication is a representation-driven model of
communication rooted in persuasion. Contrasting with this model is a model of
communication as constitutive articulate contact that situates the ontological implications
for a sensorial understanding of language. The symbol model of communication positions
discrete subjects who are using communication to transmit information (represented as
directly or accurately as possible by the symbols being used) between them. Stewart
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(1994) has argued that a “basic ontological claim” supports this “two world” perspective,
namely “the fundamental belief that there is a difference in kind between the linguistic
world and some other world – that of ‘things,’ ‘mental experiences,’ ‘ideas,’ ‘concepts,’ or
some other ‘signifieds’” (p. 128). Dualistic models such as this render matter-as-noun. If
I were to use a racist word without intending it to be racist (as is often the case in
contemporary utterances of “Illegals” to refer to those who live in the US without proper
documentation) then, the argument goes, the term is not racist. Individuals who rightly
insist on interrogating racist language such as this are thus to be viewed only as
especially political, vindictive in their arguing practices, or worse. You could identify the
racist implications of that language, a symbol-model user might argue, but that’s just you
making something out of nothing. The symbol-model’s understanding of how words work
may seem seductively “practical,” but it is also deeply problematic.
Stewart’s four additional commitments elaborate on the problems inherent in a
“symbol model” (I also refer to this model as the transitory, representation, or
persuasion model) of communication: first, language is made up of knowable
(“identifiable”) units or elements; second, “the relationship between these units and the
units that make up the other of the two worlds is some sort of representational or
symbolizing relationship” (ibid); third, the relationship between the identifiable units of
language and this representational process is “systemic;” and last, humans incorporate
this system as a “tool” or “instrument” which can accomplish goals. All of these
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fundamental assumptions are challenged 2 by the alternate model which Stewart dubs
“constitutive articulate contact.”
Perhaps the largest problem with the symbolist perspective is that it fails to
account for how words are made sense of. There are a lot of ways we can interpret
statements (an infinite amount if we are patient or motivated enough) most of which
could never have been imagined by the speaker. The interpretation phase becomes the
central focus for constitutive thinkers, replacing the intended content of the message. For
Stewart, communication involves “…the ways humans ‘do’ understanding and ‘make,’
‘build,’ ‘remake,’ or ‘modify’ worlds” (p. 140). The symbol model’s failure to account for
fundamental misunderstanding is, in Stewart’s eyes, neglecting what it means “to be a
human.” More generally, as I see it, the symbol model ignores a key phase – autopoiesis
– the individual moment of creative understanding that may or may not include the
message that was inherent in the object that is being interpreted.
Constitutive articulate contact, in contrast, emphasizes production and
composition along with reproduction or representation. In arguing that language is
“constitutive,” Stewart emphasizes the participatory nature of meaning making. Meaning
implicates subjects, and a large part of acknowledging meaning consists of endorsing or
at least presuming a plethora of viscerally embodied subject positions. By framing
language as “contact,” Stewart emphasizes the “social,” “communicative,” and “dialogic”
2 The particulars of this critique as well as of those that I might offer with regards to Stewart’s alternative
model are too numerous to explore in this brief introduction, but they will be integral to the argument as
it develops. For more on this see section two of Chapter One which attempts to trace the discussion in
rhetorical criticism regarding determinism and contingency.
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function of language – that communication is a joining of identities, a merger. In a purely
“external” sense, contact may appear to be but a momentary touching, when one accounts
for the fact that touches leave legacies in embodied-embedded brains (touches are
“remembered” because they physically “re-wire” the brains experiencing them) then
contact becomes much more constitutive.
In framing communication as “articulate,” Stewart underscores how language is
“differentiated” as opposed to “compact” (p. 142). The distinction between
“differentiated” and “compact” dismisses the notion that an utterance works because it
represents a complete accounting of a universal essence of the subject at hand. So to pull
our previous example into this new framework, words like “illegal” (no matter how they
are uttered) do not have a universal meaning in the cosmos. They are “differentiated” by
our experience of them. Constitutive articulate contact explains how, on the one hand,
some people (typically privileged people) can claim that they “do not see race” in terms
such as these whereas others (typically those marked off by them as deviant or otherwise
thusly oppressed) cannot help but see it. Even the most well-intended and naively
ignorant utterances participate in rendering sensible massively disciplining constructs of
race, that racism is there whether one sees it or not.
The constitutive understanding of communication affirms rhetoric’s place near the
center of human living. Rhetoric endows humanity with multiple ways of being, all of
which draw upon and implicate sensation and perception. Human communication and the
people that it mobilizes can now no longer be seen to be discrete entities; they become in
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many ways co-constitutive, and as ethicists from Buber to Levinas insist relationality (as
goaded by symbolicity) is the primary “substance” in that process. Rather than
conceiving of rhetoric merely as ornamental, it becomes an integral component of the
fabric of human existence. Stewart’s distinctions between a symbol model and
communication as constitutive articulate contact provide a broad framework from which
to appreciate the scholarly conversation within rhetoric that is most relevant to the
distinctions between matter as noun and verb: rhetorical materialism, or material rhetoric.
This model will serve as a touchstone in future chapters to distinguish between
perspectives that situate communication as acting upon matter as opposed to those which
frame communication as mattering.
Rhetorical Perspectives on Materialism and “New” Materialism
Casting rhetoric as “productive,” as the constitutive articulate contact approach
does, means enlisting new logical systems. The most influential logical system embraced
by communication scholars in their attempt to account for the relationships between
rhetoric and matter came from Marx. Marx’s linear narratives of class struggle have more
or less been set aside, but his emphasis on the fluid and renewing nature of human
ideology is an important step for criticism. This is because Marx’s is not a unified system;
it draws on a “plurality of doctrines” and is thus incompatible with stable conclusions. As
Baliber (1995) put it, “Marx is the philosopher of eternal new beginnings” (p. 6),
beginnings constrained by rhetoric.
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While Marx was clearly not a rhetorical theorist in the “general” sense of the
term, the transformative capacities of the “deliberative process” of rhetoric are positively
central to Marxist thought (Wilke, 1976, p. 233). Wilke summarizes Marx’s contribution
to the project of rhetorical materialism by turning to a brief work entitled “Theses on
Feuerbach.” There, Marx argued “the materialist theory that human beings are [merely]
the product of surroundings and education, and therefore that other kinds of people are
the product of different surroundings and different education, forgets that surroundings
are in fact changed by people ….” (p. 534). Here we see the first influential accounting of
how symbolicity matters, albeit in an incredibly historicized fashion.
As Marx saw it, material conceptualizations of the time accepted naturalistic
understandings of the relationship between environments and bodies, but they did not
have a ready answer for the rhetorical power of subjects to shape environments in
meaningful ways. Marx was one of the first influential thinkers to take on this challenge.
His approach is notable for a few reasons. The first reason is situated in the usage
(Wilke’s) of the term “merely.” As we shall soon see, perhaps the most persistent question
prompted by stances like Marx’s is that of determinism. Depending on how “strictly” one
reads Marx’s argument, there will be more-or less room for subjective agency. As soon as
one accounts for the influences of rhetoric, it seems, the question becomes can we
possibly be beyond rhetoric? Language will matter less the more influential ideologydriven environments are said to be; and it will matter more if it is language (and not
essential aspects of these environments) that makes sense. At the same time, language
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works as a constraining (and yet generative and “constructive”) system in and of itself. A
gradient appears, a range bleeding determinism into contingency. On this spectrum, the
more influential and unchangeable the “external” components are seen to be the less
agency is granted to subjects. The more ways that contingency drives reality, the more
pliable reality becomes.
By introducing the forces of production inherent to humans being, Marx seems to
inherently challenge determinism. In fact, as Marx saw it, the “spirit” was a “prisoner” to
matter (Balibar) and a long line of thinkers since have argued that the efficient authority
granted to “external” human-produced entities (like class) in Marx’s linear understanding
of history underestimates or impoverishes the potential of the entire process. I engage
many of those critiques later in this chapter where I discuss the debate about determinism
and contingency as it has played out in rhetorical criticism. Essentially the question will
become, if language makes ideology, can it re-make it? Or is language always-already
subject to relatively un-changing sociological assumptions? Can we use rhetoric critically
to shape human understanding in a way that makes living less determinant for the people
involved, or – as strict interpretations of Marxist thought suggest – are those efforts too
idealistic?
The second notable component of Marx’s rhetorical materialism is his inclusion,
along with the “environment,” of education. Education, social deliberation and the
resultant conceptual/material transcendences, involve an inherently symbolic process; be
it thought or speech, ideas are represented in ways that have to be accepted before they
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can even begin to make sense. For Marx (and for the “strict interpretations” of his
thought), we see a rigid relationship between ideology and reality: longstanding
ideological constructs naturally persist until they are met with sufficiently radical
reactions and new ideological constructs are then born. Such revolutions are hardly ever
successful, as the ideological constructs that precede them wield an influence that is
never localized and always eager to co-opt or appropriate resistant stances.
Marx’s inability to account for the true vibrancy of language stands as one of his
system’s fundamental limitations. Understanding this vibrancy is again of central
importance when conceptualizing language as a sense. Revolutionary narratives can
(often do) come in indignant, denunciatory, even patriarchal frames that may or may not
extend problematic components of the ideological system that they are attempting to
critique – but they certainly do not have to. The scope of potential for articulated
revolution is, in actuality, as broad as the human imagination. It can be as broad as those
involved are willing to make it.
The third notable component of Marx’s so called human sentient, practical act is
that it changes the environment, the instructors change as they instruct. When this
transformative capacity of Marx’s materialism is taken into account, what results is a very
fluid model of material development. Though not directly speaking to Marx, some
rhetoricians have used the term “protean” (Blair & Neil, 2007, p. 598), others draw on the
biological development of rhizomes (Foust, 2010, p. 23). Both metaphors utilize logics of
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feedback, expectation and emergence – logical systems that will be explored more indepth when I discuss logics of dynamic complexity in Chapter Two.
The circuitous matter-making, rhetorical materialists will agree, is mattering all
of the time in the form of human consciousness and human sociality. What results is a
“deliberative setting for awareness” (Wilkie, p. 234) that is susceptible to revolutionary
change. While we may not be the only organisms on earth to communicate, Marx and
those sympathetic to his critical intellectual tradition (I am referencing particularly
Kenneth Burke) see our reflexive abilities regarding language as significant. If we can
make sense of our own sense-making, critics are then prompted to answer the question:
what kinds of sense can we or should we attempt to make? Marx’s stance was perhaps the
first (if not the most influential) effort to situate the matter of rhetoric, but as I have
already discussed, Marx was not – in the strict sense of the term - a rhetorical thinker.
More rhetorical contributions are going to be necessary to flesh out how impactful
language might be.
Matter goaded by language becomes versatile, amoebic, and eager to take on new
shapes to account for new potentialities, and “new” material implications lay at the very
heart of the explanatory power of this tradition. Amoebic or rhizomal logics avoid
reducing criticism to an active examination of a passive material (class structures, for
example), which traditional Marxist approaches would in fact emphasize. These logics
allow rhetoricians to venture explanations about how, for instance, “middle class” can
cast such a wide shadow in the United States. Like rainbows, “middle class” subjects are

22

undoubtedly a sensed and influential presence in American life, and like rainbows the
true substance of their middle-class-ness is entirely perspectival. When rhetoricians put
too much emphasis on historical and material consequences, they neglect this
perspectival potency, which is remarkably and substantively elastic.
One example is Johnson (2007). Instead of tracing deterministic histories that
effect rhetoric (instead of studying the controlling historical and material consequences
with causative influence on rhetoric), Johnson believes that rhetorical materialism
benefits from asking questions about geography (2007, p. 30). Audiences are not “made”
to do anything by an auditor; they are induced to various degrees of compliance. They
move rhetorically through their world. They use it to “make sense” of the world
deliberatively and otherwise. Johnson warns that even an accounting of geography, if it is
situated within sufficiently deterministic historical and material consequences, risks once
again framing rhetorical mattering as “passive” ultimately retaining “a division between
language and materiality” (p. 31).
Johnson is responding to an ongoing debate between rhetoricians who are clearly
in agreement on the fundamental question as to whether or not communication matters
(they all agree, emphatically, that it does); but who are also clearly unsettled as to how
determined or constrained that mattering is. Geographic framings of human mattering put
the productive capacities in the hands of everyone, thus granting a “protean” or
“rhizomal” logic that does not rely on linear growth narratives. What is more, geographic
framings account for “erosion” – the impact that our mattering makes, sometimes
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sympathetic, other times catastrophic – in the “surfaces” of sociality that humans move
across.
Regardless of how “strictly” Marxist thinkers interpret this circuit, regardless of
how deterministic they view the influence of matter on language to be, the non-essential
nature of symbolicity prompts an account of the resultant “new” material that rhetoric
enables. Forces such as capitalism, “appropriateness,” and so much more, now resolve as
matter - as real as walls in a room with some important transformational exceptions - and
the “new” matter that necessarily presents as a result of social perturbation plays just as
active of a role (if not a significantly more active role) in defining reality as any other
form of substance accounted for by the body.
It is precisely the matter that is generated when rhetoric occurs (along with the
related question of determinism) that is the focus of McKerrow’s influential critique of
domination and freedom. Foust argues that McKerrow’s critique of domination spans
“traditional” and “firmly political” understandings of the time with a Foucauldian critique
of freedom, which “encourages an immanent criticism” (Foust, 2010, p. 67). McKerrow
argues that the materiality of rhetoric is doxastic, not epistemic, and nominalistic as
opposed to universalistic. By casting rhetoric as “influential” as opposed to “causal,”
McKerrow (1989) attempts to recognize “… the importance of absence as well as
presence, [and it] perceives the potential for polysemic as opposed to monosemic
interpretation, and [of] an activity that is performed” (p. 91). Each framing of the
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function of rhetoric strikes at the generative potentials inherent in human symbol use. As
McKerrow (1989) puts it, an ideal critical rhetoric
seeks to unmask or demystify the discourse of power ... to understand the
integration of power/knowledge in society - what possibilities for change the
integration invites or inhibits and what intervention strategies might be considered
appropriate to effect social change. (p. 91)
From the onset materialist rhetoric was primed for a discussion about “new”
materialism. The ongoing debate between the “real” place for subjects along the spectrum
connecting “determination” to “contingency” is but one potent example and McKerrow is
one of many influential rhetorical thinkers attempting to move the project along. For
many, Marx was too restrictive in his understanding of the role of ideology. Marx’s move
toward an intellectual tradition inclusive of rhetorical mattering invited rhetorical thinkers
to conceive of a system of language that extended beyond the symbol model and which
accounted for the kinds of contact enabled through discourse.
The question then became what precisely does this articulate contact mean for the
relationship between language and the material world? How active is this relationship?
How powerful? How rapid? How flexible is it? Can it be driven? How does it “work?”
These questions and more like them have persistently attracted the attention of rhetorical
scholars resulting in a constellation of answers. In order to situate my proposition that
communication scholars ought to conceive of language as a sense, I will now briefly
summarize some of the more influential responses, as encapsulated in scholarship on
material rhetoric/rhetorical materialism.
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Blair (2001) has identified three materialist “stances” produced by rhetoricians as
they attempt to answer the questions of rhetoric mattering. The first stance attempts to
account for rhetorical matter primarily as large-scale, external force, which participates in
subject creation and management. The second stance attempts to implicate the body as a
vibrant and active participant in this meaning-making process, and the third attempts to
account for the material force of rhetoric itself. The first (following Marx) places strong
emphasis on materiality as determined by (Cloud), or contingent upon (McGee, Black,
Charland, Greene) production. The second stance considers the relationship between
language and the body; how rhetoric constitutes and is constituted by bodies. The third
stance is the most ambiguous and until only recently the least developed. Explorations
into the material effects of rhetoric upon bodies as well as upon relations of production,
and others mapping the rhetorical affordances that bring spaces and places to life, all
grant material force to texts like cinema soundtracks or parks, or war memorials.
Blair also attempts to use “parables” to suture all three of these stances together
using personal stories to trace the impact of the body on criticism and on the project of
rhetoric itself. Blair traces prominent problems of rhetorical thought leading into this
three-stance tradition (the politics of representation, “what counts” as the significant
features of discourses or objects of study, the questions which surround “preferred”
versus “dominant” readings of environments to name a few examples). This approach
attempts to account for the critic as a productive participant in criticism itself,
acknowledging that the bodies, orientations, and affective registers (the felt register of the
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force of rhetoric itself) change depending on the particulars of the body doing the
surveying.
Each stance more or less accounts for the relationship between language and
matter, with the first positioning matter as the primary actor in the circuit, and the latter
two emphasizing language-use and the bodies (particularly the sensed actions of those
bodies) of subjects as foremost. Blair points out that these traditions (and the authors I’ve
selected to represent them) invariably blend into each other, and that the three stances are
not meant to be exclusive or even comprehensive categories. Instead they assist in
outlining the potential contours of rhetorical materialism that my model hopes to amplify.
I attempt to maintain two critiques throughout this survey. I argue that rhetorical
materialism as it is understood at the moment either focuses excessively on the
“transcendent” forces of rhetoric or it struggles to account for the variety of ways that
multitudes of individuals might make difference sense out of the same experience all the
while lacking a single coherent process through which language might work. Blair’s first
stance, the traditional stance, includes thinkers who have crafted incredibly helpful tools
for rhetorical critics interested in understanding the constitutive force of symbolicity
(McGee’s ideograph is a good example), but which lack the vibrancy of particular
subjective use. Blair’s second and third stances include scholars who are, in one way or
another, attempting to account for this subject-level oversight. While many of these
scholars reach to embodied-embedded understandings of language to do so, they lack a
model of language’s place in that system (as I have already alluded to, this is probably
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due in large part to the absence of such a model in embodied-embedded thought itself).
Framing language as sensorial (in the embodied-embedded sense of the term) could offer
the necessary insight to resolve both of these critiques, thus strengthening scholarship on
material rhetoric/rhetorical materialism.
I. The traditional stance.
The first, “traditional” stance (essentially stemming directly from Marx’s concepts
of a more determinant ideology) focuses on the material conditions of discourse – the
effect of matter on language. From this perspective when we talk of the rhetorical
substance of the world, we are talking primarily about transcendent concepts accessed by,
but for the most part separate from, the subject. For instance, this stance illuminates
entities like governments, economies, or disciplinary social mores as a primary substance
of human thought, and attempts to articulate the ways that humans, as societies, make
sense of them.
Cloud is perhaps one of the “stricter” materialist thinkers in Communication
Studies. In her work, rhetorical materialism is an alluring “oxymoron,” which frequently
allows theorists to forget that “discourse is not the only thing that ‘matters’” (Cloud,
1994, p. 141). She warns, “even if we concede that audiences can and do perform critical
readings, their moments of critical consciousness in and of themselves do nothing to
challenge structures of power” (p. 151). This traditionalist stance underscores the
external nature of the material consequences of rhetoric, and suggests that subjects only
make sense when their actions are observable or consequential in the “real world.”
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Responding to celebrations of “new capitalism” which (she argues) suggest an
end to industrial-styled labor concerns, Cloud (2001) emphasizes as “the most
fundamental feature of workplace social relations and communication: a powerful class
antagonism between workers and employers” (p. 269). Targeting a “misplaced faith” that
times have changed and capital production is inordinately new, Cloud remains skeptical
that ideologies can be so easily left behind. Cloud points to Fordist models of production
that still dominate the manufacture of commodities. Many of the “new” strategies of
corporate life place more emphasis on “gentler” kinds of engagement do not lead to better
living conditions but, rather, only to profitability and more robust corporate survival. The
“revolutions” of new corporate strategies designed to focus on worker safety and wellbeing are merely appropriated.
Cloud is right to hesitate on the assumption that classes are dissolving, but her
work seems overly conservative in its estimation that “things staying the same” suggests
resiliency. As I write, one of the most popular stories in the public news cycle is the
investigation of a garment factory fire in Bangladesh that killed over a hundred young
girls in ways too gruesome to describe. The factory was an example of one of Cloud’s
sweatshops that do indeed still stand as the norm in commodity production at the
moment; but careful students of history will note how potent disasters like this have, in
the past, helped transform labor relationships in general.
The Triangle Shirtwaist Fire of 1911 was an almost identical incident in New
York City that, some historians have argued, birthed the progressive movement that
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enabled the New Deal. The similarities between the working conditions of these two
disasters may suggest hopelessness, now over 100 years later we still see this kind of
unnecessary tragedy. Or, we might look at the historical example – an especially potent
“outdated” one at that” – as a moment of transformation that may well incite similar
public response. The global marketplace of 2012 is obviously much more complicated
than the lower east side of New York City and the American political system of 1911, but
the interconnected nature of social network introduces untold amounts of rhetorical
power to disasters such as this. Who knows what kinds of shifts lay in store, or how
quickly they may come about - the point is that we have seen monumental and
spontaneous transformations of public consciousness in the past, even in the face of
resilient economic forces. Cloud, like Marx, uses hindsight to define the future – a
practice which may make some sense in the present day but which completely neglects
the sudden and unforeseeable moments of upheaval that leave lasting effects in all future
discussions of ideology – even if they do not always lead to immediate change.
Perhaps none stand as prominently in this first materialist stance as Michael
Calvin McGee. Like Cloud, McGee was interested in the constraints placed on subjects
via ideological constructs; but unlike Cloud, McGee is less interested in analyzing the
resiliency of ideology and more interested in tracking its development. Starting in the late
1970’s (and carrying on through the “disturbances of the late 1980’s and 1990’s” that
Blair identifies as the locus for her catalogue of stances), McGee began bridging two
potent fields of social inquiry: rhetoric and cultural studies. For too long, McGee argued,
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the project of rhetoric devalued the practice of rhetoric, an argument very much indebted
not only to Marx’s critique in general, but also to the animated, if not convoluted,
contributions of literary critic Kenneth Burke. McGee’s approach stemmed from an effort
to expand Bitzer’s (1968) notion of the rhetorical situation. Unlike Bitzer (who according
to McGee casts exigencies as based on “motive”), McGee (1977) invites a
broader use with reference to the flow of events in history. Rhetorical situations
actually exist as dominant considerations of whole societies; they seem important
in and of themselves because they have concrete and instrumental existence
throughout recorded human experience. (p. 40)
For McGee, exigencies consist of “considerations,” which assume at least some
notion of a collapsed subject with an implied perspective. Such perspectives, McGee
(1980) argued, do not simply inform our rhetoric, they also constrain it (p. 9).
By 1980, McGee’s efforts had culminated into developing the “ideograph,” which
would transform the way that communication and cultural scholars studied
communicative artifacts. There is a material force to rhetorical exigencies that are
reflective of the relationships presumed to exist by those who wield various rhetorical
devices (like speaking for “the people”) which McGee dubbed ideographs. Notably
extending Burke’s critique of Marx’s “atrophied” concept of ideology, McGee positioned
the ideograph (a “fragmentary” word or term which rallies human collectivity and
thought) as a forceful kind of gestalt. “Liberty,” “poverty,” and “democracy” are all
possible examples of ideographic influences which have material consequences in human
societies. McGee hoped to account both for their “fragmentary” (non-essential) nature
and for their more-or-less tacitly accepted positions of authority within human societies.
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Drawing on Hegelian philosophy, McGee situates this “integrant constituent”
force right alongside economic, social, political, and psychological forces which shape
the definitive experiential environments of humans (1977). It is a force that is made by
individuals, but ultimately transcends them. While critics (Greene, 1998) argue that
McGee excessively “fixes” subjects, the logic underpinning the subject-defining power of
ideographs casts subjects as potential and fluid, reacting to and enacting rhetorical force
in substantive ways.
“Human rights” is a well-elaborated (1987) example of McGee’s ideograph. Here
we have an idea that is “foundational” to practically all forms of human governance but
which changes drastically depending on the understandings of the people involved in
making sense of it. Subjects in the Soviet Union, McGee argues, have a different
understanding of the subject-state relationship than those in the United States. This
material reality can help account for the vastly different – if not antagonistic – notions of
“human rights” in each society.
A contemporary of McGee’s, Edwin Black, also saw a forceful nature to what he
called “moral judgments;” and like McGee, Black focused primarily on transcendent
implications of this material force. Moral judgments, according to Black, “… compel, as
forcefully as the mind can be compelled a manner of apprehending an object” (1970, p.
109), and this manner of apprehension was, for Black, constitutively material. Rather
than focusing on particularities of discourse (again, essentially neglecting the lived
realities of subjects), Black renders this forcefulness as a ghost-like “persona.” Personae
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set the “mold” for the audience to fill. Black understood that this process was particular
to each individual and the point was never to suggest that personae ever actually come to
be. Instead, personae stand as an a priori template through which audiences must pass in
order to relate. They are forms of being which pre-empt and constrain subsequent
rhetorical interaction; and which individuals embrace or reject to the extent that they are
able.
This template emphasizes the relational presumptions (all that is taken on “good
faith”) inherent in communication, from basic human discourse to ranted political scree.
It inspired a whole host of other scholars (Wander, 1999; Cloud, 1999; Morris, 2002) to
go looking for substantive persona elsewhere in human symbol use. Each variation on
Black’s “Second Persona” represents an instantiation of the “traditional” material
approach, in that each focuses on social entities which render the mattering substance as
more or less beyond the reach of individual subjects, despite the fact that it is their
participation which “matters.” While Black gives us the persona as a spirit that we can
generally call “visible” in rhetoric, again we do not have a particular account of how that
spirit might look to different people and, most importantly, why various subjects meld
into some personae but not others.
One influential but still essentially “transcendent” method of answering the
question of subject-persona interface comes from Maurice Charland. Charland also pays
deference to Kenneth Burke, particularly to his emphasis upon “identification,” as
opposed to “persuasion” as a model of human communicating; and to Althusser’s notion
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of interpellation. Charland (1987) challenges understandings of “a-rhetorical” subjects
that are inferred in “persuasion” (or symbol) models of communication (Charland, 1987,
p. 133). For Charland, most of the socially constructed framework that makes us who we
are is “beyond the realm of persuasion,” including “social identity, religious faith,
sexuality, and ideology” (Ibid). Citing McGee, Charland (1987) argues that “political
identity [for example] must be an ideological fiction” (p. 137), one that must be
embodied and enacted, in order to matter. Thus, Charland argues that discourses act in
ways that “call audiences into being” (p. 134), as was the case with the Peuple Quebecois
in his famous example. It is obviously not so simple, but one might imagine a hailing of
any sort (explicit as in an overheard “hey you!” or implicit as the constitution that called
the Quebecois into being) inciting a multitude of Black’s personae. These personae are
more or less accepted depending on the responses one embraces to the hailing itself, a
response that is not necessarily always conscious, rational, or purposeful.
Extending Althusser’s term “interpellation,” Charland (1987) crafts this
interruptive moment of rhetorical constitution: “as soon as an individual recognizes and
acknowledges being addressed … an interpellated subject participates in the discourse
that addresses” him or her (p. 138). As we shall see in the section outlining embodiedembedded subjectivity, the pre-cognitive realm plays a significant role in future
perceptions and past memories. The fact that this realm is open to rhetorical inscription
and praxis underscores rhetoric’s neural materiality. For Charland, interpellation paves
the road for future kinds of “people,” the ideological or cultural contours of which may
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now be completely unknown. This ideological materiality is hidden by the fact that all
narratives “create the illusion of merely revealing a unified and unproblematic
subjectivity” (p. 139). The taken-for-granted nature of symbolicity obfuscates its material
consequence. But make no mistake, even the “utterly presumptive,” as Blair puts it, is
grounded firmly in routinized and accreted historical practices (practices which I will
argue in the next chapter are plasticized into the brain), and these practices can and do
change as often as people will allow them to.
Charland’s basic notion of interpellation gives us the active component of
rhetorical meaning-making, but it falls short of detailing the process at the individual
level. We know, for instance, that individuals are constituted when they are hailed, but we
cannot really speculate as to how. We can imagine individual people understanding
hailing “constitutively” as Charland does and with these general descriptions we can
account for the degrees of difference in response, but we do not get to see how language
plays the role of crafting and sustaining those responses. Interpellation is grounded in
individuals, but it does not give us a vocabulary or logic for describing each.
If Cloud is the strictest “traditional thinker,” then Greene stands as perhaps the
“loosest” in this stance. Effectively spanning Blair’s first and second stances, Greene
draws on Foucault to situate rhetorical materialism, too, in practice (“technologies of
deliberation”). Greene argues that stances like Cloud’s fail to account for how various
intersecting considerations collaborate to provide “landscapes” of reasoning.
Technologies of deliberation are situated exclusively within the subject’s repertoire of
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performative communicative choices. Like Johnson, Greene (1998) offers a
“geographically informed research protocol committed to mapping the temporal and
spatial coordinates of the different elements which traverse and structure the deliberative
logics of a governing apparatus” (p. 22). Technologies of deliberation are not just
determined; they are developed by people in order to navigate socio-cultural landscapes.
Greene’s (1998) materialist approach to rhetoric pushes “back and forth between a
logic of influence and a constitutive model of rhetorical effectivity” (p. 38). The primary
engines responsible for this tug of war are governing apparatuses, but we should expect
to find rhetoric mattering in Greene’s sense anywhere that we find practiced reasoning—
and not simply in a superstructure controlled by dominant ideological powers that govern
Cloud’s deterministic moves. Greene’s logic of articulation (the logic which seeks to
explain how the framing of institutional and public rhetorics manifest and interact)
attempts to traverse the fluid in-between—the space between the fragments that are
nameable if not knowable. This emphasis on the in-between spaces where the
unknowable works upon the nameable will be essential in Chapter Two when I present
the debate between cognitivism and embodied-embedded cognition, so exploring it in
some detail here is important. As the assemblages of practices that make up these
structures (often countervailing, often sympathetic) come together, their articulation
occupies, as Foucault (1972) might say, “a position ‘in the true.‘“ At the same time, they
orient certain perspectives as more or less reasonable, thus confining the potentials for
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transformation. This logic emphasizes discourses beyond “ruling classes” while at the
same time accounting for those institutions that govern “authority” in public debate.
Technologies of deliberation are not fabricated in a machine shop. Their
development manifests unpredictably in human subjects, in tangles of sensations that
range within what Greene calls “normative [theories] of citizenship” (2004, p. 188).
Rhetoric serves a mediating function for Greene, one that governs the interactions of
publics. Greene preserves the day-to-day manifestations of rhetoric by focusing on this
mediating function, but he focuses his effects of rhetoric on the societal level, once again
contributing to what I am calling individual but transcendent notions of rhetorical
materiality.
While rhetorical materialists need to make sense of the emergent infrastructures of
rhetoric which seem to function en masse, there is a “smaller,” more personal level of
rhetorical materialism that has yet to be accounted for. Greene’s move goes a long way
towards implicating immanent subjective practices of every day life into the politics of
rhetorical materialism, but it does not go far enough.
Johnson’s advocacy of memes - units of cultural transmission which Richard
Dawkins formulated using the protean logic of genetics takes a similarly individual and
yet transcendent approach. Examples of memes include fashion trends, catchy tunes,
slang and other components of popular culture. Johnson argues that memes can be a
useful tool to help scholars account for both the historical “depth” of rhetorical
materialism and the geography of the landscape that symbolicity renders. In conjunction
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with McGee’s ideograph, memes allow us to further detail the particulars of individuals
who are encountering ideographs like “human rights” – which themselves never come in
an unmediated form. But we still don’t know what a meme feels like, or perhaps more
realistically how memes are felt. Memes, ideographs, persona, interpellation, and
technologies of deliberation give critics potent tools for examining and critiquing the
forms of material consequence that human symbolicity may engender. Yet, the lived
experience of practicing subjects and the embodied-embedded logics of these
experiences, so far, has been left to future generations. And it is there, in the visceral,
“wet,” “salient” and repetitive discourses of every day life, that symbolicity matters the
most.
For that we turn to the remaining stances that more or less invert the functional
chronology of the first: rather than examining the effects of matter on language
(rhetorical matter or otherwise), they interrogate the effects of language on matter.
Likewise, each could be said to focus more on the phenomenological as opposed to the
structurally material forces of rhetoric. As a result, we can implicate both the second and
third stances as “new materialist” stances in that they attempt to speak to the productive
capacities of lived-rhetoric.
II. The body as participant.
Blair’s second materialist standpoint is the first to embrace embodied-embedded
logic, and it does so by focusing “upon the lived-in-body as a condition and consequence
of rhetoric” (Blair, 2001, p. 288). The shape of the body (a concept which can now extend
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very literally to the attitudes and felt states of mind of the bodies of symbol-users)
drastically implicates the kinds of sense it can make. While this might sound very
deterministic, as I develop throughout this dissertation, the body’s shape is actually
vigorously and resiliently transformative—especially so if one includes symbolicity. On
the one hand we are limited in our abilities by our biology; 3 on the other hand our biology
(including the material of the brain) “learns” in Marx’s sense, and transforms in the
neurological sense. Over time (sometimes incredibly short spans of it) experiences that
are otherwise wholly arbitrary (the act of carrying a ball across a line for example) can
become positively exhilarating, or devastating, depending on how you identify them.
Scholars have developed the second stance by emphasizing the phenomenological
as opposed to the material aspects of reason. In so doing, rhetoricians expand
considerably the avenues for studying the materiality of language-use. This stance is
perhaps best represented by the so-called “affective turn”4 embraced by contemporary
rhetorical thinkers, but we see it, too, in the developing school of neurorhetoric. I have
just argued that the thinkers who make up Blair’s first stance focus on “transcendent”
notions of individuals, throughout this section I hope to sustain the critique that while this
conversation is moving in productive directions by turning to more dynamic

3 Sufferers of Cotard’s syndrome, for example, can find it incredibly difficult to live normally as they
cannot identify many objects or even family members as “familiar.” This leads to the overwhelming
feeling that a coffee table, or an in-law, is in fact an imposter. This syndrome can thus obviously be
profoundly debilitating.
4 A budding rhetorical approach that focuses on (as described by Clough, Ahmed, Brennan, and many
more) the body’s ability, to affect and be affected.
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understanding of individual life, a fundamental ontological vocabulary situating language
within embodied-embedded thought has yet to be developed.
A budding conglomeration of scholars are figuring “infrastructure, space,
technology, and the body ... [situating] communication and culture within a physical,
corporeal landscape” and “focusing on discourse as inscription in the material strata of
sound, optical media, the built environment and the brain” (Packer & Crofts Wiley, 2012,
p. 4). This community is also turning to affect scholars across disciplines, including
media theorists, philosophers, and other social thinkers (Dean, Rice, Brennan, Ahmed and
Massumi to name just a few) who attempt to take into account the “embodied contexts”
of materialism and to situate rhetoric generatively within those contexts.
Clough (2008) frames the notion at the center of the affective turn “as prepersonal or pre-individual bodily capacity to affect and be affected or the augmentation or
diminution of a body’s capacity to act” (1). Clough’s framing not only accounts for
affective capacity in terms of the “human body,” but also in terms of technologies that
mediate what Eugene Thacker (2004) refers to as the “biomolecular body.” This body is
the product of a multitude of reasoning capacities, prompting many affective thinkers
(Protevi, Damasio) to prefer Foucauldian a term like “bodies politic” over simple
“bodies.” Importing affect into symbolicity is no easy task. The phenomenal aspects of
conscious living trouble our understandings of time, space, motion, action, causation,
intention, and more. I will explore the particular justifications of this troubling in Chapter
Two.
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In one of the emergent works to take up affect relative to rhetoric, Ott (2010)
adopts a “multi-modal approach that focuses on the interplay of discourse, figure, and
ground” and the “[mobilization of] viewers at a visceral level …” (p. 39.) Rhetoric in
movies, for instance, works by “inviting” audiences from within affectively-primed
“currents.” The extent to which audiences accept the affective conclusions intended
matters less than the interplay between the affects as they are crafted and the audience’s
reactions and re-actions to them. Bodies react strongly “because of what they bring to the
film” (p. 49), not just because of what the film did to the body; but also because of how
the subject understood her/his reaction. By rendering the cinematic components of film as
rhetorical, Ott adds to our understanding of the political commitments in histories
covered by Blair. He situates within the matter of film the expectations and “new
material” creations of the audience as equally important.
Much of the scholarship within the second stance has considered rhetoric’s
mattering primarily by expanding the domain of objects that can literally move us. While
this work relates to affect broadly, much of it typically does not take on affective
vocabulary, or logic, explicitly. Instead, it adopts spaces/places and public memory as the
key texts, not because of what they “mean” but because of how they can come to be
understood—as affecting bodies and subjects directly and constitutively. Dickinson, Ott,
& Aoki (2006), for instance, have focused on historical places as “key sites in the
construction of collective memory and national identity” (p. 27).

41

Dickinson et al., see museums not only as a part of the physical landscape, but
also as parts of a “cognitive landscape.” They elaborate: “… experience of a particular
place comprises not just the tangible materials available in that place, but also the full
range of memorized images that persons bring with them” (Dickinson, Ott, & Aoki, 2006,
p. 30). Rather than conceive of this imagery as simple, two-dimensional attributes, the
authors embrace a much larger understanding of “imagery” that includes “a city in a
novel, a film, a photograph, a city seen on television, a city in a comic strip, a city in a pie
chart, and so on” (Ibid)5.
By situating the mattering of language as an integral material component of
space/place experience (or by troubling the universal nature of such experiences via
symbolicity), scholars working in the second material stance closely position themselves
amongst embodied-embedded theorists puzzled by the implications of affective living
(Brennan, Manning, Massumi, Ahmed). The kinds of bodies we have and the kinds of
experiences those bodies encounter transform fundamental component of material
experience, and these thinkers demonstrate many of the places in which language plays a
part.
Given the range of the recent advances of neuroscientific technology (which more
and more seem to sustain the development of “embodied-embedded” thinking), we
5
Lakoff & Johnson’s (2003) notion of “image schemata” comes to mind here, as the authors reach more
for constellations of meaning conjured and “visualized” by the audiences. These constellations certainly
are constrained, but they are clearly not predictive, nor are they comprehensively describable.
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should not be surprised to see calls to re-examine some of the foundational components
of rhetorical thought. Neurorhetoric presents itself as a potentially ideal home for these
calls and stands firmly in Blair’s material tradition implicating the role of the body in
rhetoric.
In their introduction to the 2010 Rhetoric and Society Quarterly (RSQ) special
issue on neurorhetoric, Jack and Appelbaum (2010) not only acknowledge the
“bourgeoning attention to all things neuro-.” They also identify two main approaches of
inquiry for rhetoricians interested in contributing to the project of neurorhetoric, namely
the rhetoric of neuroscience and the neuroscience of rhetoric (Jack & Applebaum, 2010,
p. 412). The first route, “…[pays] careful attention to how cognitive neuroscience is
shaped and circulated rhetorically” (Jack & Applebaum, 2010, p. 407). Meanwhile, the
neuroscience of rhetoric essentially “[draws] new insights into language, persuasion, and
communication from neuroscience research” (Jack & Applebaum, 2010, p. 412). Because
the scientific constructions fueling the neuro-revolution are the products of symbol-using
animals, the critical tradition of rhetoric can shed considerable insight into the
problematic nature of their framing. At the same time it might become necessary to “…
broaden our very definitions of rhetoric … [and ask] how communication occurs
thorough different means, or how brain differences might influence communication”
(Ibid).
Since the RSQ special issue, rhetoricians (Mays & Jung, Jackson, Johnson, Pryal,
Pruchnic,) have busied themselves situating the brain’s functions into rhetorical
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materialism and speculating about how rhetorical formulation changes the embodiedembedded brain. These perspectives draw heavily on theories of embodied-embedded
cognition, including the work of Andy Clark, Walter J. Freeman, and Antonio Damasio
who I will engage in more depth in the next chapter. Developing an ontology that stands
between neurorhetoric and embodied-embedded cognition is one of the culminating
objectives of this project.
Jane Bennett, an increasingly influential media critic working within embodiedembedded logics, argues for a “force of things” or “thing power” which emphasizes the
“recalcitrance or moment of vitality in things” (p. 348). Like Blair, Bennett’s thing-power
figures materiality as a protean flow of matter-energy and figures the thing as a
relatively composed form of that flow …. [and] seeks to promote
acknowledgment, respect, and sometimes fear of the materiality of the thing and
to articulate ways in which human being and thinghood overlap. (p. 349)
Bennett’s thing power situates “thinghood” in the body’s ability to sense
substance and to render it “knowable.” This perspective activates matter, troubles
stagnant conceptions of it, and argues for an understanding of material production routed
in force.
Packer and Crofts Wiley (2012) examined approaches (particularly that of Mark
Hansen) which focus on a subject’s “sensibility”—“the preconscious processes of
sensation and cognition that occur prior to the perception of a meaningful phenomenal
world ... [treating] meaning as epiphenomena of more fundamental, diffuse, and less
human-centered processes of composition” (p. 9). Here we see perhaps the closest
iteration of language-use as sense: a focus on the abilities (pre-conscious but subject to
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considerable rhetorical influence) to sense possible, probable, or even improbable
meanings. If the second stance is defined by the ways that the lived-in body is a condition
and consequence of rhetoric, the abilities of various bodies (goaded by various
symbolicities) to make sense of the world defines the third stance.
Hansen’s sensibility brings rhetoric remarkably close to “affordance-driven
sensation” as the famous embodied-embedded sensorial psychologist James Gibson
understood it. The revelations of mirror neurons (neurons which fire upon contact with
the real world and upon observing the real word) that have brought Gibson’s philosophy
to the fore have potentially significant implications for rhetoric. Gibson’s approach
argues that the brain makes sense of environments around it based on the kinds of actions
it can take upon the observed world. While not officially observed in humans 6, mirror
neurons are thought to be widely dispersed, across variable sensory and motor cortices of
the brain “arguing” various affordances of the object at issue, and thus, somehow,
rendering it in experience. If this perspective bears out (and embodied-embedded thinkers
argue that it does), language provides us with an opportunity to play the senses, to play
the afforded realities that we experience. Theoretically, any time one engages in thinking
symbolically this is exactly what is happening. We draw on the same neural matter that

6
Mirror neurons have been well documented in laboratory mammals from rats to monkeys and apes and
while non-invasive neural resonance technology is getting more and more refined there is, as of yet, no
minimally invasive procedure devised to confirm their existence in humans. They are, however, thought
to be foundational components of a brain’s processing abilities and no real argument exists as to why we
should not expect to find them in humans when such technology becomes available.
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participates in rendering the world when we think about it building connections that last,
and transforming prior understandings at the same time.
The second materialist stance, perhaps more than any other, offers a promising
home for a discussion that frames language as sensorial. Along with scholarship
rethinking the relationship between material spaces, affect, and language; and
neurorhetorics; rhetoricians have recently revisited Kenneth Burke’s influential rhetorical
theory (which reads remarkably similar to the embodied-embedded perspective reviewed
in Chapter Two). In 2008, Diane Davis observed, “the entire logic of [Kenneth Burke’s]
identification has to be rethought” in light of mirror neurons (p. 233). Burke’s
understanding as applied by most rhetorical thinkers is primarily analytical, subjects
understand and analyze the dramatic components and then interact within them. This is
not, however, the only way to read Burkean Identification. Debra Hawhee suggests that
Burke may have been pointing rhetoricians towards mirror neurons all along. Instead of
considering the identificatory process as a group of actions we select from within a wellunderstood “scene,” Hawhee figures the term in a way that is “as much postural and
somatic as it is social and psychological” (p. 118). Burke, after all, relied heavily on
Gesture Speech Theory (an embodied-embedded theory that is very sympathetic to
Gibson’s approach and which relies heavily on the mimetic logics substantiated by the
assumed presence of mirror neurons) when he crafted Identification. Hawhee quotes
Burke as framing the symbolic act as a “dancing of an attitude,” if one extends the
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dancing into the brain and beyond the gestural components of “oral-aural” speech it starts
to become evident how intimate the relationship between meaning an body might be.
The argument I hope to develop figures language as a morphological part of a
mattering body. Body parts not only render material realities on their own (again the
mattering of rainbows is owed in large part to the particulars of the biology of human
seeing systems), but they also adapt to account for still more meaning in the process of
use. The various morphable parts of the body will in fact matter as much sense as they
can. This sense is felt, manipulated, and transformed via symbolicity, which “mirrors”
meaning corporeally. As important as this component of human sense-making is,
however, it does still operate within a seemingly “external” social reality. The particulars
of this seemingly “external” reality form the subject of Blair’s final material stance.
III. The materiality of rhetoric.
Blair’s third and final stance attempts to “[understand] rhetoric as itself material.”
This stance accounts for the material force of symbolicity in humans and in critics, and
attempts to formulate the necessary implications for matter. Like the second, the third
stance accounts for influential veins of post-structuralism (particularly those of Foucault,
Lyotard, deCerteau, and Deleuze as listed by Blair), all of which more or less attempt to
account for the feedback process that take place between bodies and environments which
ultimately determine the experiential particulars. These processes are unexplored in the
traditional Marxist tilt of postmodernity (and rest at the heart of embodied-embedded
subjectivity, as I develop in this project).
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Blair traces the particulars of the public/private divide as it materializes in
memorials arguing that this sensed division (itself rhetorically constructed) is crucial in
the rhetorical mattering of these monuments. In her analysis comparing the rhetoric of the
Vietnam War Memorial and the AIDS Quilt , Blair (2007) argues that the Vietnam
Memorial democratizes the commemoration of the war by referring to the soldiers
inscribed thereon by name. While this no doubt brings the private life of the soldier into
the public, it does so in a fairly straightforward way – this is the name of a US soldier
who was missing or killed as a result of this war. The AIDS Quilt, on the other hand, built
by innumerable “authors,” and including innumerable personal stories (from buttons to
condoms) that are essentially inexplicable, but nevertheless relatable, prompts a privateto-public exchange that is, in Blair’s eyes, all together different. This fluid, energetically
changing logic undergirds Blair’s approach. Commemorative places certainly attempt to
transmit stories but they are only successful to the extent that those stories are felt.
Visitors, drawing on politically and culturally inscribed life practices, make their
understanding of experience and while that experience will no doubt be influenced by the
presentational aspects of the commemoration, the experience itself is affective, not
effective. Some people who view the quilt can feel nothing but the tragedy of it all; others
see a celebration. The quilt conveys both to an extent (again I am not completely
dismissing a transitory understanding of speech) but it is the viewing and contemplating
subjects that register and navigate the affective particulars. This inclusion of the reading
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of the quilt and the making of sense via culturally inscribed life practices greatly expands
the meaningful exigencies that should be considered by interested critics.
As with the critique of the stances in Blair’s second approach, my critique here is
that the ideas represented by this stance do well to turn to a more phenomenologically
oriented approach to understanding individuals, but a great deal of work remains to be
done if critics are to understand the processes and logics which individuals draw upon as
they experience the world. The role of feedback in affective as well as embodied
embedded logics is crucial, it is indeed emphasized in these perspectives, but more could
be done to trace out how this feedback “works” in every-day life. One possible way of
tracing this feedback process is an embodied-embedded, sense-making perspective on
metaphor – this will be a focus of Chapter Three.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have traced the transition from a symbol model of
communication dependent upon representation to an understanding of communication as
language as articulate constitutive contact, and I briefly described the influences of
Marxist thought on early and contemporary rhetorical scholars trying to account for the
subsequent rhetorical materialism. Following my summary of Blair’s three materialist
stances, I critiqued the first stance (represented by notions such as McGee’s ideograph,
Black’s “persona,” and Charland’s phenomenon known as interpellation) as engaging
transcendent communicative phenomenon. While scholars do emphasize individuals in
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their approach to the study of rhetorical matter, they do not take an individual perspective
which is essential as it is individuals who are mattering rhetorical thought.
In my examination of Blair’s final two stances, I attempted to demonstrate how
rhetorical materialism expands the object domain to include an infinite number of
affective possibilities. Rhetorical efforts to understand the substance generated by
symbolicity should draw on “protean” or “rhizomal” logics. While these approaches
make good use of embodied-embedded logic and active affective sense-making, the role
of language – its abilities and potentialities to matter – is still not well understood. Both
critiques posit the need for an embodied-embedded ontological understanding of
language, which I hope to build through the remaining chapters.
The second chapter turns to the shift in cognitive science from a cognitivist model
to one of embodied-embedded cognition. It describes sense-making in embodiedembedded thought and contrasts it with the understanding of most Western traditions that
situate thinking as somehow disembodied. I attempt to demonstrate how the materialist
implications inherent in the shift from a symbol model to one of constitutive articulate
contact is reiterated and reinforced in the corresponding shift in cognitive science.
Included are numerous examples that I will use to set the stage for an examination of
language-as-sense to follow in subsequent chapters. I will emphasize how repetitive,
active, selective action goads sensory development in ways which position metaphors as
profoundly influential sensory contributors. This will prompt a re-examination of some of
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the basic approaches to teaching and thinking about language including pedagogy and
ethics.
Chapter Three will extend methodological capabilities of metaphor as conceived
by Kenneth Burke and Lakoff and Johnson into a language-as-sense model. These
theorists have already done the work which positions metaphoric structures as
foundational in human symbolic thought, and by some accounts (Hawhee, Davis) Burke
even suggested many of the same sensory implications that I am driving at. Metaphors
are products of embodied thinking that are rooted in symbol using and they guide our
pre-cognitive understandings in profoundly influential ways. I will briefly explore a few
examples that attempt to show how racism, for instance, can be both visible and not
visible, present and “not present,” at the same time. I argue that while it is obviously not
reasonable to attempt to justify or rationalize mindsets that produce post-racial discourse,
there is practical and ethical value in trying to better understand them. Post-racial
discourses have proven to be remarkably resilient, this is in large part due to a
misunderstanding in the public over what does and does not “matter” when raceinfluenced crime occurs.
While most communication scholars have adopted the language as articulate
contact model some nagging components of the symbol model continue to persist. It’s not
exactly breaking new critical ground to argue that the metaphors that we rely on are
somehow complicit in our rendering of race or class. However, communication as a
discipline continues to struggle to account for the implications of language-as-contact
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within public speaking pedagogy. Public speaking education and communication
scholarship have a deep, shared heritage in the traditions of “the West.” And while many
public speaking texts have more or less adopted a language-as-contact model, many of
the contemporary approaches to the topic rely on what I consider to be transmissionbased understandings. Chapter Four attempts to demonstrate how, even though the
communication discipline has more or less accepted that language is embodied, there is
still much work to be done.
Particularly, Chapter Four turns to “professionalized” notions of public speaking
education. The models that one uses in crafting lesson plans and learning environments
will obviously exert tremendous influence on the kinds of learning that can take place.
When one attempts to teach the methods of “professional” public speaking they are
attempting to give their students the tools to transmit perceptions of confidence,
credibility, and persuasive reasoning. Instead of focusing on the development of symboluse these classes emphasize becoming better speakers. I take on a few critiques and then
attempt to articulate what framing language-as-sensorial might mean for public speaking
instructors and students.
Like questions of pedagogy, questions of ethics have a rich shared history with the
development of the so-called Western communication studies discipline. Chapter Five
works to elaborate on some of the ways that framing language as a sense interacts with
questions of ethics. I will argue that nonviolence, which has received some attention in
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the communication studies field, should be positively central to our understanding of
what it means to be symbol-using animals.
Neuro-scientist-philosopher Walter J. Freeman (1995) has argued that both
consciousness and causality become “ethical imperatives” (p. 7) when one takes on an
embodied-embedded perspective, Chapter Five struggles to describe what that might
mean for day-to-day symbol use. If one accepts that language senses the world thus
rendering the material surfaces that s/he and those around her/him live within, the
question then becomes what kinds of sense might we be able to make? Aspiring towards
“better” sense is itself a profoundly political project, and so I turn to the ongoing tradition
of nonviolent thinking to attempt to chart a more sympathetic course for those interested
in taking on life-practices and perspectives that aspire to a more charitable and just world.
Nonviolence has a deep history in the communications discipline, if nothing else Chapter
Five aims to strengthen those ties.
In conclusion, this introduction has posed the question: how does communication
matter? To understand how sensorial reason works, I turn in the next chapter to a very
similar materiality debate that is taking place in cognitive science and, more specifically,
to an “embodied-embedded” logic of sense making. This debate, and the embodiedembedded logic that appears to be prevailing, not only mirrors the “new material”
implications of the efforts to make sense of a model of language as constitutive articulate
contact, they also set the stage for an understanding of language as sensorial. I suggest
that rhetorical and embodied-embedded scholars are driving at the same problem – how
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is meaning made – and in both circumstances a more robust understanding can be had if
we incorporate language-use into our sense-making capacities.
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Chapter Two: Cognitivism versus Embodied-Embedded Cognition
…again and again that which has the status of object must blaze up into
presentness and enter the elemental state from which it came, to be looked
on and lived in the present… (Buber, 1937, p.40)
“Perception is not a process of passive absorption, but of active construction”
(Blakeslee & Blakeslee, 2007, p.41).
This chapter starts with a brief summary of the debate in cognitive science
(Shapiro, Noe, Damasio) between an embodied-embedded perspective (which situates
brains as necessary but not sufficient to human cognition by emphasizing the role of
enaction in perception) and a more or less defunct—and yet remarkably resilient—
enlightenment model called “cognitivism” (an approach which places the brain as the
seat of the self). I argue that the functional implications inherent in this debate reflect
(and often underscore) those within the turn from the symbolic model to the articulate
constitutive contact model in communication studies. The resulting emphasis on
embodied-embedded thought as a model for human cognition has prompted cognitive
scientists and brain scientists to go looking for “help from the humanities” (Damasio
1994, xiv) in order to fill in the gaps of scientific inquiry, this chapter attempts to respond
to that call by positioning language as a sense. Language has not exactly enjoyed a
charitable interest from scientists in the enlightenment tradition; and yet now it seems
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that within our daily life, rhetoric could have substantial importance when it comes to the
function and organization of the brain.
It should become evident that the move from a cognitivist model of cognition to
embodied-embedded cognition demands “new material” understandings of rhetoric that
are very similar to those prompted by the move to acknowledge rhetorical realities in
postmodern criticism. The attempt to explain the new material understandings that are
inherent to embodied-embedded cognition embraces models of emergent explanation that
are driven by complexity theory; the second half of this chapter is dedicated to outlining
those implications. It is my hope that the reader will engage the discussion of complexity
theory with the material debates regarding determinacy and contingency in mind. While
aiming at explanation, emergence-driven models like those rooted in complexity theory
are by their very definition incapable of producing cause-and-effect understandings of the
ways that symbolic thinking, acting, and perceiving lead to behavior. While critics often
argue that approaches that rely on emergence lean too heavily on “mystery,” this critique
largely misunderstands “broad reductionism” according to Clark (1997). Clark argues
that emergent approaches have a great deal to say about “the ways in which the lowerlevel properties and features combine to yield [behavior]” which should help to “render
the presence of higher-level properties unmysterious by [referencing a] multitude of
lower-level organizational facts” (p. 104). The discussion of complexity theory will not
offer answers to the rhetorical materialism debates in the preceding chapter, but it should
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provide the working understanding of the “logic” that my prior critiques suggested were
missing.
This chapter concludes by exploring some of the implications of embodiedembedded thinking on the notion of ‘embodiment’ itself and hopefully sets up metaphors
as useful rhetorical sites for a more particular understanding of the material force of
language. By situating metaphors as ubiquitious, potent, and productive components of
symbolicity, I hope to be able to suture the phenomenological components of the last two
stances offered by Blair in Chapter One, as well as the transcendent notions of
individuals offered in her first stance to the now predominating theories in cognitive
studies. This move should provide not only the founding logic that I have been promising
for phenomenological thinkers in Blair’s second and third stances, but also a means of
utilizing the transcendent approaches crafted by McGee, Black, Charland and others into
the practice of everyday life.
Cognitivism and Embodied-Embedded Cognition
Cognitivism is rooted in a “top-down” approach to thinking which positions a
subject as somewhere in the body and that subject engages the body to gather information
about the world as it discretely exists. Shapiro (2011) defines “standard cognitive
science” (or the “cognitivist” approach to the mind) as being primarily computational:
“Commensurate with this view is the idea that cognition consists in the manipulation of
symbols, where these manipulations often involve the application of rules for the purpose
of deriving conclusions that go beyond the information contained in the input stream” (p.
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28). Much like the symbol model of communication, the cognitivist approach situates
symbols as exterior to the thinking human. While the conclusions drawn by this
computational approach may be more than what is input (computer algorithms can be
“productive” in that they can assess data for patterns or other forms of meaningful
information), the incoming information is situated as discrete, isolated from the system
that it enters. In Shapiro’s view
the subject matter of cognitive science lays nestled between the peripheral shells
of sensory organs and motor systems, making possible an investigation of
cognition that needn’t concern itself with understanding the cognizer’s
environment nor with examining the interactions between the two. (p. 28)
The cognitivist approach emphasizes a transitory understanding of meaning, somewhere
between sensation and action sits the thinker. Thinkers receive information input which is
then assessed and acted upon.
This pattern of thinking is well-established in so-called Western thought.
According to Noe, Descartes most influentially lionized the “top-down” approach of
cognitivism: “Descartes thought that inside of each of us there was a thing … a thinking
thing – a ‘res cogitans’ in Latin – and this thing inside of us, it thinks, it feels, it decides”
(Campbell, 2009, p. 5). The experience of this thinking thing was the only knowable truth
for Descartes, the experience of “it” thinking was what gave Descartes comfort that he
was, in fact, real and that his waking life was no mere illusion. Enlightenment
reductivism saw the mind as a little man (and it was always a man) in the “boat” of the
body. If he trained himself and guarded himself from the unnecessary and biased
impulses of “the body,” that man could be purely reasonable. He could draw on the stuff
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of feeling and emotion to understand the world and then parse it down scientifically;
purging it of all of the whimsy brought on by the initial “emotional” exploration, and thus
come to know the truth. Cognitivism suggests that we see the world through this “man’s”
eyes; “we” are that man.
In contrast, an embodied-embedded cognitive perspective situates the brain and
all of its sensing parts as co-constitutive—meaning that the brain and body move together
and that they move each other in ways that shape the body to be receptive of matter. This
shaping – goaded by relational exploration – alters drastically the presence and character
of matter as it can be known. Subjects are said to be embodied because the self is made
up of a myriad of sensing systems feeding it situational information to locate the body
within a milieu of sense-able conditions. Over time these sense-able conditions plasticize
within the dynamically functioning brain resulting in a sensible world. This process
(plasticity) not only constitutively renders the subject it also renders matter. Subjects are
also embedded ecosocially. Humans look to culture, language and the behavior of others
with known identities for further clues to fill in and animate the embodied experiences
that they encounter.
Sensation in this model is an active (Noe uses the term “enactive’) and ongoing
process of meaning making, as opposed to something that is passive or transitory as the
cognitivist model would suggest. What results is a “solipsistic” brain (Freeman, Shapiro)
that nevertheless renders expectancy-laden reductions of the world based on its ongoing
explorations of it. As Maturana and Varela put it embodiment suggests that “ … only

59

those external environmental differences capable of being sensed and made sense of by
an autonomous system can be said to exist for that system, can be said to make up the
world of that system” (Protevi, 2009, p. 16). The kinds of explorations available
ultimately dictate the kinds of matter perceived. Arguably, no form of exploration is more
salient or repetitive for the brain than language.
Shapiro insists that it is important not to completely replace cognitivism with
embodied-embedded reasoning (much like the noun status of “matter,” or the symbolic
capacities of language, cognitivism remains an inordinately important fantasy); but the
embodied-embedded approach problematizes several aspects of the “man in his boat” and
ultimately prompts a whole new kind of thinking about subject production, meaning
making, and how the human world matters. Most simply, it argues that the individual and
the boat are the same stuff. They come to be, together. In the words of noted
neurophilosopher Walter J. Freeman (1995), they are “con-substantial” (p. 28). The body
(and very importantly the motivated actions of that body) and consciousness (our sensed
state of being in the world) are intimately entwined via innumerable fibers (existing and
spontaneously developing) of feedforward and feedback processing. The “pilot” model of
cognitivism gets replaced with a “control” model,7 in which a massive percentage of the
work of navigating the world gets “outsourced” to the body. Scent, sight, sound, touch,
7 Borrowed from Glenberg (in Campbell 2008) who argues “… high level cognition is based on neural
systems that control action, neural systems that control perception, and neural systems that control
emotion. And this is in contrast to the previous 40 years or so in cognitive psychology where the
Presumption has been that those high level cognitions have been analyzed humans [as Descartes
“Cogito” suggests] as a separate sort of ability: something that’s unique to humans, perhaps something
that required particular evolutionary changes” (1).
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balance—these are no longer discrete interactions controlled at all times by the brain (the
boat is no long “driven” by an otherwise separate “man”), instead they are modes of
abstraction that inform what David Eagleman (2011) has likened to a “team of rivals” 8
that all shout at once in our brain. The senses and other faculties thus tell us not only
where we are, what we see, what we smell, and how we feel, but also what we know,
what we don’t know, what we are thinking about, and even what we think about all of this
thinking. Our sense-abilities constitute the many various pieces of equipment that we
need in order to be – to live (an idea that makes all kinds of sense if you are familiar with
the work of Kenneth Burke).
Eagleman has likened the resulting shift in understanding regarding human being
and human agency that is coupled with the rise of embodied-embedded thinking to the
jolts sent through the sciences when the “geocentric” view of the solar system got
replaced by a “heliocentric” one. Initially the idea that there were multiple points of
motion in the sky was too complicated, too preposterous to consider seriously. By
observing the moons of Jupiter, Copernicus discovered and was able to prove empirically
bodies in space do in fact orbit other bodies. Therefore, the Earth could not be the very
center of the Universe. Once this indisputable proof existed, what ensued was over four
centuries of an “accelerating slide from the center, [that deposited] us firmly as a speck in
the visible universe, which contains 500 million galaxy groups, 10 billion large galaxies,
100 billion dwarf galaxies, and 2,000 billion billion suns” (Eagleman, 2011, p. 14). In
8

Drawing on Doris Kearns Goodwin’s popular history of Lincoln’s cabinet.
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very similar fashion, it was once thought that a thinking, being “sat” somewhere inside
the human body acting as the focal point of our understanding of ourselves. What
embodied-embedded research has yielded time after time is that the “you” at the center of
your being is not a cohesive whole, but rather a somehow, seemingly, unified by a
positively dizzying array of active, expectant, associative, and reductive sense-loops. As
one neurologist put it, “I think the idea of what is ‘you’ is an outdated term, based upon
the idea that we are conscious, rational human beings … we have choices within the
limits of our biology” (Burton interviewed in Campbell, 2008).
Burton’s emphasis on the limitations of our biology is important when it comes to
making sense of the world before us. We are, after all, limited almost exclusively to the
equipment that we have “on us” at the time. But embodied-embedded thought also
emphasizes the resilient plasticity of the human brain. Plasticity, according to Noe (in
Campbell, 2009), is “the brain’s ability to change itself in response to novelty.” The brain
was once thought to stay more or less stagnant after a theoretical “critical period” of
development was eclipsed. It is now readily accepted that the brain does – in fact must –
physically change in accordance with our ongoing experiences over time. 9 And these
changes are by no means incidental or periphery 10. In many cases neural changes
9 Thanks primarily to the research pioneered by Recanzone et al, 1992 which demonstrated neural
topographic reorganization in the brains of owl monkeys trained to discriminate signals in novel
auditory as well as tactile stimulus.
10 Though it could be noted here that University of Oregon neuroscientist Helen Neville has extended the
implications of Recanzone et al into peripheral sight and hearing, demonstrating that plasticity is most
likely linked to the especially acute peripheral sight in the congenitally deaf as well as to the especially
acute peripheral hearing in the congenitally blind.
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developed over even short periods of time lead to wholesale phenomenological
differences in sensing and action potentials.
Perhaps the most startling example of the brain’s ability to rapidly acquire new
sensory capabilities comes from the work of Paul Bach-y-Rita. 11 Bach-y-Rita was an
engineer and physiologist interested in restoring sight to people stricken blind. He
essentially wanted to make prostheses for sight. Initial efforts linked a pad placed on
one’s back with thousands of tiny electrodes to a movie camera. The electrodes worked
similarly to pixels on a screen conveying intensities and movement, translating what was
picked up by the camera into tactile touch on the skin of the blind participants. Initial
trials were incredibly frustrating and early participants showed practically zero
adaptability even over extended periods of time. This continued until one very important
moment occurred. Apparently, in a fit of frustration, one blind participant walked over to
the movie camera, picked it up, and started moving it around. This had profound
consequences. Within hours participants who not only experienced the stimulation but
who also controlled the motion of the camera were able to swat a moving ping pong ball,
to pick up items off of factory-style conveyor belts, even to discriminate people, objects,
and animals from across the room. This finding confirmed an earlier influential study
conducted by Held and Hein (1963) that linked full visual development in kittens to selfactuated mobility 12. Lacking human test histories, the extent of the effect was completely
11 Found in Campbell, 2009 and many more.
12 In a rather gruesome series of experiments Held and Hein (1963) yoked kittens together during their
brief critical period of development so that one kitten was actively controlling a shared visual field
while the other kitten was only passively exposed. Only the kitten with active control over the visual
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unexpected. Exposure, it turns out, is necessary but not sufficient to the full sensory
perception. By coupling exposure with action (action that is laden with expectancy and
which establishes an innumerable amount of measurable relationships), the brain can
incorporate whole new sensorial suites into its repertoire.
The reliance on self-actuated motion for sensory acquisition is what leads Noe to
refer to embodied-embedded cognition as an “Enactive” theory. Coupling action with
sensation enables not only feedback (from the nerves themselves) but also feedforward
(from the brain). Feedforward is colloquially explained by Blakeslee and Blakeslee
(2007) who suggest that as sensation is fed back to the brain “each area [of the brain that
is involved] asks ‘Is this what I expect? Is this what I predict? Does this conform to what
I already know is the case?’ … brain is constantly comparing information to what it
already knows or expects or believes” (p. 41). These processes obviously occur at electrochemical speeds making the entire “discussion” in the brain appear instead as a cohesive
present. Blakeselee and Blakeselee emphasize that that feedback fibers from the
speculative and creative brain appear to outnumber feedback fibers to the brain by as
much as ten to one (Ibid). This suggests that a large bulk of the world as we “see” it
exists, not because as Descartes’ boat metaphor suggests the world exists apart from us,
but because of the expectations, interpretations, and fabrications of the brain.

Field developed full sight. The passive kitten was not blind, per se, but it did manifest marked
debilitations.
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Bach-y-Rita could not restore sight as it was before 13 but it was “sight” of a kind
that was created and sustained by the brain despite having only short periods of
experience and despite the fact that the participants in most cases were otherwise fully
developed adults. Noe points out “it’s not as though the skin is being wired up to the
brain in a new way” (Campbell, 2009, p. 13). Instead the two senses anchored by
motivated actions somehow made new sense. This sense was possible only because of the
embodied (autonomous explorative) potentials of the participants, and because of the
“controlling” mechanisms of the brain, which resiliently understands and reduces even
novel sensation into meaningful sense throughout our lives.
New sense is made, “scaffolded,” via the brain’s exuberant plasticity in all sorts of
ways including no doubt many which we have yet to discover. As Freeman put it, “brains
are creative. They do not wait passively like video cameras but actively stretch forth in
search of input” (1995, p. 38). Clark and Protevi alike use the term scaffolding to account
for the brain’s ability to acquire new sense making apparatuses. Add scaffolding to the
“soft-assembled” body (a body with ready-made “control” functions which compact a
staggering amount of feedback and feed-forward processing into simple, meaningful
sensation) and what was once a monumental computational task (the ability to adapt new
modes of sight, for example) becomes fairly straight-forward standard operating
procedure.

13 And it is important to note here that the health of the visual cortex is imperative for these prostheses to
work – congenitally blind patients cannot experience visual sensation in this way

65

Unlike a strict computational or cognitivist approach that requires a ready-made
inventory of the world around it, embodied-embedded cognitive approaches draw on
connectionist philosophies that animate the world to explain human sense-making.
Perhaps the most notable connectionist theories are those of James Gibson. Gibson took
an “ecological “ approach to perception in order to tackle one of the more complicated
questions of his day: how could a particularly shaped eye apparatus account for all of the
variable shapes, distances, and dimensions of the world that it is trying to account for?
Assuming a one to one representative translation from light point to eye, vision alone is
inadequate for the kinds of perspective taking that human eyes appear to provide. When
we look at objects we see not just light or no light, but also shape, color, motion, even (as
Burke would emphasize) character. Linear beams of light impacting a necessarily round
eyeball cannot explain all of this seeing. Gibson resolved this by suggesting that the
physical apparatus of the eye was not, as conventional wisdom suggested, the sole source
of vision in the brain.
The task of accounting for all of the potentially fluid kinds of surfaces that the eye
can account for at seemingly any distance gets much easier if we rank that information
stream among the astronomical sensing chorus of the brain. Not just the eye, but the
movement of the eye, and on top of that the movement of the head, neck, abdomen, even
knees, the precognitive dance that the body engages to look – all of the feedback that the
body gets locking motion and expectancy to stimulus – that makes sense! Sense is not
made predictively, and it is so not so much determined by the “lay of the land.” Instead,
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the understood motions of the body coupled with the lay of the land yields frictional
points of opportunity, affordances as Gibson famously called them, and presuming that
those friction points offer some sort of insight or another the world comes to be seen. The
brain, in mere microseconds, scrutinizes those affordance points and renders them as a
seemingly unified visual field which consists of chairs, tables, floors, ceilings, as well as
“up,” “down,” “coming,” “going,” and on.
An ecological, affordance-driven approach to sensation can be somewhat modeled
by considering pin-art toys. Popular among children and adults, pin art toys are simple
frames filled with potentially thousands of mounted dull pins. Any shape that one presses
into one side of the frame will be represented on the opposite side of the toy as the pins
conform to the pushing that they are receiving to various extents. No single pin is
responsible for the shape that emerges, let alone for the fact that that shape is interpreted
as a hand or a face. Instead it is all of the pins working in concert along with the
necessary animations of cultural and social interpretation that cobble together the
experience of seeing something. One might imagine that each pin represents a sense-loop
of the brain and that each pin communicates not only in vertical depth but also in various
forms of intensities. Only then can we begin to understand how complicated and
embodied sense-making is. Eagleman’s reliance on a cosmic metaphor to explain the
dissolution of the central “I” in embodied-embedded cognition is carefully chosen as the
ramifications of adding motion or character to the pin art toy example are exponential.
Each notion of sight (of which there are potentially millions) is not a one-to-one transfer
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of data, but a monumental assessment, speculation, reassessment and reduction.
We can replace the person-in-the boat metaphor with our example from the
previous chapter regarding rainbows. Again, the body does not brush against a rainbow,
as noun-form of matter; technically, rainbows do not exist. And yet they are seen. Not
because we look out from our “boat” of a body and encounter them, but because
perspective, motion, sensation, and salience renders them as real. There is no isolated
thing that can explain rainbows; they are not seen by a solitary figure in an otherwise
separated boat. Instead we have to account for water, light, bodies, thoughts,
perspectives, movement, and, of course, round sensing eyeballs. We do not see rainbows,
rainbows appear to us because of ALL of this. We can engage them “theoretically” before
ever actually witnessing them, pictures which “make visual sense” certainly help here,
but that kind of sense-making is nothing compared to the “real thing” in terms of the
impact it leaves in our minds. This is why when we “see it with our own eyes” we can
become so reluctant to challenge that perception.
All told there is no real knowing how many kinds of sense-making conversations
there may be going on in the brain at any one time, but one thing we do know is that a
massive majority of it takes place pre-cognitively (outside of conscious awareness). In
order to simply sit and read, the body has to account for the motions of the head to stay
upright as well as to facilitate reading, the motions of the arms compensating for weight
and shifts of positions, the steady flow of blood, the inhale and exhale of oxygen into the
lungs and on and on and on. This seemingly simple task boggles computational thinkers

68

and yet it becomes remarkably simple if we outsource the lion’s share to the body. The
muscle fibers in the neck and limbs participate in the body’s placement, firing nervous
commands to move the neck this way or that with hardly any participation from the brain
at all. The eyes move without being told, they are in fact always moving so as to inform
the ongoing chatter of feedback and feedforward. Meaningful sensation comes to us not
because it is there, necessarily, but because our moving bodies, as they are assembled,
scaffolded, and used, sense it.
Burton (2008) calls this unseen work that the body does to render conscious
existence the “hidden layer.” To Lakoff and Johnson (1999) it is the “cognitive preconscious.” The point is that the brain thinks all of the time, even when we are
unconscious and especially when we do not actively know that it is thinking. The brain is
listening to the carefully evolved more or less enthusiastically plastic sensing organs of
the body as they interpret their surrounds and collapse the story. It is actively scrubbing
biases and imperfections from view. The famous example here is the point in the center
of the eye that has no photo-receptive cells on it because of the bundles of fibers coming
together there. Technically speaking we should experience a blind spot in our vision and
yet most of us do not. Our brains even (often) lie to us.14 Sense can even be made in ways
that we as the sensing thing cannot detect. Blind-sight, for example, is a condition

14 Time is constantly being restructured in order to syncopate the world of conscious experience.
Technically speaking a baseball player should not see the ball that they hit until they have already
experienced hitting it and moved to drop the bat and run. And yet many ballplayers will attest to seeing
the moment of impact in the finest of detail. Most importantly, practically none of them report that they
see the ball after they hit it as they chronologically should.
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whereby someone who has suffered damage to the fusiform gyrus in the brain, which is
primarily responsible for our ability to detect and detail faces. Individuals afflicted with
this kind of damage upon being shown pictures of others will not be able to tell you if the
photo is of a man or a woman, they cannot tell you the color of the eyes or if they have a
pierced nose, nor can they tell you where that individual is looking. They can, however,
tell you (if they are forced to guess) with a remarkable degree of accuracy if the
individual they are “viewing” is happy, or sad. This is because sensed emotions
emanating from the faces that they are otherwise unable to see follow alternate routes to
our awareness (primarily through the amygdala) which do not require that we actually
see the face itself.
Neuroscientists emphasize how much of our conscious living is thus constructed.
The very feeling of embodiment, the feeling that we are in our body (or more particularly,
in our heads) is a sensation that is created for us by our brains. Proper stimulation to
various areas of the right temporal lobe produce the effect of the subject being wrenched
from their body and can even result in the sensation of looking down on the body from
above (Campbell, 2008, p. 14). Jet pilots, for instance, who experience just the right gforces for sustained periods of time will report almost uniformly that they were instantly
transported to the tail of their aircraft. They could see the plane, the ground, even their
own head in the cockpit, and they could still, amazingly, control the plane. They could
not, however, put themselves back into their own bodies until the g-forces subsided.
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It should be a little clearer now that sensation is not a one-to-one arrangement
between matter and sense. Instead, as Burton summarizes it, “modularity, combined with
a schematic hierarchical arrangement of increasingly complex layers of neural networks
and the concept of emergence serves as an excellent working model for how the brain
builds up complex perceptions, thoughts, and behaviors (p. 59). As Burton suggests, in
order to begin to piece together a picture of how this fluid, enactive sense making takes
place theorists have turned to dynamic complexity theory and emergence. It is not
essential that all of the “ins and outs” of emergence theory are understood to conceive of
language as a sense, but if the goal is to begin to answer questions like how do people use
language to be persuaded, or how determinate or constraining is material rhetoric, a
basic understanding is helpful.
The Dynamic Complexity Driving Emergence
In order to explain how the hidden layer turns embodied-embedded, enactive
sensation into consciousness, theorists in embodied cognition turn to perspectives of
emergence. Emergent perspectives are the outcome of dynamic complexity coupled with
plasticity. Complex systems are all the more complicated when they are dynamic, and the
brain is incredibly fluid. Not only is over 90% of it water, it also processes astronomical
numbers of intensity-guided feed-forward and feedback conversations in real time all
while dreaming, reading, gossiping, driving, talking, running, or what have you. In order
to do this all at once, the brain relies heavily on a hidden layer of cognition, itself a
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product of emergent logics, to somehow sort and ‘pass upwards15’ only the essential
components of conscious experience.
Emergence is defined (perhaps as well as it can be) by Clark as a process of
becoming rooted in organism-environment interactions that is takes place whenever
“interesting, non-centrally controlled behavior ensues as a result of the interactions of
multiple simple components within a system.” Pain is the quintessential example. There
is no single point in the brain that is responsible for painful feelings, it certainly is not the
stumped toe that hurts. Pain is best understood as something that is felt when certain
“voices” in Eagleman’s Team of Rivals discord just so. These voices are each products of
the nervous system and the electrical impulses that that system conveys but pain, itself, is
somehow “bigger” than any one voice. Pain is an excessively mal-tuned “chorus” that
requires a multitude of voices to function properly (or “improperly” as the case may be
here) to emerge. It is not a one-to-one correspondence with any part of the body, but
rather something that results when multiple parts of the body produce an overwhelming
sense of discord. Pain is positively real (calling it “interesting” seems to be an
understatement), but it is not located anywhere.
Like pain, lots of basic affective experiences are not anatomically discrete –
surprise and gratitude are frequent examples of “higher order” emotions that cannot be
stimulated into existence artificially (dependent as they are on complex social relations
15 Although direct hierarchies become difficult to maintain in embodied-embedded thinking goaded by
feedforward and feedback, scholars still rely on “upward” and “downward” notions of consciousness
primarily because no other descriptions suffice.
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for their production). And even though many other sensations are anatomically discrete
(the sense of certainty is my favorite “non-voluntary” affect) that does not mean that their
attachment to any particular experience is essential. Instead, these sensations are said to
emerge from a combination of experience, action, sensation, and world.
Emergent transitions cannot be thought of as predictable or even for that matter
describable from a causal point of view. Leo Tolstoy, in his many overlooked ethical
works (2008), likened the shifting of human consciousness to a pitcher gradually sinking
in a choppy body of water. It rocks back and forth, careening from extreme to extreme
seemingly randomly, and gradually filling from here or there with water. No single water
droplet sinks the vessel, and the sinking may take hours or it may happen all at once. Not
even the best physics models can tell exactly when or how or even if it will sink,
nevertheless the sinking happens and it happens in ways that we can study.
Similarly, isolating causation in emergent logics can be a tricky business. Clark
points out that
it is not that the emergent patterns are totally uncaused … rather it is that the
observed patterns are largely explained by collective behavior (under specified
conditions) of a large ensemble of simple components, none of which is playing a
special leading role in controlling or orchestrating the process of pattern
formation. (1997, p. 106)
Freeman emphasizes that emergent logics are non-linear. Apparently the
communicative power of neuropil (the tissue that, along with the electro-chemical
transmissions of the brain or “neuroactivity” makes up the primary functioning structures
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of the brain),16 does not even follow the first or second laws of thermo-dynamics 17
(Freeman, 1995, p. 33)! These systems are rhizomatically spontaneous and generative,
accumulating more and more neural topography, further facilitating future extensions,
connections, and understanding.
One path of study for emergent phenomenon is complexity theory. Complexity
theory attempts to explain how simple structures can more or less grow out of more
complicated interaction between various component parts of a system. Emphasizing the
importance of feedback loops in cultivating “basins of attraction” within a fluid dynamic,
complexity theory “renders merely unpredictable, rather than undetermined” the behavior
of vast systems (Protevi, 2007, p. 6). Feedback loops govern the development and
presentation of sensation. “Touch” (for example) is fed forward by the nervous system
but also fed back to the nervous system by the interpreting brain. Embodied subjects
(especially those endowed with symbolicity) engage the world with a huge variety of
morphologically developing capacities, capacities ultimately particularized by sensing
subjects. As repetitive sensations accumulate, salient “troughs” of normalcy become not
only more apparent but also more participatory. These accreted basins collect everything
that is “normal.” Experiences of this kind are presented consciously as “more of the
same” with little to no superficial novelty. If, however, the feedback/forward loops
16 In Freeman’s words “the tissue formed by neurons in brains which has emerged evolutionarily in only
three known cases. Molluscs (octopus), crustaceans and vertebrates, “always as the bases for adaptive,
goal-directed behavior.
17 The first law being that energy cannot be created nor destroyed, the second being that energy must
deteriorate via a process known as entropy.
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produce a groundbreaking new salient experience, it appears to us as a distinction and we
inspect or interpret it further – potentially to the point of valley-ing out into a “normal”
experience (creating a sensation of immediate normalcy out of what was initially
abnormal, aberrant, or “strange”).
The back and forth looping process helps explain why Protevi crafts the resulting
experience (entrainment, he calls it) as both diachronic (deliberative) and synchronic
(immanent). The “diachronic construction of functional structures in complex systems
[achieves] a synchronic focus of systemic behavior as [it constrains] the behavior of
individual components.” Protevi (2007) continues, “Synchronically arising or
developmentally appearing patterns are said to emerge when a system’s feedback loops
constrain the behavior of its parts so that a systematic focus of behavior becomes
possible” (p. 8). A rather crass step-by-step examination of toe-stubbing would suggest
that as the toe drives forward into whatever it is that it hits, the soft spongy tissue
communicates with the brain diachronically and the experience gets synchronically
experienced as pain. We do not exactly feel every piece of the toe as it connects with the
object causing the discomfort, nevertheless there is a very concise conversation flowing
back and forth between brain and nerves that tracks the contact points. As the gain of the
conversation increases (as the toe drives more and more into the object) the synchronic
realization of pain is, somehow, manifest in our conscious awareness as a focused
sensation of pain.

75

A key component of complexity driven emergence for Protevi and others
including Murphy and Brown (2007) is that so-called “whole” systems will ultimately
end up exhibiting non-summative characteristics, modes of operating that cannot be
reduced to a sum of that system’s parts and which may even prove to be
disproportionately systemically transformative. This is how, despite the embodied
solipsism of the brain, we can still detect a world outside of our own little bubble. If
humans had nothing but a cognitivistic computing brain they likely would live only
within the parameters of that computational system. By constantly stretching into the
world in so many innumerable ways the brain can account for things that otherwise
would not exist. This not only includes our sensing of the identities of Others (which will
be the focus of a later chapter on ethics) but also the ability to use scientific exploration
to detect natural phenomenon that otherwise are undetectable to the human body.
Conclusion
This chapter attempted to increase the reader’s understanding of the complicated,
non-linear, interpretive, and creative capacities of sensation. Just as with the transition
from the symbol model to one of constitutive articulate contact in the understanding of
communication scholars, the transition from a cognitivist approach to an embodiedembedded approach in the cognitive science world comes fraught with new consequences
for matter. Rather than being something that is contained and transmitted, in language (in
particular) or in sensation (in general), matter becomes something that is fabricated as it
is felt by an enactive, meaning making brain. Matter can be sensed all sorts of ways, but
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never – ever – directly. It is always interpreted, “filled in,” reduced, and fed-upwards into
consciousness by the circuits of the body. One of the many implications of this
perspective is that it obliterates almost completely the cognitivist ambition for objective
thought. As Burton puts it, “feelings such as certainty, conviction, rightness, wrongness,
clarity, and faith arise out of involuntary [hidden-layer] mental sensory systems that are
integral and inseparable components of the thoughts they qualify” (p. 139). “Certainty,”
Burton concludes “is not a biologically justifiable state of mind, because there is no such
thing as an isolated circuit in the brain that can engage in thought free from involuntary
and undetectable influences” (p. 141). There is no “man” apart from his boat; once again
the person and the boat are the same stuff.
My argument for this dissertation is that language should be situated as sensorial.
Whenever someone is trying to “make sense” of something, perhaps that individual has
just witnessed something she has never seen before, her linguistic explorations that
attempt to “resolve” what was seen make sense. If that same individual has seen
something like what she is trying to understand (sense-made), she will draw on that
experience to categorize and characterize whatever it is that she is trying to make sense
of. This is possible because these remembered experiences, these perspectives, have been
incorporated (cognitive theorists use the term “scaffolded”) into her brain and they can
thus be wielded through symbolicity.
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Chapter Three: Metaphoric Sense Making
And however important to us is the tiny sliver of reality each of us has
experienced first-hand, the whole over-all “picture” is but a construct of our
symbol-systems. To meditate on this fact until one sees its full implications is
much like peering over the edge of things into an ultimate abyss. And doubtless
that’s one reason why, though [hu]man is typically the symbol-using animal, [it]
clings to the kind of naïve verbal realism that refuses to fully realize the full
extent of the role played by symbolicity in [its] notions of reality. (Burke, 1963, p.
493)
This dissertation began by asking the question “how does communication
matter?” This chapter attempts a crude demonstration. I argued in Chapter One that
rhetoricians are struggling to account for the “new materialism” inherent in the Marxist
tradition; that missing in “transcendent” approaches (framed by those in Blair’s first
material stance) is an account of the differences among individuals; and that the
approaches which do attempt to account for individuals (like those in Blair’s second and
third material stances) are in need of a more robust embodied-embedded logic. Chapter
Two attempted to trace the debate between cognitivism and embodied-embedded
cognition – suggesting that the material consequences from this shift are strikingly
similar to those resulting from the move between the symbol model and the model of
language as constitutive articulate contact. Complexity theory and emergence were
offered as the grounding logic for an embodied-embedded approach to language, what is
still missing is a working example.
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This chapter examines the work of Lakoff and Johnson and Kenneth Burke in
light of the joint shifts in communication scholarship and cognitive science in the hopes
of exploring the role of metaphor in human meaning making. While metaphor is hardly a
comprehensive example of the kinds of mattering that language might bring about, it is,
for the purposes of this project, more than just a convenient one. Language, to the extent
that it is symbol and concept driven, is inherently metaphoric - nevertheless, words make
real sense. They make spatial sense, performative sense, temporal sense, emotional sense
(including the emotive sensations of conviction and knowing), and more. And the kinds
of sense making that we use most – the kinds that “make the most sense” – matter the
most when it comes to the kinds of worlds that we can “see” in the future. Reliable
perspectives matter, whether they are ultimately true or not.
Language’s mattering via metaphor (the scaffolded understandings that humans
rely upon based on their ongoing metaphoric engagements with the world) isolates
symbol-use, “symbolicity” as Burke called it, among all of our other sense-abilities as an
especially generative material process. Language is remarkably resilient, spontaneous,
transformative, and exuberant. More importantly language is fundamental to human
existence. Burke and Lakoff and Johnson alike draw on metaphor because it is the most
“ordinary form of analysis” (Burke, 1954, p. 95; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 3). Any
comparison of experiences is inherently a comparison of perspectives, each prompting
potentially numerous realizable (and thus material) outcomes. It is the ubiquity and
limitless potentials of metaphoric understanding that makes metaphor such a fascinating
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subject for rhetorical scholars and embodied-embedded thinkers alike. The plasticity and
sensory acquisition studies discussed in Chapter Two (particularly the work of Bach-yrita) emphasized that repetitive, salient, meaningful and purposeful sense-making can
quickly yield new sensorial abilities, literally affording the blind a sort of sight.
Experimentation on kittens discussed in Chapter Two also suggested that the inverse
potential is also possible; certain kinds of engagement with the world can leave an
otherwise healthy individual completely blind.
This chapter begins by examining the emphasis on metaphoric thought as a
critical and practical embodied-embedded practice in the influential works of Kenneth
Burke and Lakoff and Johnson. Next, I hope to explicate the ways that perspective-use
makes sense in an embodied-embedded approach, particularly with regards to language.
This explication happens in two steps. First, I unpack how conceptual scaffolding and
motivated action guide sense making by examining the dexterity of the human hand. The
“grasping” of something hidden, say in our pocket, is very much like the linguistic
“groping about” that goes on when we try to “make sense” of events in the world, most
notably with regard to the actions of others. I attempt to use this metaphor to understand
metaphors themselves as a form of “grasping” at the world.
This “grasping,” depending on how it is carried out, can make some “surfaces”
(like race, or class) “visible” to some and not to others. I argue, along with Burton, that
we must have “sympathy for our biology” (in Campbell, 2008). This argument should not
be read deterministically. My argument places the ability to see in practice which, in
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theory, can and does change. The lives that people have lived assist them in “seeing”
something that, for others, is completely absent. This explains how various individuals
might look at a shooting, for example, and arrive at very different understandings of
whether or not it was racially motivated. This is a reality that is not owed to a particular
person’s indifference (though no small amount of indifference is required to persist in
such mindsets once they are exposed and openly scrutinized). Humans have the ability to
look at a shooting “as if” it were racist or, if they insist, “as if” it were not. The choices
we make when presented with all of the alternative perceptions of others matter.
And in that regard this chapter is designed to be suggestive of the kinds of ethical
conundrums that a natural dependence upon rhetorical sense making entails. I implore the
reader, as Burke has, to use the power of metaphor to inexhaustibly convert “villains”
into “fools.” Burke’s method of “humble comic irony” (Simmons, 2009; Jablonski, 2000)
makes “fools” out of all of us by emphasizing how “foolish” incapacities practically and
sensibly evolve in ways that can either lift us to the stars or threaten us with extinction.
This approach finds no fault beyond our utter dependence on our symbolic grasping and
it emphasizes the potential not only for progress but also embarrassment afforded to those
who would use symbols to criticize the world in which they live.
Making Sense Metaphorically
Two approaches to linguistic sense-making via an embodied-embedded
perspective already exist that rely heavily on metaphor as method. The first approach was
provided by literary-critic-cum-philosopher Kenneth Burke. Hawhee (2009) has
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demonstrated the influence of Paget’s gesture-speech theory (an early and influential
precursor to embodied-embedded cognitive studies) within Burke’s complicated thought.
According to Hawhee, Burke drew upon the body as integral to the sense-making that
informs our symbolic thought. She argues that “… Burke’s meditations on verbal
choreography produce … an extension of Paget by which linguistic dance develops in
reciprocal, mimetic relation between and among biological, psychological, and linguistic
processes” (p. 118). As I discussed in Chapter One, Hawhee figures the term in a way that
is “postural” and “somatic” (Ibid). Identification 18, “so frequently figured by scholars as
a sheerly social formation, first presented itself to Burke as an alliance formed between
sounds made through similar laryngeal postures or through physical mimesis” (p. 117).
Other sympathetic readings of Burke (Brock, Davis) have begun speculating on the
ontological implications for symbolicity that arise when identification is so conceived;
likewise this chapter attempts to ground identification in human physiology and sensemaking. Arguably one of Burke’s more encompassing terms, identification essentially
refers to the emergence of a more-often-than-not uncontested (but otherwise incredibly
problematic) socially embedded self. While identification primarily occurs at a preconscious level (what Lakoff and Johnson might dub the cognitive unconscious),
sociality and symbolic action nevertheless play important roles (Burke,1941b, p. 227) and
metaphoric understanding is at the heart of that relational participation.
18 Identification is a complicated term in Burkean logology which includes “one’s material and mental
ways of placing oneself as a person in the world … one’s ways of seeing one’s reflection in the social
mirror” (1941b, 227).

82

The second approach to metaphor was provided by linguist George Lakoff and
philosopher-ethicist Mark Johnson. Lakoff and Johnson’s approach to metaphor has
inspired rhetorical and embodied-embedded thinkers alike to focus on analogic thought
as a “scaffolding” of an embodied brain that is profoundly constitutive. In other words,
metaphors are not simply “thought experiments” or “mere” poetry. They matter
substantively in ways that can be at the same time constraining and liberating. Lakoff and
Johnson, in fact, argue that metaphors are perceptual: “the concepts that govern our
thought are not just matters of the intellect. They also govern our everyday functioning,
down to the most mundane details. Our concepts structure what we perceive ...” (1980, p.
3, emphasis added).
Indeed, one prominent embodied-embedded thinker, Glenberg, credits the forcefulness of
Lakoff and Johnson’s analysis of language (as well as the same histories of affordancedriven models of cognition developed by James Gibson discussed in Chapter Two) for an
experimental explosion of neurology and cognitive psychology work that tests how the
body draws on basic experiences to arrive at meaning. Glenberg summarizes the link
between metaphoric conceptualization and perception and cognitive operation:
Because of the sort of bodies that we have we are able to investigate containers;
for example, using our fingers to feel the inside of a container and the outside of a
container. And by virtue of that common experience of containers over the course
of development, we develop what Lakoff calls an image schema for a container.
And that image schema is not only visual but also has motoric components to it
and, in Lakoff’s thinking, has a logic, part of the logic being that something can
be inside the container or outside the container but not both at the same time.
(Glenberg, 2008, p. 6)
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It turns out that metaphors share a great deal with sensing in general. Metaphors
draw on selectively reduced understandings of prior experience in ways that create
symmetry as well as insightful opposition. From this perspective, it is not so much the
content of a metaphor, as it is the oppositional or sympathetic understandings that stem
from its use that grants it meaning. Similarly, it is not the content of the light that hits the
eyes that generates a rainbow; it is the way the physical apparatus of the eye records the
opposing experience rooted in action. Both rainbows and meaningful metaphors appear
to us not because they are “out there,” but because we make sense of them.
Embodied-embedded experimentation 19 suggests that the direction of motion, the
force of motion, and even the character of motion (whether the incoming motion was a
“warm embrace” or an “assault”) all rely upon embodied motoric components that preempt so-called rational thinking. In other words, we know whether or not an incoming
action is aggressive, long before we can make sense of it in conscious awareness certainly long before we see it in our visual realm. Understanding character, these studies
suggest, is neurologically and motorically prior to seeing. This suggests that metaphor is
more or less rooted in sensation, and that sensation is metaphorical. Or as Protevi put it in
Chapter Two, we do not sense the world, we sense the world “as if.”
Burke and Lakoff and Johnson arrive at definitions of metaphor that are very
similar and they each emphasize the embodied-embedded nature of metaphoric thought.
Burke and Lakoff and Johnson alike emphasize the relational and character-driven
19 For an enjoyable and comprehensive summary see Glenberg (2008).
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presumptions of metaphoric thought and they all use as their foundation the potential
material consequences. For Burke (1945), “metaphor is a device for seeing something in
terms of something else. It brings out the thisness of a that, or the thatness of a this” (p.
503). Lakoff and Johnson (1980) argue, “the essence of metaphor is understanding and
experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another” (p. 5). For Lakoff and Johnson
metaphors are a kind of action, and for Burke their visualization takes place within the
framework of dramatism. 20
What is perhaps most important to note with both definitions is that they stand in
stark contrast to cognitivist or symbol-driven models of sensing. For Burke and Lakoff
and Johnson, the ability to sense predicates material rendering, not universal truths. In
contrast to cognitivist or symbol models of human understanding (which Burke dubs
“scientific realism”), for instance, Burke (1941) offers “poetic realism” which posits “that
characters possess degrees of being in proportion to the variety of perspectives from
which they can with justice be perceived” (p. 423). This perspective can account for the
as if mattering of rainbows and rhetorical surfaces alike and it situates that mattering
intimately in everyday human thought and practice.

20 In other words, “seeing” for Burke involved “... some kind of answers to these five questions: what was
done (act), when or where it was done (scene), who did it (agent), how did [they do] it (agency), and
why (purpose)” (1945, xv). Burke went so far as to include “attitude” or the “manner” sensed (443),
thus bringing his act of interpreting very much in line with what one might imagine when prompted
with Lakoff & Johnson’s “understanding and experiencing.”
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While there are many notable similarities between the two approaches to
metaphor the distinct approaches of each have been so influential that a brief overview of
each is warranted.
The Thisness of a That
Kenneth Burke’s logology of dramatism draws heavily on perspective for
ontological substance as well as epistemological and hermeneutical development
(Brock). Understanding metaphor means understanding A’s character (any thing, pattern,
situation, structure, nature, person, object, act, role, process, event, etc., attributable to A)
from the perspective of B. The ability to shift perspectives is not insignificant for Burke:
Such shifts of interpretation make for totally different pictures of reality, since
they focus the attention upon different orders of relationship. We learn to single
out certain relationships in accordance with the particular linguistic texture into
which we are born, though we may privately manipulate this linguistic texture to
formulate still other relationships. (Burke, 1954, p. 36).
Herein, we see a vision of reality that is not bound by essence but is in fact “motivated”
or “attitudinal.” Perspectives can be manipulated in various ways to prompt new
considerations of “what’s out there” but only to the extent that those new moments of
transcendence can be “fitted” into the “textures” already established (ibid). Metaphorical
understandings of experience thus become central not only for our current experiencing
of the world, but also for any and all transformations of “the future” that we might
imagine or willingly conceptually occupy.
To this point, Burke’s dramatism may appear deterministic: if we can only “make
sense” of the world to the extent that we can metaphorically frame it inside an
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attitudinally-enhanced pentad, then we are more or less bound to things “just the way
they are,” or, at least, “as we see them.” And, indeed, in Chapter Two I discussed how –
to an extent – the sensing brain is ultimately solipsistic. But the brain is also profoundly
generative, and Burke redundantly emphasizes that humans are especially clever and
dexterous in our ability to sense new meaning, by making use of a perspective making
process:
By deliberate coaching and criticism … characters can be considered tentatively,
in terms of other characters, for experimental or heuristic purposes. Examples
may be offered at random: for instance, human motivation may, with varying
degrees of relevance and reward, be considered in terms of conditioned reflexes,
or chemicals, or the class struggles, or the love of God, or neurosis, or pilgrimage,
or power, or movements of the planets, or geography, or sun spots, etc. (Burke,
1945, p. 504).
The magic of metaphor, Burke (1954) argues, is that it works by revealing “hitherto
unsuspected connectives ... [appealing] by exemplifying relationships between objects
which our customary rational vocabulary has ignored” (p. 90). Otherwise distinguished
conceptual screens can be overlaid on top of each other, at once constraining and
inevitably freeing auto-poetic thought at the same time.
The ability to shift metaphorical lenses dramatisically, and to explore (as
Nietzsche has) the destructibility of literally every symbol-driven reality now becomes a
profoundly transformative but equally frustrating skill for human agents. The kinds of
sense we can make are broadened as we are constantly imagining new angles or ways of
seeing which require no more biological adaptation than a willingness to think it through.
As humans “break” acceptable linkages, an opportunity for “analogical extension” opens,
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and each metaphoric lens has entailments that to varying degrees do and do not make
sense in the new context in which they are used. Each effort to re-examine a problem or
potential from an alternate perspective might yield confirmatory, or equally enlightening
contradictory, information, thus “solidifying” what we feel we know about the everelusive substance at the center.
In explaining this potential, Burke’s flamboyant writing style serves him well. To
emphasize not only the scope of the ability at hand but also the patience required to truly
entertain that potential the point warrants quoting at length. Unfortunately, the
conventions of publication and citation prohibit this. Instead, the reader should peruse at
her leisure (or ideally, at her insistence) pages 119 to 122 of Permanence and Change,
where Burke describes the “cracking” process to which language should be subjected.
Burke exhaustively lists some of the ways that metaphor can help us make sense, by
turning “mastodons into microbes” or by revealing the “brilliance” of mosquitos. Disease
might well be thought of as an “accomplishment” and one could fruitfully trace the
development of medicine through a careful analysis of quackery. Essentially, Burke
(1954) advocates here for the “merging of things which common sense had divided and
dividing things which common sense had merged” (p. 113), not only to solve problems
that we know we have, but also to “see” things we could not have possibly imagined
before. The frustrating thing about summarizing Burke in this regard is that doing so
skips the actual sense-making that readers do as they wade through his writing. No
summary can render the argument as Burke has, and yet his rendering is but one (lengthy
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and wonderfully challenging) interpretation of a method that really could go on and on
and on.
Burke’s development of metaphor underscores how symbolicity is a form of
contact that renders very real sense on/in the human mind. We should on the one hand be
weary of any one voice telling us that it knows the way to go - that kind of minding being
counter-productive in a heuristic model emphasizing truly frivolous exploration - but on
the other hand we have to want to know what it means to, as Burke put it, find
“Napoleonic” (as opposed to, say, merely McClellan-ian?) features in one’s dog. While
we want to be pliable and insatiable in our analogical extensions, we at the same time,
have to acknowledge that this methodology also suggests that the more we know about
Napoleon, the more we may come to know about our dog. Confusing things more, the
“this” and “that” of the “thisness of that” are at once substantive and arbitrary ...
depending upon your perspective.
Burke suggests ways to draw on and to goad our development that contain hints
of pedagogy21, but it is here his practical epistemology essentially stops. Developing
exercises or techniques for broadening perspective (or otherwise taking advantage of the
lessons of this new approach to language) will be part of Chapter Four. For now I need
only to point out that insisting that the world “is what it is,” is perhaps the only way to do
metaphor wrong.

21
For example, see Burke’s “contest” to “fill out” a metaphor, in Burke 1973, p. 145.
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A system that situates metaphor so sensorially is unkind to individuals who lack
the patience, the good faith, the doggedness, and the genuine curiosity to exhaustively
engage and explore each “new” iteration they confront, all the while doing what they can
to keep track of all of the old. If we chose, for instance, never to entertain what it means
to feel Napoleonic (if we never imagine ourselves dramatistically identifying to the fullest
and most varied of extents that we are able with the diminutive genius/murderer), then we
can only sense so much about our dog. Conversely, each effort to make sense of the
French general potentially scaffolds senseable knowledge of pets, sports, human space
exploration, or whatever.
The forms that historians, hobbyists, internet “trolls,” and other participants use to
make sense of him, either in “actuality” or “merely conceptually,” cumulatively form a
kind of terrain that those interested traverse and erode. For the disinterested, even the
most thorough of inspection will yield next to zero geographic knowledge. For those who
find themselves unable to do anything but wonder what Napoleon was really like (either
because they love history, or because they love the era, or because they love military
strategy, or because they love historical perspectives on masculinity, or because of
anything else), the scaffolding they have accrued seems to enable them to walk
knowingly along all the related symbolic terrain in the dark. And, to a remarkable extent
(owed completely to the scaffolded understandings that came before), this is exactly what
this scaffolding does. There will no doubt be catastrophic missteps, but for those enabled
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by prior symbolic experiences that they relish, “feeling our way” into the unknown can
be remarkably rewarding.
Confounding the issue still further is the fact that arguers will frequently feel like
they are “comprehensively” identifying with Napoleon in a study of their pooch, but in
“reality,” what is going on is the arguer is drawing on incomplete or grossly reduced
biases (say about, “French people”). Worse still, arguers will - when exposed - cling to or
ignore perspectival blindness for the sake of proving a point. As Buber puts it, instead of
pursuing destiny, the convinced will only doom themselves to a self-selected fate.
Failing to know all of the Napoleonic features of one’s pet may not seem like the end of
the world (though there may be benefits in thinking of ways that it might be!). But as we
shall soon see in our case study, selective blindness (particularly that predicated on
privilege) “matters” in ways that, once informed, we should not continue to allow to be
ignored.
In conclusion, Burke’s development of metaphor elicits the embodied-embeddedness of all rhetoric:
… our minds, as linguistic products, are composed of concepts (verbally molded)
which select certain relationships as meaningful. Other groups may select other
relationships as meaningful. These relationships are not realities, they are
interpretations of reality - hence different conclusions as to what reality is.
(Burke, 1954, p. 35)
Like it or not, all of these realities matter. Burke’s emphasis on embodiment
drives at the visceral, the affective, the phenomenological components of metaphors in
human being. Lakoff and Johnson take a much more conceptual (but no less embodied)
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approach when they confront the force that metaphor exerts upon our thinking. Unlike
Burke that implicates the participatory nature of the body and viscera in rendering the
stuff of experience, Lakoff and Johnson focus on the conceptual forms of constraint that
metaphoric sense-making entails.
Metaphors We Live By
In 1980, University of California Berkeley linguist George Lakoff and University
of Oregon philosopher Mark Johnson released a deceptively simple text that has had
enormous influence across a wide array of academic disciplines. Examining the
systematicity of the Metaphors We Live By, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) argue (in a move
that excited constitutive rhetoricians and embodied-embedded scholars alike) that
our conventional ways of talking about arguments …our very concept of an
argument … is not poetic, fanciful, or rhetorical; it is literal. We talk about
arguments [a certain way] because we conceive of them that way - and we act
according to the way we conceive of things. (p. 5)
This approach positions language as material in ways that ingratiates Lakoff and
Johnson to symbolic “constructivists” (Pfohl, 2008), rhetorical materialists (explored
throughout Chapter One), and embodied-embedded cognitive thinkers (reviewed in
Chapter Two) alike. Conceiving of an argument for instance as a “war” as opposed to a
“soup,” changes, materially, the potentials for that all important activity. As with Burke,
Lakoff and Johnson position metaphor in a way that accounts for how language operates
materially on/with the mind.
Rescuing deliberative thinking from the neglect it received in the Enlightenment,
Lakoff and Johnson (1980) argue that
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From a biological perspective, it is eminently plausible that reason has grown out
of the sensory and motor systems and that it still uses those systems or structures
developed from them ... it is only from a conservative philosophical position that
one would want to believe in the old faculty psychology - in the idea that the
human mind has nothing about it that animals share, that reason has nothing about
it that smells of the body. (p. 43)
Before we ever have a chance to “coolly” reason, to think “objectively” or to separate our
emotions from the facts, the cognitive unconscious (what neurologist Robert Burton has
dubbed the hidden layer) orientationally performs everything we sense - from the
“things” we sense in the world to the sense that we are sensing, to the sense that we are
sensing as an “embrained” being (2008). The body becomes an active participant in our
thinking; even the most “sterilized” of formal methods “bleeds out” into the affective
mulch of subjective thought.
For embodied-embedded thinkers (Shapiro, Noe, Glenberg, Pfeifer & Bongard),
the brain has always been necessary to an understanding of consciousness, but it cannot
be sufficient. A brain-first approach lacks the ability to explain the ways that the
environment of the embrained can change, including the innumerable ways that the
environment can change based on how we actively “view” it. Humans change their
conceptual reasoning about science, for example, by drawing on technology metaphors.
At one point the brain was thought of as a clock, now most people frame it as a computer.
Both perspectives are equally bankrupt, as the brain is massively more dynamic and
complex (and not to mention biological) than either clocks or computers, but at the same
time both perspectives make some sense. New metaphorical understandings of
technology invariably prompt new insight, and new blind spots. This suggests that the
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shapes of reason have an effect on the shapes of our brains, and because reason feels
more or less indeterminate, so, too, is the brain.
From this standpoint, the linguistic artifacts known as metaphors offer us a
glimpse into the realities of humanity that is every bit as “authoritative” as a meticulously
crafted chemical experiment. Ten years before the discovery of mirror neurons, Lakoff
and Johnson (1999) discovered in metaphor-use a systematicity that linked expression
and reason to bodily experience, beginning with “categorization.” Experience, they argue,
is “inseparable” from categories, and concepts:
Since we are neural beings, our categories are formed through our embodiment.
What that means is that the categories we form are part of our experience. They
are the structures that differentiate aspects of our experience into discernible
kinds. Categorization is thus not a purely intellectual matter, occurring after the
fact of experience. Rather, the formation and use of categories is the stuff of
experience. It is part of what our bodies and brains are constantly engaged in. We
cannot, as some meditative traditions suggest, “get beyond” our categories....
(Lakoff & Johnson, p. 19, emphasis in original).
Our bodies speak to us in highly reductive, experientially motivated 22 ways. “Reality” is,
by and large, body-made.
This means that foundational experiences such as time, events and causes, the
mind, the self, morality, ontology, coherence, truth, objectivism, subjectivism and action
all appear to us not as they are, but rather - “as-if.” The character of the good/bad “as-if”
of each experience is predicated on relatable experiential prior states (and even
“recorded” across generations) to give the otherwise arbitrary nature of “up” and “down”
22
Though again I insist that it would be useful, it is not my intent at the moment to suggest a reference to
Burke’s usage of motive.
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coherent meaning. Language, then, becomes an important place to begin to interrogate
the nature of our sensical reductions; and nowhere in language do these reductions
present themselves more plainly than in our uttered or implied metaphorical concepts.
Lakoff and Johnson ultimately develop a “Philosophy of the Flesh,” which
emphasizes the importance of sensorimotor input in reasoning and understanding.
Reasoning is not “simply thinking,” it is a very active and reductive doing of the brain
that relies on our recollections and re-performances of the as-if past. Mirror neuron
research seems to vindicate the idea that many (if not most) of the same components that
go in to the “actual” doing of life are animated when we do “conceptually” – reading the
word “spoon” and encountering and using spoons both rely on the parts that engage
spoons (or other spoon-ish things). The question of moral responsibility (the necessary
foundation for any and all pedagogy) then
… is understood metaphorically on the basis of our experience of more bodily
responses. We do not project all of the structure of the experience of automatic,
reflex responses onto the moral realm, since choice of alternative bodily responses
introduces a crucial gap between the stimulus and our response to it. This gap
allows us to be moved by the force of moral reason rather than physical forces,
such as bodily desires, needs, and interests. (Lakoff & Johnson, 1987, p. 16)
By “minding the gap,” Lakoff & Johnson (1987) suggest, we can guide human
development in ways that are more sensitive, ethical, and which can be rapidly and
profoundly transformative.
As for the particularities of pedagogy, Lakoff & Johnson call for a reorientation of
many of the “classic” human faculties. One example that might resonate particularly well
with Burke’s flight into analogical-extensionism (moving toward a “perspective on
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perspectives”) is imagination. For Johnson, it is imperative to “revive and enrich our
notion of imagination if we are to overcome certain understandable effects of deeply
rooted sets of dichotomies that have dominated Western philosophy” (Lakoff & Johnson,
1987, p. 140). These dichotomies include mind/body, reason/imagination, science/art,
cognition/emotion, fact/value, “and on and on” (ibid). Johnson advocates “enriching”
common senses of imagination to explore the role it plays in embodied-embedded
meaning, understanding, reasoning, and communication.
More broadly, Lakoff and Johnson acknowledge and attend to the need for
“critical tools” to make sense of the differences between choosing to enrich our
understandings of the world versus not. Johnson, in his related works, dwells on image
schemata (variously overlapping “abstract patterns in our experience and understanding”)
which are “nonpropositional” in that they are dynamic patterns that function “somewhat
like the abstract structure of an image”, connecting a range of different experiences to
somehow render similar “recurring” structures (Lakoff & Johnson, 1987, p. 2). Although
they are nonpropositional, dynamic image schemata can be broken down and critically
studied all sorts of ways. Johnson explores several notions of force (as an ontology,
orientation, or interaction) and demonstrates how the various schemata that these notions
of force can take implicate reasoning and acting in human life.
Image schemata are governed by internal structures which Johnson (1987) dubs
“gestalt structures” because they function “...as coherent, meaningful, unified wholes …
[which] generate coherence for, establish unity within, and constrain our network of
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meaning” (p. 41). These internal structures are not uniform, the known inconsistencies
are as important as the consistencies. They are made of innumerable understood
groupings and associations that connect concepts like “gravity” for instance with
concepts like “momentum” practically from birth. We learn what to expect from the
world as soon as we start acting within it, those expectations schematically inform all
future explorations, including those done by our senses.
To illustrate how image schemata operate coherently to form gestalts, we need to
look no further than to our presumptions about force. Johnson (1987) examines “the way
in which patterns of typical experiences of force work their way up into our system of
meaning and into structure of our expression and communication” (p. 42). Johnson
(1987) outlines several presumptions about force: the sense that it is always an
“interaction,” that it has a “vector quality,” that it has a “path of motion,” that it has
“origins or sources,” that it has measurable “degrees of power or intensity,” and finally
that it always necessitates a “structure or sequence of causality” - each of which might
implicate reasoning systems that ought not think of force in such a way (ibid).
Notions of compulsion versus attraction for instance can have considerable
influence in our efforts to understand, say, an assault. Depending on the schematic
narratives ontologizing and orienting those gestalts we can expect profoundly different
conclusions in terms of “what, exactly, just happened.” In other words, “reality” depends
on the pre-cognitive or “hidden” experientially based categorization and animation of
“the world” as it can appear to each person observing. The world matters for each of us
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in ways that come to be thanks to our corroboration with the world. It does not exist in
any meaningful way independently of any of us.
Human beings understand force as having a trajectory, having an origin, involving
interaction and as structuring sequences within a causal narrative. Often it is the case that
we attribute portions of these schemata inappropriately. Doing so can give us incredible
insight into the world but it can also lead to tragic mis-perceptions. The lines separating
being “followed,” “confronted,” and even “attacked” are much blurrier than they seem.
The sensorial components that register the differences rely upon the history and
experience of the subject. If experience suggests that certain kinds of people are
“suspicious” (and experience can suggest this in many ways including through
conversations, asides, books, magazines, movies, songs, history and more), it is because
there has been an accumulation of symbolically driven narratives that corroborate that
qualitative assessment of the approach.
Language participates in this scaffolding of suspicion almost constantly. It is the
mechanism through which we identify “those people,” and the mechanism through which
we compare and share our identifications with others. Depending on the kind of lingual
environments that we are in, suspicion can mount in catastrophic ways. This is in part
because the symbolic components of our metaphorical sense making are working in
tandem with the somatic as-if components that are feeding us suggestive visceral affects.
In summary, then, while Kenneth Burke’s approach emphasizes the “dancing” of
the body, Lakoff and Johnson’s perspective focuses on the reductive, presumptive
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components of sense-making. On the one hand, the body performs (or “dances”) in ways
that make sense of the world, on the other hand the metaphorical gestalt structures that
we learn and develop over time participate in choreographing future dances.
Glenberg (2008) has identified several studies which suggest that we are much
quicker to recognize that a sentence is coherent if we can indicate our acceptance with a
sympathetic gesture. We can understand sentences like “Jake sent me the message” if we
can indicate the coherence by pulling a lever (as if the message were being received)
more quickly than if we are asked to indicate coherence through non-sympathetic
gestures (like pushing the lever). The presumptions about orientation and interaction that
make some gestures sympathetic and others not are more or less arbitrary (messages can,
after all, arrive in lots of ways including many that are multi-directional and temporarily
non-linear) but these sensed orientations and interactions still matter.
The next sections are going to attempt to put these two approaches together. First
I will discuss the role of action in perception, attempting to trace not only the dancing
that is necessary for sense making but also the ongoing dependence on structured gestalts.
The section after that will attempt to ground this same approach in a concrete case study
taken from an ongoing dispute about so-called “Stand Your Ground” laws in the United
States.
The Role of Action in Perception
Action is a fundamental piece of the perspective-driven embodied-embedded
approach. The body is “intelligent” from an embodied-embedded perspective, but not just
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because of how meticulously and densely packed the sensing apparatuses of parts like our
hands are. Sense-making is often defined as a kind of “skillful behavior,” or most often as
a “coupling” (Shapiro, Noe, Pfeifer & Bongard). In Chapter Two, I discussed how
autonomous motion was imperative for normal visual development in kittens; this section
expands on that discussion to emphasize the other ways motion implicates sensing and to
demonstrate how relational (perspectival) understanding goads felt understanding. More
particularly it draws upon the immediately prior conversation combining the “dancing”
metaphorical approach of Kenneth Burke and the “gestalt-driven” approach of theorists
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson.
People who are looking for new ideas will often say that they are “feeling about”
for solutions; one of the most illuminating examples of embodied-embedded cognition
emphasizing motivated action is just that ordinary. If you have ever put your hand in your
pocket and felt an object you knew right away that to learn more about that object (or
objects as the case may ultimately be) you will have to move your fingers. The motions of
your fingers are important;23 if you were to keep your hand motionless in your pocket you
would feel whatever you felt initially but otherwise you would literally be blind. As your
fingers move, as you explore, various surfaces on the tops, tips, sides, and fingernails all
come into contact with the contents of your pocket and no single touch is responsible for
23 It could absolutely be argued that the motions of your reasoning are equally important. You move
between various memories, the last time you wore these pants, and last time you may have had
something to put in your pocket, and you deliberate about the possible contents as you explore with
your fingers. All of these explorations, the fingers moving, the memories moving, the deliberative
thoughts moving, provide various degrees of perspective that ultimately can resolve to a huge extent
even the unseen.
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your ultimate realization that there are coins in there. You “see” the coins between all of
the various touches on your fingers.
Importantly, you do not just flail your fingers randomly about in your pocket. You
search it. And you use what you learn instantaneously it seems (because for the most part
the “realizations” of such searches are hidden-layer output), to govern the search as you
go. If you want to distinguish coins you will need to feel the edges. You will want to feel
the edges of various coins against other coins. US quarters and nickels will distinguish
themselves immediately, because we all know what quarters and nickels feel like (some
are larger, some are smaller, some are thick and some are thin) and because we are
looking for them. Dimes and pennies need more careful consideration. The dime-penny
distinction is minimal, but it is there if you are willing to “look.” Small distinctions in
size and the texture of a coin’s edge matter greatly to searching fingers/brains. These
distinctions are what clue us in to which gestalt structure “quarter” or “nickel” (each of
which work within still larger structures like “coins”) is most appropriate. Once one has
“grasped” the meaning of the sensation then the concept is locked in; that thicker fatter
metal thing becomes twenty five cents, a bout of pinball, one tenth of a one-way bus fare
and on.
Hands are remarkable at sensing in large part because of how dexterous they are.
The ability to oppose in various ways (against each other, finger tip to finger tip, fingers
into the palm, against the “sides,” “top,” or “bottom” of the sensable world via the wrist,
elbows and shoulders) enables the hand to move against surfaces, along surfaces, and
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around surfaces. Things that we grasp24 are moved in relationship to our two offset eyes.
We can shake various objects, moving them as we do towards one ear to see how it
sounds over here as opposed to over there. We can use our hands to smell either bluntly
like a child pushing a flower into a nostril or methodically like a chemist waving a gloved
hand over a smoking vial. Many people gesture with their hands both when they know
what they are talking about and (arguably more importantly) when they do not. Gestures
like this do not “feel the air” so much as they “work the space” in sympathetic ways
which, hopefully, jostle our thinking and symbol making in ways that facilitate
understanding.
And when it comes to dexterity our hands do not stop there. They have soft,
plushy, variously sensitive skin. Depending on where you press into the skin an entirely
new constellation of perspectives becomes available. Experiences including temperature,
texture, edge-type and more are possible because of the soft morphological material that
covers our fingers and hands. The plasticity studies explored in Chapter Two suggest that
places in the brain dedicated to finger skin are very different from the place in the brain
24 Grasping is a good example of how cognitive functions can be “outsourced” to the body, a conversation
taken up in Chapter Two. Mirror neuron research suggests that even before we “decide” to grasp an
object many of the neurons responsible for moving the hand to the proper shape are already firing. As
the object is sensed within our peripersonal space (space in the “reachable” bubble around your body
that is intimately mapped by the brain) the notions that we can/cannot grasp it are always already to
some extent an integral part of our becoming aware of it. The body has already compared the map of the
found object to the map of the hand as it knows it and determined the extent to which it can be grasped,
that information is as essential of a component of our “understanding” that object normally as is the
color or classification of the object. Equally important, the tendons, musculature, and bone structure of
the hand give these otherwise computationally unwieldy devices very predictable, but still incredibly
pliable form. The fact that our fingers seem to “fall together” when we relax is a testimony to fact that a
huge part of grasping has been outsourced to the body.
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dedicated to, say, thigh skin. Finger skin senses the thin film on the surface of the skin
and several gradually thickening layers beneath, while thigh skin has no such layering.
The sensing activity across the surface of finger skin is likewise massively
amplified. Temperature sensors are more densely packed on our finger neuronal regions,
resulting in each case in much more lively (we often say “finer”) sensation across the
board. This anatomical preferencing for finger skin sensitivity over thigh skin sensitivity
is no accident. It is an emergent property of the innumerably sourced fact that we are far
more willing and more able to “make sense” of the world with our fingers and hands than
we are with our thighs. Fingers and hands are good at making sense, we in fact often
enjoy using them to make sense of the world, and so they matter immensely.
Language, too, is incredibly dexterous. It touches the body in incredibly literal
ways. Part of understanding the word “knee” as you see it now in print relies upon the
firing of millions of mirror neurons that are otherwise inseparable participants in the
sensations and actions available to the thing you know as the joint in the middle of your
leg. When we wince at pain inflicted in stories we feel the reality of words. Humans
understand the “conceptual” nature of language, it could be argued that the naïve
agreement that language is “only” conceptual is a large part of our ability to make sense
of it at all, and more often than not we hesitate to grant words the material worth that they
are due. But the old nursery rhyme “sticks and stones can break my bones but names will
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never hurt me” could in a more free-verse form of equally real satire say “sticks and
stones can break my bones but names can get me shot.”
Like our fingers we use language to “feel our way” through the world. But unlike
our hands language is not necessarily impoverished by peripersonal space. 25 Language
can roam as far as the imagination will allow it. Humans use language to make sense out
of the otherwise unseeable material of the cosmos and to make ideas like human rights,
justice, and equality matter. As with all of our other senses, the how of the movement is
imperative. The actions we take up against the surfaces of the symbolic excite reaction.
Whereas bats and mammals in the ocean use sonar to “see” prey, mates, reefs, predators,
and migration routes, humans use rhetorically infused sonar to make sense of the people
and the culture around us. Importantly, this sense making is not the product of choice
(though it sometimes can be), but rather more often the product of accreted sense-made
over time. And so far as we can see, no mammals have mastered sonar to the extent that
they can convey satire, irony, ribbing, or sarcasm. While it can be argued that these
intended messages within messages frequently miss the mark, it is equally true that
especially among those who know us the best, they can “bite.”

25 Perispersonal space is the space within reach of the body or accessible tools that gets “annexed”
(Blakeselee & Blakeselee, 2007, p. 3) by your brain’s body maps. The boundaries of this space are very
elastic “like an amoeba, it expands and contracts to suit your goals and makes you master of your
world” (ibid), but it is ultimately limited by the reach of your physical, visual, olfactory, and auditory
sense making abilities.
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Conclusion
As often as I am able, sometimes for hours a day, I participate in debates with
friends, family, and strangers online. As a communication scholar who has made sense of
post race discourses, the gun debate, the health care debate, and more; as a debate coach
who has a pedagogical interest in nearly every issue that besets humankind, and as one
who wants to learn to make sense of these discourses for and with others, I feel
compelled to bring what expertise I have to bear on how the media portrays as many of
these issues as I can. I attempt to offer as best I could a variety of suggestions to those
who were willing to listen as to what other kinds of sense could be made of the tragedy.
Each new stranger who engages me in discussion was not an individual to be won over,
but rather a new font of opportunity to see these otherwise invisible worlds anew. I draw
upon the metaphorical components of reasoning in an enactive way, utilizing and
engaging various perspectives on important issues, not to learn the Truth (not to see the
noun-status of reality behind them), but to see what sense was being made and, equally
importantly, what sense I could, in good faith, participate in rendering.
These practiced sense-makings inform my ruminating on these subjects whether I
can recall the particulars or not, and the efforts I explore to make sense each day
influence my abilities to do so in the future. They inform my future attempts to confront
and name the oppressive realities that I understand and they beg questions that perhaps I
have not taken seriously enough to answer. It is not enough to simply think about these
issues and it’s not enough to just read about them (though thinking and reading clearly
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make sense). From the perspective developed in this dissertation, I have to engage the
reactions of others as much as I am able, for only then can I see how the day-to-day
enaction of symbolic sense-made feels.
Regardless of how many minds are changed, it is, I feel, incredibly important
work if I (we) are to remain sensitive to the problems that beset our species. I often get
asked by people who I would expect to understand, people in the communication field
themselves, why do I bother arguing with so many people who are “clearly ignorant” or
who “will never learn?” I am often told, “don’t waste your time arguing with him/her, it’s
pointless” and asked more than a little suggestively if I don’t have better things to do with
my time. All of these questions surprise me when they come from students of critical
communication because they reflect a persistent symbol-model understanding of rhetoric
that, in the face of the “new” rhetorical materialism traced in Chapter One, should be a
thing of the past.
Such avoidance strategies when it comes to people we “don’t have time for” only
participate in enabling the silence of post-race, for instance, and they certainly do not
assist in mattering any kind of better sense for the future. Moreover they reserve for some
undetermined future the work that I, as a communication scholar, must do if I want to be
as accessible and informed as my rank of “PhD” suggests I am. And so I reply to these
questions by reminding those asking that all we can do is continue to make the kinds of
sense that we feel are justified, and to rely upon the sense-making capacities of others to
assist them in “feeling the way” and feeling my own way in turn. As someone aware of
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the sense-making potentials of metaphor I feel compelled to enact those potentials as
often as possible, not only to manifest resistance to ideas that I do not make “good” sense
to me, but also to check my own reactions against those of Others.
One potent example of metaphorical exploration that I encountered during the
writing of this dissertation stemmed from the shooting of Trayvon Martin, an unarmed
black youth in Florida. I conclude with it here, to underscore the value of metaphor for
rhetorical criticism, within an embodied-embedded logic. Martin was followed and
ultimately shot by a self-appointed neighborhood watchman who ultimately was not
convicted. The shooter’s non-conviction was owed to the laws in Florida that stipulated
that, regardless of who instigated the conflict (a lot of the evidence suggested that Martin
was not the instigator), if the shooter felt threatened he was justified in using lethal force.
As I argued this issue, I confronted by all sorts of alternate perspectives on Martin and his
murderer, some of which played into racialized notions of young black men as “thugs”
and “gangsters” in an effort to vindicate the shooter. Other arguments focused instead on
Martin’s youth, innocence, and the predictable outcome of the jury’s decision given the
color of Martin’s skin.
One of the latter such reactions attributed to the Twitter accounts of several
individuals questioned why the shooter did not stop to offer Martin a ride home to get
him out of the rain. Instead of seeing a potential thug, the Tweet asked, why not see a kid
trying to get home who needs a lift? Without expressly indicting race, this perspective
implicates race in Martin’s murder. It also participates in the notion that the shooter (who
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again had appointed himself a “watchman” of the neighborhood) was out to protect his
community begging the question why this youth was targeted as “suspicious” or
“threatening.”
I also encountered a potent perspective offered by columnist Michael Skolnik
(2013), who altered via Photoshop the skin tones of the individuals involved. Very much
like the “what if Martin was a young white girl” hypothetical offered by still more
interested in interrogating race, this perspective challenges the role race played in the
sensed credibility of the people involved by presenting the readers with the optics of a
young white boy being murdered by a looming black man. By shifting the tone of the
images the observe was essentially asked what kind of sense does this make now?
Of course I have my advocacy, and of course I believe that advocacy is best (as
we all must because these advocacies “make the most sense”), but at the end of the day
my understanding is that together my interlocutors and I will make sense (some good,
some bad) of an incredibly important issue and, somehow, justice will come of it.
Abraham Lincoln called this process the work of “folk wisdom;” perhaps Martin Luther
King Jr. was invoking the same process when he famously argued that the arc of moral
history bends towards justice. Rather than arguing to “win” I argue to make sense, and
the ability to shift between various metaphoric perspectives on any given problem is a
key component of that work.
Abandoning the persuasion model, unfortunately, means abandoning the
expectation that when “better reasons” or the “best” means of persuasion have been
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employed then the minds and attitudes of others will change like clockwork. More often,
the organisms surrounding those minds will continue to “make sense” of the world as
they have even after they have been “shown the light.” And yet, voices can and do haunt
us. Perhaps real change only manifests itself in small ways that are hardly detectable at
all. Perhaps instead of turning over like a clock, humans opt to go to our graves perfectly
satisfied with the kinds of sense we have made of the world, regardless of the
consequences that it may or may not have for others. What will ultimately be real for
each individual is left to the lives lead, the choices each makes as they navigate the
affective deliberative spaces. Those choices will interact with the choices made by those
who inhabit that space who argue back. The ability and willingness to explore the world
rigorously, to refuse to rule out “matters” that “don’t make sense,” to challenge one’s
sense-making abilities, these factors will have a profound influence on the attitudes that
seem reasonable.
While one can obviously never learn all of the perspectives available to humanity
(a truth which potentially dooms us to at least veiled forms of endemic oppression) a
heightened sensitivity to the potential inherent in symbolicity can be made immediately
and remarkably clear. And, who knows, perhaps the human symbol-user is creative
enough to fabricate a way around the seemingly inevitably violent marking off process
that so defines us.
I conclude this chapter on metaphors with this illustration in part to situate
metaphoric sense-making in day-to-day life, but also a means of demonstrating how
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many of the fundamental understandings that communication scholars have about speech
use must change. The metaphors discussed above, those which framed Martin as a “thug”
and those which asked why he couldn’t be a kid who needed a lift, are the stuff of
everyday life. The perspectives which insist that racism is “not” present in Martin’s
murder “make sense” to enough people that these narratives circulate, despite the outrage
that such narratives rightly prompt. The times that outrage is expressed, the environment
of that expression, and the choices of the interlocutors that follows map the potential
extensions of sense-making. If the metaphoric sense-making perspective accomplishes
anything, it must accomplish a demonstration of the value of multiple perspectives.
Solitary perspectives are the stuff of post-racism and denial. B, by opening up the space
for those who see racism in the tragically predictable event, symbolic sense-makers more
sensitively account for the full breadth of reality that symbolicity can enact.
Can this kind of sense-making be taught? Are humans doomed to enact the kind
of careless sense-making that enables post-race mindsets in the wake of obviously
racialized tragedy? The first section has attempted to situate the positive material that
communication scholars have contributed to the questions of materiality and to contribute
by tracing a sympathetic debate in embodied cognition and by situating a new model of
language-as-sense within metaphorical life practices. The second section attempts to rewrite some of the most basic ethical and pedagogical principles in light of my approach.
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Section Two: Preface
My focus in Section Two is to highlight that the mattering of language necessarily
re-orients basic components of speaking as practice – chapters Four and Five attempt to
explore two components of this practice. In particular, Chapter Four explores how
contemporary pedagogy is steeped in the necessary acknowledgements regarding the
language-as-contact model, but in many ways still operates primarily from a transmission
perspective. Texts that emphasize the ways that a student can become a better speaker as
opposed to enabling her to work on developing the speaking abilities that humans
innately possess are at the center of this critique. Because “better” can often be “worse”
public speaking texts should emphasize adaptability and develop sensitivity to practices
of speaking instead of relying on “best” practices.
Practice in the narrow sense (the sense that emphasizes focused, repetitive, drills)
as well as in the broad sense (which emphasizes the every-day life-practice of symbol
use) becomes the focus and many of the fundamental precepts regarding how public
speaking should be taught that rely on “acting confident” or building an “effective”
outline are de-emphasized as potentially restrictive. The classroom becomes a “gym”
where students are encouraged to get as many “reps” as possible, not only in crafting, recrafting, and articulating their ideas with symbols, but also in navigating the interactions
that follow. From this perspective no single course in public speaking can make someone
a better speaker. There simply is not enough time to do the kind of work necessary to
truly hone a sense in even a semester-long course; but classes can emphasize various
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kinds of exercises and reflexive self-scrutiny techniques which can hopefully motivate
the life-long goal of communicating more clearly and more sympathetically. The end of
Chapter Four attempted to suggest a few techniques that might be demonstrative in that
regard.
Chapter Five culminates the study of language-as-sense by turning to the
questions of ethics. At least since the days of Quintillian, ethics and communication have
been inherently yoked together. This is no less true when language is framed as a sense. I
argue in Chapter Two that the old nursery rhyme “sticks and stones can break my bones
but names will never hurt me” may well be changed to “sticks and stones can break my
bones but names can get me shot.” The names and schemas that humans use ultimately
craft the justifiable potentials for the future. Empirically, these affordances can include
destroying, mutilating, or simply callously ignoring the most vulnerable among us. I turn
to the project of nonviolence (as viewed by Tolstoy, Buber, Ruskin and others) to
emphasize and hopefully goad the material implications of language use.
Chapter Five argues that language use is inherently violent (Buber, Butler), it
suspends the fluid reality that embodied-embedded subjects operate in in an effort to
make stable sense of that environment. This inherent violence, to mash Buber’s and
Burke’s words, is the “original sin” of the symbol-using animal. Language makes us, at
once, villain and fool, emperor and slave, dominated and free. Language cannot be
overcome, but it can be used reflexively. Hope is endemic in reflexivity. Reflexivity can
be, as Burke points out, both profoundly productive and profoundly destructive,
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frequently at the very same time but the “spirit” is always aiming at “better.” Staying
sensitive to the fact that “better” is not always better cannot shield us from the delusions
and selective violence of language, but it might be enough to “arc” humanity towards
justice. This will only be the case if everyday languaging people understand the ethical
impacts of their words.
If language is a form of contact and if humans are language-ing all of the time,
then all of us are constantly sculpting the lives that we live as well as the very bodies and
identities of others as we see them. Sensing Others and understanding our own lives alike
are always already political tasks, and the entire process is rooted in the most “ordinary”
rhetoric that we use to engage the world. This begs the question, what kind of politics
might one attempt to adopt?
Rather than emphasizing a “right way” to go about communicating, nonviolence
instead focuses on a reflexive sensitivity, a deference, to the influences of experience. An
embodied-embedded approach to perception mobilizes infinite possible realities at once,
the only way to engage this understanding incorrectly is to insist that various components
of the world “are what they are” or to dwell on reality “as it is.” The theories of practical
nonviolence that I review suggest that all humans biologically abhor violence and that the
reasons that violence continues to “define” human existence is because of our insistences
that it must. We simply “cannot see things any other way” or, worse, concede by and
large that violence is inevitable. These concessions come most often in the form of simple
dismissals of nonviolence (frequently rooted in misunderstandings of the theory itself)
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that it is only nice “in theory,” or that it is ultimately too naïve to ever have any real
impact on human life.
The practices of nonviolence do not offer a panacea, again language itself is
inherently violent, but they can offer an alternative to fatalistic approaches to human
living that presume that war and hatred are inevitable. Leaning on the demonstrably
resilient and unpredictably potent potentials inherent in the wildly productive sensemaking ability of symbol users, Chapter Five begs readers to begin and sustain the life
work of interrogating the “helpless” situations that lead them into participating in
violence. Until such questions as the ones posed by nonviolence can be taken seriously
(and it is my feeling that even now, in our “enlightened” age of Civil Rights expansion
that by and large they are not) then the best humanity can hope for is the contemporary
environment where war is essential and hatred (even if only temporary) is justified. If the
metaphors that we draw upon to understand the world matter as viscerally as Chapters
One through Three suggest, then at some point humans have to ask the question what
kinds of matter are we willing to embody? The framework established by the authors I
review suggests that basic precepts of humility, good faith, patience, and a dogmatic
commitment to renewal and rebirth can lead that inquiry - but only if humans make a
concerted and consistent choice to make those attitudes a priority.
Humanity accepts all sorts of absurdity, from the relatively arbitrary governances
of capitalism and individualism to the equally fantasy-driven notions of dividual
nonviolence, and while each extreme may be equally arbitrary the differences matter
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substantially to those living in their sway. Given the fact that the arbitrary choices that
humans make matter so immediately, the questions of nonviolence in particular and of
ethics in general are inherent in the Copernican shifts playing out among communication
scholars and neuroscientists alike. If humanity can come to accept the absurdity of
charity, if we can take seriously the role that benign, symbiotic cooperation has played in
“elevating” us this far, then there is no telling how peaceful and sustainably productive
we may be – even in spite of our ongoing humiliation. Exploring the sensitivity that must
be earned for that future to play out comprises the final push of this project, in part to
enlist the reader as an advocate and in part to emphasize the material consequences,
globally, of language-as-sense.
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Chapter Four: Learning to Make Sense: An Embodied-Embedded Perspective on
Public Speaking Pedagogy
A brain scientist I heard interviewed once described how backwards scientists had
been when it came to studying rats in a maze as a test of their intelligence. For decades
intelligence tests were “2-dimensional” where the rats had to have all four feet on the
floor and they were expected to navigate the hallways in a timed trial. As interesting as
such studies were, this scientist quipped, they told us absolutely nothing about how rats
navigate space. Studies such as these, the lecturer concluded, suggest even less about the
intelligence of these amazing animals. This is because perhaps the single most important
feature of a rat’s explorative behavior is its ability to climb.
When researchers incorporated climbing into the maze designs they found that the
rats could discover routes through a maze that they had not even known existed. Research
stretching as far back as the 1960s suggests that rats that do not have “enriched”
environments (defined as environments which enable climbing and exuberant
exploration) will in fact be neurologically underdeveloped compared to their more
mobilized counterparts (Diamond, 2001). The initial mazes used to test the intelligence of
rats not only failed to measure intelligence, they might have actively inhibited it.
I feel like a similar oversight exists in many conventional means of studying
public speaking. If language is a sense, then speaking is a very literal form of climbing.
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Routinizing speech practices, emphasizing strict memorization, “best” performances
(frequently involving dress codes), and other common icons in traditional public speaking
textbooks work 2-dimensionally. Approaches such as this, in a way, pin the students’ feet
to the floor. Sensorial adaptation according to embodied embedded practice hardly works
that way at all. This chapter sets out to explore some of the primary components of the
“Copernican shift” in communication studies discussed in Chapter One, particularly those
in public speaking pedagogy.
Perhaps one of the most frustrating components of the development of most
mammalian brains as we understand them is that they undergo a “critical period” of
development. Depending on the task and the mammal, that critical period changes: for
kittens and rats it is a matter of days or weeks, for humans it can stretch into the late teens
or mid twenties. The brain remains plastic throughout life, but at the same time large
amounts of pruning – reductive, associated, neurological specialization – takes place that
limits the future potentials of the action. In short, the longer one waits to confront the
physiological frustrations that accompany speaking, the more difficult it will become to
do so. The number of repetitions (or “reps” as coaches tend to say), the kinds of
repetitions that a brain gets, matter.
For some reason, when it comes to our most meaningful behavior
(speaking/deliberating/arguing), we leave the learning to the playground and the home.
Class time, in most American public school models, is spent listening, writing, drafting,
memorizing, and only rarely speaking. The few times that young people get to speak in
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school and that the rest of us might speak at work are almost always couched in the
confines of providing a “correct answer.” This is hardly the kind of exploratory exposure
that brains need to make varied sense of their world. While there are a few “nontraditional” exceptions to this rule, the sheer size of most school classrooms coupled with
the staggering demands placed on teachers alone is enough to inhibit the wide practice of
enabling young ones to make sense as much as they will want to.
Learning how to track interrelated statements (which can mean any number of
possible things), how to navigate the structural components of our thought as one
understands them, and how to diversify our means of expressing and exploring such
thoughts is an incredibly challenging, often frustrating, and never-ending project. The
kind of dogged determination and constant renewing of commitment needed to undertake
it may not be foreign to traditional public speaking texts, but it certainly is not central to
classroom practice. While co-curricular activities such as competitive forensics can
substantially increase the number of “reps” available, even four or eight years spent
competing seven to thirteen weekends a year in speech and debate offers only a
preliminary engagement with the kind of pliability that is going to be necessary to make
sense of all of the bewildering kinds of contexts that human sense-making can render.
It could probably be argued that since humans began speaking there has been
interest in how one might learn to do so “better” this chapter joins that endeavor. It is
important to note that treating speech pedagogy and ethics separately, as I do here and in
Chapter Five, dangerously limits one’s ability to fully understand what it means to be a
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“better” speaker. This chapter focuses on the fact that practice (the kind of systemic,
routinized, life-practice that builds and sustains conceptual scaffolding), not necessarily
knowledge or precision, dictate effective speech acts. But this claim leaves unstated the
kinds of practice (and the important differences they entrain) that are available to symbol
users.
I have argued in prior chapters that rhetoric is a form of “contact,” not only upon
the outside world but also with the outside world and that the kinds of relational contact
that we are willing to make matter. Gehrke (2009) ranks the fact that students of public
speaking may well use their skills for the purpose of evil (and I might add indifferent
self-advancement) as “the single most persistent and important question in the history of
the study of communication and rhetoric” (1), and he notes that fracturing the study of
pedagogy from ethics diminishes significantly one’s ability to study the ethics and
politics of communication alike. At least since Quintilian the “good person” and
“speaking well” have been considered to be inseparable components of public speaking
pedagogy. That emphasis on the ethical components of speech understood it as contact
should only amplify. That ethical discussion will be the focus of Chapter Five.
I have separated these components of my project primarily due to a lack of
imagination. I want to emphasize two integral points at once, first that public speaking
does not get the practical appreciation that is due if it is, in fact, a form of sense-making
(trouble with seeing typically leads to trips to an optometrist whereas most public
speaking instructors I know insist many if not all of their students are more or less
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“captives”) and, second that the kinds of symbolic contact that one makes matters.
Blending these arguments together has produced a great heap of ideas and not much else.
This chapter, then, focuses on the first question and the last chapter of this dissertation
will focus on the second.
If experience can be trusted (and it often cannot) Americans avoid deliberating,
either because it is “impolite,” “confrontational,” “egotistical,” “pointless,” “too time
consuming” or because there is a debilitating doubt as to their ability to do so well. With
all of our other sensations, perhaps most notably with hearing and sight, deficiencies or
frustrations will become “conditions” that require attention, even medical intervention to
address. With symbolicity, it seems, many if not most are prepared to live with this kind
of communicating practice. This dissertation argues that rhetoric matters because it is a
sense, and if it is a sense this kind of approach is arguably the worst way of confronting
our frustrations with communication.
What speaking students need most are environments where they can try various
kinds of sensible reps, including those which have been tried millions of times before and
those which are profoundly problematic. Unfortunately, this is not how most public
speaking curricula are formulated. It is no wonder so many Americans are terrified of
public speaking, they have spent their entire lives neglecting their brain’s efforts to make
sense. The “how to” of public speaking should give way to rampant “how’s this/how’s
that?”. Only then, by “climbing” in pointed and motivated ways, do growing brains get
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the redundant, and most importantly salient opportunities that they need to make sense of
sense-making.
As discussed in Chapter Three, part of human sensation is trying to make sense
out of the world by inflecting it with motives, attitudes, and intention. People come to
know the world based on our perspective of it. If we think of “making sense” of the world
as a literal sense-making, as the embodied-embedded perspective does, then early
reflexive opportunities for exploration and enaction can offer much more than
expectations, strategies, or tips. Components of the traditional perspective on public
speaking will remain useful, to the extent that the students can make sense of them, but
they will no longer be the focus. Through the lens of embodied-embedded thinking,
practice, instead, becomes crucial. Key components of traditional models of public
speaking like “confidence,” “eloquence,” even “success” itself, will likewise retain their
importance (and in many cases they will reserve important aspects of their meaning), but
fixing them in knowable space becomes impossible. The ability to navigate symbolically
carries precedence over the ability to fulfill the understood burdens of “good” speakers
In this chapter, I critique traditional, “instrumentalist” or “symbol-model”
approaches to public speaking, and offer instead an embodied-embedded pedagogy
focusing on practice, exploration, enaction, and reflextivity. To do this I have relied on a
handful of representative textbooks (Sprague, Stuart, Bodary; O’Brien, Scholz, Grice &
Skinner) and close to a decade of public speaking teaching experience to make a few
basic claims about the way that public speaking has been theorized in the United States
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up until now: Namely, that we are not all born gifted speakers (or, put another way, that
good public speakers are somehow different from those who struggle); that public
speaking is a way of “getting ahead” in the world; that effective public speaking requires
a meticulously and expertly executed performance; and that audiences can be adapted to
and adjusted to in ways that make them more accessible to our ideas as speakers.
This chapter then draws on historical treatments of public speaking pedagogy
within the United States (Gehrke, Cohen, Bartannen) to trace the development of the
“instrumental” approach to public speaking in American pedagogy as well as to
demonstrate how evasive a more “embodied” classroom approach has been. I emphasize
here a move towards a practice-oriented perspective on public speaking that currently
dwells on more “discussion-oriented” class time (Cohen). While this trend is sympathetic
to the project of this dissertation, a grounding logic for embodied-embedded public
speaking has yet to be developed. While the movement from Elocution and hygienic
perspectives towards discussion and practice-based approaches points educators in the
right direction, the critiques from the front half of the chapter and the state of
contemporary pedagogy unveiled in the second half should demonstrate there is still a
great deal of work to be done.
Throughout this dissertation I have attempted to demonstrate that the ongoing
“new-materialism” debates in rhetoric and the vindication and general acceptance of
embodied-embedded logic for neural organization each open the door for a new theory of
how speaking matters. Chapter Three explored how metaphors work as integral
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components of the linguistic scaffolding that symbolicity provides, enabling humans to
view an act of violence in very differing ways. This felt “seeing” is the “sense made”
through symbolicity, it arises like all other senses in grossly reduced components that
emerge prior to our conscious awareness. The practiced use of this sense made will
determine the kind of sense that can be made in the future. If sense is – for whatever
reason – useful, it will persist. This chapter will attempt to put these observations into the
practical context of speech education. Public speaking pedagogy is an important place to
begin asking the question: how pliable can my linguistic sense-making become?
When a history buff recounts a particular story, say from the American Civil War,
in a way that just draws audiences in, it is because that individual has learned to speak the
language of history in particular, and the language of the Civil War in general. S/he
pauses for pregnant inflection because that inflection feels right; it propels the story in a
way that makes useful sense. Attempting to craft a thrilling historical expose from
scratch, starting with the recipe’s generated in a text book on public speaking and
applying all of the necessary content and thought does not guarantee a “good” speech.
Only an entrained understanding of the nuances of the symbolic landscape can do that.
The ability to merge various perspectives to shed insight onto frustrating problems is only
one of the many benefits that come with our morphological relationship to language.
The chapter ends with a new schema for public speaking education (which I am
calling the “gym”) and I offer a few exercises designed to emphasize the embodied nature
of speech development. There are practical limitations on public speaking classrooms,
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from class sizes to the times allotted for classes to occur. These limitations put surprising
amounts on pressure on instructors attempting to provide fluid, conversational, drill
space. The exercises suggested at the end of this chapter are by no means comprehensive
or even “best.” They are meant merely to be suggestive as to how one might overcome
these limitations and provide productive embodied-embedded opportunities to confront
symbolic mattering.
Four Criticisms of Contemporary Speech Pedagogy
The first general argument to be made in response to text-book based public
speaking education is that relying on scaffolding found in texts (learned lessons, outlines,
and advice) is itself a “2-dimensional” approach to the task. Instead, I offer a dynamic,
fluid pedagogy founded in an embodied-embedded perspective oriented around practice.
Four general claims underline the arguments in contemporary public speaking texts. They
are that effective public speakers must be made, that public speaking is a way of getting
“ahead” in the world or of getting what one wants, that effective public speaking relies on
expert execution, and that audiences can be analyzed and understood. I address each of
these claims in this section.
The first basic claim implied and applied in public speaking texts is that not all of
us are born gifted public speakers, we have to “become” great. There is, this stance
suggests, a sort of greatness that must be achieved, and great speakers transmit it. Grice
& Skinner (2006) begin their introductory text by emphasizing the “relative security” of
the classroom as one of the bonuses that public speaking classes can offer. Students
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“become intellectually and socially empowered” (p. 2, emphasis mine) through studying
public speaking, reports the Carnegie Foundation in Grice & Skinner’s text. Like Grice
and Skinner, Sprague, Stuart, and Bodary emphasize how successful effective public
speakers are in the workplace and at home, suggesting that becoming a good speaker is
financially and socially rewarding. Sprague et al. also equate giving a public speech to
having a root canal. They then ask the reader which of several scenarios seem familiar
and list scenarios in which someone is either too shy, lacking confidence, or unable to
formulate thoughts into words (p. 3). An almost identical list of frustrations that
inexperienced speakers encounter (but which presumably evade “good” speakers) can be
found in the introductory pages of Lucas and Griffin as well.
It is no doubt true that some of us feel more comfortable speaking in public, and it
is no doubt also true that the degrees of “success” experienced while speaking will vary.
But the embodied-embedded approach emphasizes the fact that the brain is seemingly
wired from birth to participate in the miracle of human behavior that is speech, so these
differences in outcome owe a lot more to the relationships we have with the people
interpreting our words than to our innate ability to transmit confidence or ability. Each
individual will have their own frustrations which will change environment to
environment stymying our efforts and leading to feelings of inadequacy when, instead,
there is only a lack of familiarity. Overcoming the “I’m just not good at it” attitude that
most Americans bring with them to public speaking is an important step (almost as
important as overcoming the notion that “speech doesn’t matter”) that is often only
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worsened when we approach public speaking as though there are fundamental differences
in ability. “Good speakers” will bomb frequently if they are not careful, and “bad
speakers” will frequently have “all the right arguments,” depending on the situation.
Mobilizing these realities, exploring them as they exist for each speaker, makes more
sense.
The second claim that traditional approaches to public speaking embrace is that
public speaking is a way of “getting ahead” in the world. Practically every public
speaking textbook that I have encountered emphasizes the professional, personal, and
societal gains that can come from individuals interrogating their speaking abilities. Great
speaking rewards us in ways that can range anywhere from lucrative business success to
the ability to speak to a school board and thus save a teacher who could help children
with disabilities (Lucas, 4). “Once you get the job,” Sprague et al. argue, “you can use
these communication skills to shape your career environment, influence those around
you, and gain personal satisfaction while being an effective and valued professional
resource” (pp. 4 – 5). Similarly Grice & Skinner (2006) suggest that while “… changing
the world may seem unrealistic and intimidating at this stage in your life, you do have the
opportunity to help shape the values, beliefs, and behaviors of those around you and in
this class”—and what’s more the various skills that studying speaking enables are
transferable into other areas of life (p. 2). In this perspective, too, we find a reliance on
some form of existing ability that can be effectively utilized and drawn upon in the times
that matter most. Instead of viewing effective speaking as the sensitive navigation of
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diverse environments as a language-as-articulate-contact perspective would, this
perspective suggests that once learned it is kept. Speaking ability is something someone
has and thus can use for success.
Professional advancement and personal acclaim are important objectives that can
be facilitated by focusing on our speaking practices, but these are treated from an
embodied-embedded approach as “symptoms” of more sensitive speaking; as opposed to
objectives in and of themselves. Sustaining success is far less certain from an embodiedembedded perspective and is owed much more to one’s ability to sustain ethical
relationships (a concept I will discuss more in the following chapter) and less to earned
and kept speaking ability.
The third basic claim that most instructional and historical texts take for granted
regarding public speaking is that it has a lot to do with the perfected execution of a
carefully crafted task. Here is perhaps the most obvious perspectival approach that
equates great speaking with effective transmission. Speeches in most textbooks are
outlined meticulously, memorized if possible, and practiced as they are written with as
few “ums,” or verbal hesitations, as possible. For Grice and Skinner (2006) this translates
as speech that eventually “looks and feels natural, comfortable, and spontaneous” (p.
228). “Naturalness” “comfortableness” and “spontaneousness” are crafted.
If you lose your audience you can “enliven your delivery with movement and
changes in volume. Such relatively simple changes in your delivery,” the authors suggest,
“may revive their interest” (Grice & Skinner, 2006, p. 228). All texts emphasize avoiding
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speaking “too fast” or “too slowly” (though the specifics of these rates of delivery are
obviously never explored) and utilizing dynamic speaking strategically to maintain
interest. Sprague et al go so far as to argue “speakers who have clear speaking voices
devoid of vocal tics waste these good qualities if they speak hypnotically, with no
variation in pitch, rate, or volume” (p. 361). Precision, enunciation, volume, and pacing
are all emphasized across texts as tools available for a speaker to transmit meaning or
excite interest, defining the range of acceptability however is an entirely different task.
Speaking becomes something one does to an audience, not something done with them in
constantly changing contexts.
Embodied-embedded speaking emphasizes, instead, ongoing, and reiterative
exploration, which is open to and expectant of the kinds of speaking frustrations that
trouble all of us and open as well to the idea that disinterested audiences may well just be
disinterested. If we do not “make sense” for some audiences no amount of movement or
vocal variety is going to help If one conceives of each thought that flits through the mind,
each idea that is committed to paper or screen, each utterance we encounter or creative
rendering that we manifest, is a practiced speech act, then suddenly “good speeches” are
ubiquitous. Hardly any human environment depends on the perfect execution of a predetermined text and for the most part we all move to some extent or another through
social human life without a carefully maintained documentation of what we need to do to
improve.
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Acting confident, in the embodied-embedded model, is replaced with learned
familiarity, not only with ourselves but with the kinds of ways that speaking can break
down Practice and learning take place in our lived day-to-day life, not in the “preparation
stages” of a project. If coming into the world is as Burke has described it, 26 like entering a
massive lobby already a-babble with long-standing and quickly changing conversations,
then bewilderment and frustration should be expected. Each new group of people,
historians perhaps or maybe “Beliebers,” will prompt similarities and differences and
each will deftly wield words that we are unaccustomed to. The ideas that make the most
sense will come readily to hand as the subject wades into the discussion, the places where
we cannot make sense of the phrasings the ground will seemingly buckle and give way.
As the familiarities with discourse communities and the related conversations mount,
subjects find themselves on more stable ground. Rapidly, entire discussions begin to snap
into view, becoming almost rote.
The fourth and final basic claim that embodied-embedded speaking takes issue
with regards the relationship between the audience and the speaker. From the standpoint
of the textbooks, audiences are things to be analyzed and prepared for; speakers are
expected to demonstrate in as many ways as possible (from posture to their attire) that
they are “trustworthy” sources, and speakers who do not take such steps are dismissed as
disrespectful or unprepared. Lucas, Stuart et al., and Griffin all situate their discussions of
“audience analysis” in the early “Preparation” stages of their texts. Most texts emphasize
26 Burke, 1941b, p. 110.
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maintaining a relationship with an audience throughout the speech process, but in these
sections of text we find potentially troubling suggestions such as “demographic audience
analysis,” “psychological” analysis (Lucas), direct observation, systematic data
collection, and interviews/focus groups (Stuart et al.), and even particular suggestions on
how to deal with audiences that vary in gender, “racial, ethnic and cultural background,”
education, religion, and values (Lucas, Grice & Skinner). One text (Grice & Skinner)
goes so far to offer Lincoln’s Gettysburg address as an excellent example of audience
adaptation despite the fact that most of the people at the address (including prominent
speakers, politicians, journalists, and military leaders as well as members of the local
public) panned the speech. Most historians agree that hardly anybody beyond the avidly
devout Lincolnian Walt Whitman recognized the brilliance of that speech at the time, in
large part because of how unconventional it was.
Regardless of whether or not the Gettysburg address is a good example of
audience preparation, most public speaking texts suggest that knowing audiences (as
things in the world) can facilitate an interaction and lead to success. “Learning about an
audience’s demographic makeup, their attitudes toward your topic, and details about the
speech situation can improve your ability to make the speech meaningful to the audience”
according to Stuart et al. (p. 101). In Grice & Skinner’s terms, analyzing your audience
allows you to “discover who your audience members are and what motivates them” (p.
73).
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To be fair, most texts (like Lucas) do warn against “…compromising your beliefs
to get a favorable response … [and] … using devious, unethical tactics to achieve your
goal” (p. 98); however the emphasis on changing views, conveying meaning, and
accommodating alternative mindsets in a way that can make others more sympathetic is
consistent. This emphasis is rooted in a dualist notion of people as knowable and
understandable things. Embodied-embedded cognition, remember, suggests that knowing
and understanding are actively achieved (for better or for worse) based on the selections
and understandings of the agent – audiences will look one way to one speaker and
another way to another. Who is right? What kind of audience is present is a question that
depends not only on the condition of the audience at that time and place but also on the
kinds of reactions that individual presences will make when the conversations begin.
Audiences are environments and like the impossibly complicated environment of our
globe most efforts to “understand” and “prepare for” those environments will yield a little
value and a lot of misunderstanding.
The idea that audiences are knowable and predictable, above practically all others,
is the most damaging. It neglects the fact that human speaking is driven by fluid contexts,
it is impossible to know what kinds of attire, posture, cadence, and tone are acceptable
until we have some idea where and to whom we hope to speak. For aspiring young
business professionals it makes a great deal of sense to encourage standing, dressing well,
and careful practiced speech, but for the innumerable other environments where one
might craft, navigate, and maintain their articulated thoughts, such practices are, in fact,
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counter productive. Such approaches suggest that the orator is in control, that audiences
are more or less passive, and that the “right kind” of manipulation will result in a positive
result.
Rather than emphasizing the “best” approaches to public speaking then, this
chapter will focus almost exclusively on practice. What I am calling for is a new
approach to context, one that takes into account flexibility and scaffolding as it could be
built in the act of speaking as opposed to prediction and control - the hallmarks of the
instrumental model. If language is an embodied sense then it should be developed as a
component of our embodiment and embeddedness.
In Chapter One I explored how the shift from a transmission model to an
embodied-embedded model of rhetoric prompted a need to explain the “new material”
implications of language, it could be argued that the same shift prompted a move toward
a more embodied-embedded approach in communication scholarship. If this is the case
one should expect to see a sympathetic shift in speaking pedagogy and, despite the
criticisms leveled in this section, such shifts are visible. What these critiques suggest is
that while the basic understanding of the relational nature of public speaking is set, the
comprehensive nature of the implication for this logic are underdeveloped. The next
section aspires to present a “macro” view of speaking pedagogy to support this claim of a
trend towards embodiment in speaking pedagogy.
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The Shift Towards a Pedagogy of Practice in Everyday Life
The “practice of everyday life” incriminates the ongoing “bubbling” of thought
that takes place in our minds, the narratives we are exposed to in popular culture and
familial life, and all of the symbolic acts in between. This is the brain “climbing” around
with language. Over time, my argument suggests, these forms of symbolic action
plasticize themselves into our neural workings in ways that can be manipulated, even
exploited, but which may not necessarily be easily overcome. This is because rhetorical
understandings of the world are more complicated when it comes to sense-making than
they may seem. Michel de Certeau has argued that speaking cannot be reduced simply to
knowledge of language. According to de Certeau
speaking operates within the field of a linguistic system; it effects an
appropriation or re-appropriation, of language by its speakers; it establishes a
present relative to a time and place; and it posits a contract with the other (the
interlocutor) in a network of places and relations. (1984, xiii)
These incidental components of speaking could play out any number of ways. I
have already explored in Chapter Two how notions like time are neural constructs, and in
Chapter Three I examined how “as if” experiences code for sensations like threat or
warmth. Each time we speak, these associative regions of our brain have already fired;
the sensed symbolic confines that we encounter in speech represent the sense made by the
brain up to that moment. And each time we select a form of speaking (framing an assault
as an act of racism, for example) we make sense with these modules still more.
Over time, the more familiar one gets with various forms of sense-made, the more
readily, viscerally, and acutely those senses get felt. This suggests that until a person has
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discussed, read about, listened to, experienced and witnessed all of the ways that racism,
for example, might work on various bodies in the world, sensing that racism could be
incredibly difficult. It also suggests that narratives are our gateways into whatever world
it is that we desire to understand. As humans we are, in a way, endowed with the ability
to install forms of understanding into our brain, all that is required is that we practice
those narratives in as many varied contexts as possible. The more contexts to which we
have applied our narratives, and the more versions of those contexts to which we apply
our narratives, the more pliable they become.
Public speaking pedagogy has been influenced by de Certeau ‘s notions of the
life-practice of speech, but the dualistic approach to speaking has proven resilient
nonetheless. As the understanding of language-as-contact has developed, so has
pedagogy. But like the understanding of language as contact that I traced in the rhetorical
materialist literature, the understanding of language as contact in pedagogy has developed
in fits and starts.
Elocution-based approaches to speaking, which began in the United States as
early as 1915 (Cohen) and which have persisted through today, tend to side with a
“correct” way of speaking or “proper preparation techniques” that need to be learned.
Elocution based approaches engage public speaking like a science oriented around
correcting “bad habits of speech and gesture, and to make the body a fit instrument to
serve the mind and soul” (Cohen, 1915, p. 7). Understanding one’s bad habits is
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obviously important, but so is understanding that “bad habits” themselves are more or
less context driven.
Fulton and Trueblood, two foundational thinkers in early American speech
pedagogy, laid out the dualist mindset for speaking pedagogy by emphasizing (as Plato
did) that speaking practice should emphasize the reproduction of the purest forms of good
speaking. An embodied-embedded approach emphasizes instead how fluid such “proper”
criteria can be in human environments, and emphasizes the exploratory process as a
means of engaging as many contexts as possible. This is not a project that can be
successfully undertaken in the classroom. It has to be something someone does
throughout her or his life—so the goal of an embodied-embedded curriculum would be to
prepare students to engage in such a long-term learning process, rather than attempting to
convey all of the known formal processes of better speaking.
The practice of everyday life began to make its way into speech education in the
1930’s with the advent of approaches like mental hygienics. Mental hygiene was rooted
in Freud’s and Dewey’s notions of well-adjusted personalities, and, in a move more or
less novel to scientific thinking at the time, it incorporated speaking, thinking, and
symbolic acting in that project. While the emphasis here was placed firmly on the
everyday practices of rhetorical life, the dualist approach that elevated knowable forms of
better speech persisted. Bryng Bryngelson, identified by Cohen (1928) as one of the
earliest proponents of this perspective, framed those who struggled with speech as
“speech defectives” and blamed their inabilities on “inadequate adjustments on the part of
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the human organism to their social environment” (p. 208). Cohen charts how mental
hygenists emphasized the day-to-day, organic, embeddedness of speech acquisition,
situating “effective” speech within various fluid social environments; as well as the
ability of speech instructors to enlighten students with regards to their capabilities to
adjust themselves to the environments they find themselves in, but at the same time these
thinkers insisted on known “solutions” for the struggles that students would encounter.
While the concept emphasized the use of language, the reliance on dualistic notions of
“good” hygiene versus “bad” hygiene persisted (p. 121).
Cohen points out that many contemporary classes are turning to group discussion
models, which get very close to the kind of lived-in exercises that embodied-embedded
thinkers demand to learn, but even here the emphasis on “right” and “wrong” forms of
speaking takes precedence. This is in large part because, at least in the United States,
most discussion modes inevitably turn to a yes/no deliberation. Debate education has
long been married to the project of public speaking pedagogy (according to Bartanen the
first competitive debate programs in the US date back to colonial America); when those
discussions are goaded entirely by one conception of argument (competitive/contest
formations being by far the most popular), then the kinds of exploration that students
might enjoy is profoundly limited.
Debate and speech competitions were, initially, a kind of decathlon that would
send students into speaking environments that were interpretive, time-constrained,
memorized and/or extemporaneous. This kind of “all purpose” debate education has
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considerable benefits; however, the competitive spirit won out, and a history of
“fractionation” (Trapp, 1990) began to divide the various events into their own little
worlds as the desire to craft predictable forms of competitive success increased. Now, in
2013, it is hard to find tournaments that offer such a wide expanse of opportunities to
young minds with educators and tournament administrators alike focusing either on
individual speaking events or one of several kinds of debate and frequently doing so
behind disparaging perceptions of the other kind of forensics. Rather than encounter and
explore the kinds of forensics that do not make sense competitors and coaches alike are
opting for “specialization.”
This kind of education is still preferable to relying solely on the classroom, as
forensics competitions of all kinds afford students incredible mobility and numerous
redundant opportunities over the course of their competitive careers to actively and
responsively speak. Unfortunately, the trends of fractionation continue to divide forensics
education in much the same ways that I described in 2009 (Donaldson, 2009). The failure
of forensics educators (of all people) to see eye-to-eye on the need to stay together has
proven costly and the overall future of forensics education as a stable locality for this
kind of practice remains in doubt.
Despite the efforts to shift speaking education towards an active, practiced, and
embedded perspective too many public speaking textbooks continue to rely on
formulation and execution. The lingering components of an emphasis on formulation is
seen in a number of ways including an emphasis on strategic and formulaic lists of tasks
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(like “getting the audience’s attention), the ongoing efforts to segregate for the sake of
learning “informative” speeches from “persuasive” speeches, and in the discussions
surrounding “credibility.”
Getting and maintaining the attention of an audience, something that is obviously
important to an effective speaker, is typically broken down formulaically and the entire
process is more often than not framed strategically. “The speaker has to use just the right
bait” (Lucas, p. 187) and doing so involves relating your topic to your audience, stating
the importance of your topic, startling the audience, questioning the audience, or
beginning with a provocative quotation or story (pp. 188–191). Other texts (O’Brien,
Sprague et al.) suggest relying on a topical joke or other forms of humor for “capturing”
the attention of your audience
Most individuals who understand compelling speeches understand that they most
often do start with something that gets the attention of the audience, and most of us are
probably equally aware of how wrong a speech can go that follows all of the rules.
Attempts at humor, especially, can go wrong quickly when they are forced for the
purpose of “baiting” someone who does not want to be caught. The relationships that are
cultivated and maintained as someone engages and fulfills our attention are complex and
constantly changing. While it can be helpful to approach formulas such as these for new
ideas, fulfilling them all line by line is no promise that we will speak well.
Instead of focusing on the strategic and formulaic capturing of an audience’s
attention, embodied-embedded cognition emphasizes practice. Tell a short story about
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something that you find interesting and then listen to and engage feedback from your
audience. The practice of the story itself and gauging and engaging the response with
your audience is more than most students have access to in a classroom setting and yet
more often than not it is all that they need to develop into natural story tellers. Humans
capture each other’s attention because they have a shared understanding of the
“interesting” components of a shared landscape, a story that is mind blowing to one can
be absolutely drab to another. Framing the process itself as a strategic gambit for a
successful speech forces a substantial amount of focus on a single, albeit important part
of what is going to need to be a sustained conversation. It cannot be faked, and it cannot
be forced.
Another place critics can find a more dualistic conceptualization of public
speaking pedagogy in contemporary text books is with the distinction between persuasive
speeches, informative speeches, and speeches meant to entertain. Of the dozen books that
I surveyed for this dissertation, nearly all of them made use of the method of separating
speech types based on our motivation. This is perhaps most evident in the texts that break
down these kinds of speeches into knowable formula in and of themselves. Persuasive
speeches, for instance, can be broken into three types according to Grice & Skinner
(2006), speeches to convince, speeches to actuate, and speeches to inspire (pp. 285-6).
Speeches aimed at conviction target an audience’s beliefs, while speeches aiming to
actuate works from established beliefs to prompt action. Speeches that aim to inspire
attempt to “change how a listener feels” (Grice & Skinner, 2006, p. 286). Each of these
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motivations can be broken down into knowable and executable strategies, the assumption
being that if we can but execute just the right kind of persuasive speech at just the right
time we will succeed in our efforts to persuade.
Much like earning and keeping the attention of an audience, however, persuasion
is a remarkably complicated task. Between the research on all of the various kinds of
selection or personal biases and the Western stigma attached to admitting defeat in an
argument, it could be argued that deliberative persuasion (the “you were right and I was
wrong” part of deliberation) is a myth! It is here that the arbitrary distinctions between
persuasive speeches and informative speeches become incredibly problematic; as most
individuals will not be persuaded by an argument that does not appear to be informative.
And whether that argument is or is not informative has much more to do with that
particular audience’s histories with the entirety of the discussion (as well as with the
“kinds” of rhetors that they identify before them) than it ever could with a carefully
executed tactic.
Persuasive speaking from an embodied-embedded perspective looks more like a
bunch of chefs working together to season a soup than a “yes it is / no it isn’t” moment of
advocacy. Rhetors bring their own personal tastes to the soup (perhaps it’s the debate
about whether or not the United States should allow Stand Your Ground legislation), and
rather than attempting to make the soup one thing in particular, the object is to react to
the seasonings that are added by our interlocutors in a way that makes the soup at least
somewhat enjoyable.
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The formulaic emphasis on speech making stretches into all of the various
phenomenon of public speaking, including “credibility” (which can be broken down
according to Grice & Skinner among initial credibility, derived credibility, and terminal
credibility for the purpose of study); a “supportive climate” for invitational speeches
consists of “the condition of equality, the condition of value, the condition of selfdetermination” being successfully instilled within an audience (Scholtz, 229, 30); the lists
go on. The point is not to disparage this list making, lists can be enormously helpful;
instead it is to question an approach which puts so much emphasize on conceptualization
and which ultimately must then put so little emphasis on enactment.
The difference is that the contemporary approach emphasizes a scaffolded
understanding based on lists and best practices as opposed to a scaffolded understanding
of sensitivity-driven practice. Drawing on both forms of scaffolding might just lead one
into a career in communication. Maintaining credibility, let alone a complicated
supportive climate open to input from all, is incredibly difficult. More often than not
doing so is as much the product of good faith as it is of sound execution. An embodiedembedded perspective draws on lists for inspiration, but points to the doing and more
importantly to the interrogation of that doing that can go on when we decide to practice
speech.
The single greatest hurdle to classroom-based approaches to public speaking has
to be the finite amount of time available to all of the students eager to get their chance to
practice. This problem is only exacerbated by the disturbing trend to increase attendance
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in online classes where presence itself is sacrificed for the digital tokens of a liberal
education. This section focused on critiquing some of the more common places that
dualistic conceptions of “better” speaking persist in contemporary speech pedagogy, the
next section attempts to devise some alternatives.
“The gym” – A New Model for Public Speaking Classrooms
I have reluctantly embraced the gym metaphor to help articulate the kind of public
speaking classroom that best mobilizes students in their efforts to learn how to become
more sensitive and morphological speakers. There are many kinds of gymnasiums, those
oriented for play, those oriented for weight lifting, those oriented for basketball, or
racquetball, or even swimming. There is even such a thing as a “jungle gym” which
barely fits the frame – all of these impressions (plus the many to be invented by readers)
are involved in my invoking of the term. From an embodied-embedded standpoint,
nothing substitutes repetitions and the primary goal for a public speaking classroom
should be to maximize the chances students get to speak. Dialogue and extemporaneous
speaking receive priority, as those are perhaps the most important kinds of scaffolding
that speakers need to develop. This means not only incorporating a more discussion based
approach to classroom learning – something many contemporary educators are already
doing – but also letting go of some age-old assumptions regarding what is necessary to
speak well.
For example, an embodied-embedded approach based on lived life practice more
or less “outsources” the research component to the student’s daily lives. While there is
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certainly tremendous value to learning and implementing rigorous research techniques,
when it comes to public speaking, familiar research tends to be the most important. One’s
ability to speak to their topic will have much more to do with their ability to recognize
and articulate key components of the discussion, something that is more or less presumed
in the “research” section of textbooks without any understanding as to how such
familiarity comes about. Instead of having students prepare speeches about topics that
matter to them, but which they may not have much first hand experience, embodiedembedded classrooms should encourage students to focus primarily on the kinds of
claims that they feel that they can justify. Whether or not these claims are “right” or
“wrong” is something that gets fleshed out in the back and forth that hopefully
accompanies the numerous repeated opportunities to speak – as students are pressed for
“better” or “more accurate” warrants or examples they will have to either produce them
or change their argument. This is not to suggest that students do not need to do any
reading or to engage with sources outside their own acquired knowledge – deliberation
itself is a fantastic mode of doing just this – but rather to emphasize that this issue
scrutiny is more or less inevitable if we are enabled to speak within the confines of topics
that we already understand. Research becomes the stuff of life, not something that we do
only when we are attempting to craft and deliver a speech.
The topic of organizing speeches, in most public speaking textbooks, is typically
accompanied with a variety of various outlining exercises and techniques. Picking a
traditional outline and sticking to it – at all costs – in the name of clarity and fluency
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tends to be the focus, despite the fact that this kind of structure up front hardly accounts
for the ways that humans reason. A good outline, like a good definition, is like a map in
that its value is predicated entirely upon the use that it will be put to. And the uses of a
speech are inevitably as varied as the audiences that may encounter the speech. Rather
than emphasizing a strict approach to outlining and structuring, I argue that the ability to
shift between and within outlines should be the priority. And instead of turning to
“traditional” outline formats, I turn, once again, to Kenneth Burke for clues on what
makes a good outline.
Burke, in his summary of what makes a good definition, tells us that definitions
are usually the last thing that a speaker comes across. Speakers “hit upon” them as a
“breakthrough” and we should keep trying for them until they “click” – remembering at
all times that they may unclick at any moment. A good outline has “just enough clauses,
and no more” and they should be arranged in a way that makes deriving “all of the
properties attributed to the thing defined” understandable (Burke, p. 491). This is hardly
the kind of specificity that “type A” personalities (those most likely to emphasize the kind
of structured thinking that outlines offer) will suffer, but it speaks to the real fact that
there is no “correct,” or even “better” way to arrange the matter of a subject. This should
not be mistaken for a kind of structural relativism, organizing one’s thoughts and signposting their progress for their audience remain key forms of repetition and reiteration
that enable embodied-embedded listeners to learn, but it does suggest that approaches
which emphasize ONE outline might need to loosen up.
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Style is perhaps one of the most elusive terms for embodied-embedded thinkers.
The 2006 film Idiocracy written by satirist Mike Judge demonstrates how the
“reasonable” and “calm” dialogue of one era could rapidly transform into the “weak,”
“snooty,” or “arrogant” tone of another. No example stands so starkly as the seemingly
over-scripted approach of a speaker who begins with “I had prepared some comments to
read from, but I want to be genuine and speak to you from the heart.” Here we have an
effort at “conversational” style speaking that, to some, immediately smacks of overpreparation.
Most texts on the subject emphasize business settings, as if though those are
themselves uniform! Encouraging students to stand when they speak, to dress
“appropriately,” to avoid the need to search for words or to pause for reflection. Failure to
effectively meet these requirements tends to suggest (according to most texts as well as to
public opinion) a lack of respect, preparation, or credibility: the penultimate failure of a
speaking advocate. As complex and fluid as natural speaking is, as positively impossible
as it is to artificially render, one might think humans could find more sympathetic
understandings for such pitfalls. Instead, most tend to base their understanding of
speaking on a form of dualistic expertise that creates arbitrary baselines dependent
primarily on what kind of “expert” we’re asking for.
Speakers are encouraged to find their own voice, to be sensitive to topics that are
controversial (especially if they do not appear so to the speaker), and to liberally sample
from as many different styles as they can enjoy. Rather than thinking of humorous
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moments as carefully crafted pieces of a speech, embodied-embedded speakers are
encouraged to find humor where they will. Rather than encouraging students to dress a
certain way, students are reminded of the pitfalls that one might encounter wearing a suit
for the first time in public (sweat being the most obvious) and encouraged to explore
meaningful “reps” in suites if that is something that matters to them. Hesitations, slips of
phrase, the occasional “um” are, in fact, inevitable. The question should not be how many
ways can we abolish such things but, rather, how might we feel comfortable when we
encounter them?
Memory, like research, is more or less “outsourced” to the student in an embodied
embedded classroom. Remembering is a complicated task for the brain, and the tricks of
the trade are indeed numerous and well documented. Remembering in public, from the
lectern, can be a monumental challenge for many, the odds of success increase
significantly if the issue at hand is one that the student is deeply familiar with. Asking for
prompts, taking time to recall, preparing basic notes that are neither distracting nor overlimiting, these are the techniques that embodied-embedded speakers rely on to remember
all that they have to say. In this instance more than any other, practice, practice, practice,
is the key. Practice admitting you are lost in your own thoughts, or practice stumbling
over a word, if typical communication is anything to go by these forms of practice could
be the most useful “real-world” public speaking assistance a class can offer.
Delivery, the act of articulation, the pace of the speech, the volume shifts of
inflection and the kinds of physical gestures available to the speaker, too emphasizes
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practice. When one stops to think of the dozens of muscles that make up the human face,
tongue, laryngeal, and human breathing systems that are required for language, it is a
miracle we can speak at all! And nowhere do we police the boundaries of “effectiveness”
more thoroughly than with regards to delivery. Accents, mis-pronounced words or names,
quiet shaking tones, we all know these can and do hinder our ability to communicate
effectively, the question is what methods can we embrace to enable ourselves to work
them all out? The use of visual aids and technology like Power Point or Prezi (slide show
software that runs on projector screens) add an entire new dimension of technological
complexity that most individuals, for whatever reason, assume they can jump into
without complication. But what happens when the slide-show fails, when we do say a
word wrong or find ourselves unable to speak as loudly as we would like? What then?
Again, instead of viewing such challenges as signs of a “poor” speech, embodiedembedded pedagogy expects these moments and seeks redundant opportunities to exploit
the necessary experience needed to overcome them. Each speaker has their own
solutions, just as each sensing animal has its own means of accounting for the world
around it, instead of emphasizing perfection in delivery educators ought to emphasize
repetition and practice.
Exercises for Embodied-Embedded Speech Development
At the risk of sounding redundant, the goal of a public speaking classroom should
be to enable practice. From this perspective, discussion oriented classes are ok, but
focused drills and exercises are better. Nothing enables the kind of growth like rigorous,
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4-8 year long engagements with competitive speaking environments can. Competitive
debate, for example, has reached a point of “crisis” where instead of sound assessment of
evidence and facts debaters frequently argue horrific cases (like those rooted in the
Malthusian ethic of self-imposed population deflation), or use rates of delivery that
exceed 250 words per minute to win strategic games (Rowland & Deatherage, 1988). I
have already argued that by emphasizing Conflict Navigation, as opposed to the
traditional expectations of debate educators steeped in Elocutionary or Mental Hygiene
perspectives, even these kinds of “absurd” debate experiments can have meaning
(Donaldson, 2009). The world is full of tasteless, cruel, and inhumane forms of
reasoning, what better way to prepare for them than to devise an activity that exposes us
to them and that encourages us to interrogate them early and often?
Extemporaneous and impromptu speaking are two competitive events developed
through the competitive speaking communities in the US that offer profound potential.
Instead of using class time to discuss a reading, public speaking seminars could parse
these activities down to 2-3 minute drills that can benefit both the students doing the
exercise and all of those listening. Prompts are given (quotations, political cartoons,
objects, or current events questions of the day) and students are given limited time to
prepare a response. Instead of focusing heavily on the “responsive” nature of their speech
educators can craft arbitrary structural formats for students to try to work within. In the
most extreme case I have even encouraged students to give so-called “blah-blah-blah”
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speeches where the only articulated content in their speech is the structural language
selected. Such speeches literally can sound like:
At the beginning of my speech, in my talking point, I would be talking about
something I’m familiar with which demonstrates or contextualizes my thesis
without giving it away. That would lead me to the prompt I’ve been given today
which is the quotation “Ask not what your country can do for you but what you
can do for your country” or, basically, my thesis – blah blah blah blah blah. Today,
we will examine this thesis with three points of analysis. My first point would be
a philosophical or literary point, like blah blah blah. My second point would be a
historical point, like blah blah blah blah blah, and my third point is a
contemporary point – blah blah blah blah blah.
While hardly exhilarating speech making, drills like this help students flex the embodied
aspects of their speaking without the terrifying burden that they actually have something
interesting to say. As students develop they can begin to take their speeches further, out of
the intro and into the body of the speech for example, and maybe even start striving to
include content which may or may not represent their thesis and/or prompt.
Outline exercises, too, can be devised to encourage students to shift between
outlines as opposed to working from within the confines of one. An exercise granted to
me by a colleague serves as a fitting example. Students are broken into groups of 3-5 and
given an assortment of various singly-wrapped candies (eg. suckers, Jolly Rancher
candies, Starbursts, Tootsie Rolls) and asked to arrange them in any way they see fit.
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Each group, inevitably, will come up with their own take on the project, the order of each
group “making sense” to them as they go. Some will organize their candies based on
flavor, others on color, others on preference. Some may even go so far as to include such
categories as sugar content, meltability, and on. Then, each group is asked to share their
organization and the class, as a whole, compares and contrasts that organization to the
others, making still more organizational sense and giving each group the ability to adapt
to and even adopt organizational schemes that they had not thought of themselves.
Without even noticing it, the student who explains the organization is delivering an
outline. The more the outline makes sense to that student, typically, the easier it is to
remember and draw upon. Instead of thinking of an outline as something that gets made,
embodied-embedded perspectives emphasize the elaboration of useful structure, an
emergent outline as opposed to one set in stone from the beginning. Even notions like
internal structure can be addressed, as groups such as flavor can then be internally
organized by color – hence the advent of superstructure—and as the exercise develops
students deploy and manipulate the necessary language to navigate within each outline.
This deceptively simple exercise has all sorts of practical opportunities for students to
“make sense” in ways that matter to them, and while it may not always result in the most
flawless outline delivery, the ability to use the outline to make further sense is more or
less endemic.
Even single phrase exercises can be enormously helpful for individuals who are
not used to speaking their mind out loud. In similar fashion to the blah-blah speech,
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students may be given a prompt and then various amounts of time to write a single thesis
that they would then read to the class when the time was up. The requirement would be
that, like speech, they are not allowed to correct something they have written without
saying it out loud. So if they scribbled part of their thesis out in the writing process, they
would have to read “scribble scribble” when they announced it to the class. The class
would then discuss what kind of thesis it was (is it a normative claim or a description?
Does it require multiple claims to be developed or simply one?) and the next student
would go. Encouraging students to find thesis in inanimate objects or “off the wall”
prompts can add a good deal of humor to the enterprise without getting too wrapped up in
who had “the smartest thing to say.”
This activity, which I have unhappily dubbed “thesis sharp-shooting,” emphasizes
precision, reflection, and care without putting the students in the spotlight when they
think. The next step, obviously, would be to merge this exercise with full-scale
impromptu and extemporaneous speaking drills to get a larger “workout” in when the
student felt ready.
More prepared speeches, too, can be explored from an embodied-embedded
perspective. Prior classes I have taught were told to write a 1 – 2 page paper describing
three issues, topics, or themes that they felt like they could talk about from a position of
authority. Themes were as varied as “the best binding for snowboarders” to “the best
episode of Gossip Girl” and, once collected, they were organized as best as I was able
into “discourse communities.” Topics about TV shows might get lumped together, music
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conversations could get lumped together, there really is no need for a rhyme or reason to
the lumping provided the topics are at least tangentially related. Throughout the course
students are expected to meet with their discourse communities to “make sense” of their
topics as some sort of cohesive whole. These understandings are then presented – panel
style – to the class at or near the mid-term as the first public “rep” of their practiced
speech. Each student then is expected to meet with the professor to take the next step,
from the confines of the discourse community to the topic of their speech – what do they
have to say that matters? At the end of the term they are given 10 minutes to do what they
will to explain their topic to the class.
Burke’s metaphor heuristic, discussed in Chapter Three, suggests that metaphor
use itself could be a potentially useful form of linguistic “exercise.” The Metaphor game
is an activity that selects an “artifact” (like The United States) and then gives students in
groups or working alone time to select an image schema for exploring the artifact.
Students come up with some that are obvious (America is a “melting pot”, America is an
“experiment”) and some that are less obvious (America is an “old house,” America is a
“smart phone”) and then more time is given for students to flesh out the entailments of
their schema. After a few minutes, the instructor collects the metaphors through
discussion, and, suddenly, everyone is contributing to a bubbling conversation.
Disagreements crop up (like when one student defines America as a “terrorist”), the
disagreements too pave their own useful paths for inquiry and practice. Sharing these
entailments takes elaboration, the fact that there is no “right way” to describe America as
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either a “melting pot” or an “Old House” opens the doors for students to explore into the
realms which make useful sense.
America is obviously not a “thing” that has substance that can be measured,
quantified, or contained. If America is anything at all it is a collection of all of these
narratives. Those interested in speaking confidently about what America is or is not
would do well to familiarize themselves with as many of these “as-if” approaches to their
subject as possible. Rather than emphasizing confidence, this approach emphasizes
familiarity. At the same time it insists that even the most mundane and predictable image
schema can often produce startling and unforeseen arcs of understanding.
Because these conversations and talking opportunities are shared there are
boundless ethical implications. What if participants insist on propagating hate speech?
What if participants are abusive? How are those environments climbed over? The next
chapter takes on the challenges of goading that development for the cause of good.
Because if history has taught us anything it is that people can be persuaded to endorse all
sorts of evil, overt and nefariously invisible, if their attitudes and doctrine permit it. At
the end of the day words do not go out into an ether, as perhaps some of the “blah blah”
styled exercises might suggest, they matter in the bodies of others. Once students are
liberated to make the kinds of sense that they will, there must be an equally important
insistence that they take care of the kind of sense that they make to and of others.
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Chapter Five: Ethical Conundrums for Embodied-Embedded Speakers
Every [person] of the present day knows that all have an equal right to life and the
good things of life, and that one set of people are not better nor worse than
another, that all are equal. Everyone knows this, beyond doubt; everyone feels it
in [their] whole being. Yet at the same time everyone sees all round the division of
[people] in to two castes – the one, laboring, oppressed, poor, and suffering, the
other idle, oppressing, luxurious, and profligate. And everyone not only sees this,
but voluntarily or involuntarily, in one way or another, takes part in maintaining
this distinction which conscience condemns. (Tolstoy, 2008, p. 78)
This dissertation has argued that language is a sense, that it makes sense as a
result of contact in ways that are constitutive and real. Throughout I have begged the
question, if language is a sense then what kinds of sense are we willing to make? To what
extent will we allow ourselves to claim to understand other people? What kinds of
justifications will we give to their actions? What impressions of others will we allow to
govern or explain our responses to Others? Does an individual have a choice to
experience racism, for example, or does it “wound” (Matsuda et. al.) like a bruise or a cut
without our participation? These are not “simply” theoretical questions if language makes
sense; they are material questions about practice.
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The “Copernican shift” from a transmission model to a language-as-contact model
suggests that speaking is not simply a sharing of abstractions, it is a form of touch. The
move towards embodied embedded cognition and away from cognitivism enlists our
imaginations in “moralistic” ways (Johnson, 1994) – if sensation is enactive then we
participate in rendering Others as villains. Communicating matters and so those
interested in using communication for good and not for evil will be forced to grapple with
ethics.
In Chapter Two I argued that it is the most mundane and ordinary forms of
discursive mattering that ultimately matter the most. If language is indeed a sense then so
long as there is narrative action (mental, purposeful, or otherwise) then language is
participating in rendering the sensible, contactable world. The language that we convey
(purposefully, accurately or otherwise) strikes bodies, leaving what one advisor of mine
has called “affective legacies.” These legacies are not just like scars - they are scars. Like
scars not all language is painful; language also can heal. Language nourishes us,
stimulates vibrant and happy growth, without it we all suffer tremendously.
Moralistically, each moment we spend framing Others, either as “conniving,” or
as “liars,” or as “innocent,” or as “threatening,” enacts a sensorial mapping of their
existence. The stories we tell ourselves and each other regarding the relationships we
have, the expectations that we have, the patience that we have lost or the faith that is illplaced, matter. These stories dictate how and what we can see. For a great and growing
tradition of nonviolent thinkers this means that for true revolutionary rhetoric to “work”
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(whatever that word might mean), it must be ever-forgiving, ever-humble, and always
patient. Rather than focus on the forms (the noun-matter) of language, the focus for many
of these thinkers is placed upon the attitudes (the verb-matter) that goad our symbolic
explorations – and as I have argued in Chapter Three shifting the attitudinal frames of
argument, for instance, from “fighting a war” to “making a soup” can have tangible and
substantial effects. Ethical communication means acknowledging that our very existence
as symbol-users is replete with sensorial lies like color, or balance; all sensation to one
extent or another, is a story and how we tell those stories matters.
Take the idea of reciprocity for example. Notions of love, of justice, and most
notions of peace rely in the typical on some form of reciprocity or another. Reciprocity
exists in nonviolence, as an end (more of a symptom than anything), but never – ever – as
a means. Expecting the best of other people while enduring the worst could (inevitably
should) lead to mutual respect and a cessation of hostilities, but when put into practice,
the barrage of aggression that represents status quo relating can quickly become
deflating. This aggression is rooted in innumerable justifications like impatience,
exhaustion, frustration, even love. Arguing with people who are willing to distort our
image feels sacrificial, and in many ways it actually is, and it will always be enticing to
“correct the record” or deal out retributive punishment. But enabling this kind of sense to
be made unleashes still more of it into the world. Finding creative and self-critical outlets
for aggression, refusing as much as one is able to “strike back,” “being the change that
we want to see” – responses to aggression like this change materially the legacies left
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behind and they transform completely the terrain of life that stretches forward from there
for all involved.
If language is a sense than it inevitably follows that no other form of symbolic
mattering has more potential to propel the human experiment more directly towards
peace and prosperity than the practices of nonviolence as described by over a century of
advocates including Leo Tolstoy, John Ruskin, Martin Buber, Gene Sharpe, and Marshall
Rosenberg, to name a few. If humans can become as committed to nonviolent rhetorics as
they are to violent ones, what potential futures might lay in store? It is said that Tolstoy
and Ruskin’s works inspired Mahatma Gandhi, arguably the single most effective
nonviolent advocate of all time, to quit his law practice and pursue a life of resistance that
changed colonial history in India and the conversation about nonviolence worldwide
forever. Moreover, Martin Buber famously served as an influential touchstone for
Emmanuel Levinas, a deeply influential French existentialist and ethicist; and Gene
Sharpe’s deceptively slim text “From Dictatorship to Democracy” reportedly is serving as
the how-to manual for student resisters in Chile and protestors engaged in the so-called
“Arab Spring” alike. Marshall B. Rosenburg’s communication-based textbook-style
approach to “A Language of Life,” meanwhile, is a contemporary bestseller that
motivates theologians, philosophers, and popular authors including William Ury (Getting
to Yes) and Jack Canfield (from the hugely popular Chicken Soup for the Soul series). The
potentials of nonviolent practice are plain enough, and yet nonviolence as a life-practice
enjoys modest if not possibly growing public acceptance at best. The maddeningly
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consistent tepid and often indifferent stance that most have to the immanent questions
posed by nonviolence as it is outlined by these thinkers is responsible, according to
Tolstoy, for 99% all of the violence in human life (p. 27). For Tolstoy, and for those who
understand the material implications of language, the question of nonviolence is “the
most essential question” (2008, p. 24). In his words, how can Christians in particular and
society in general reconcile the perceived duties of love (or at least Justice) for all,
neighbors and enemies alike, with our sensed compulsions to justify the use of force
against those who would do evil? For embodied-embedded symbolic thinkers the
question sounds more like how can those of us who believe that violence is never
optimal, never good, reconcile ourselves with our willingness to participate in hate
speech, uncharitable representations of Others, or blame?
This dissertation has pondered what it means, materially, to re-examine the role of
language as constitutive articulate contact, this conversation culminates in a call to
reassess the practical validity of nonviolence. Nonviolence offers the best politic to justly
account for a human ethic of language as constitutive contact. If one accepts that
language does matter, and if one believes that each of us ought to be valued the same, that
we are each owed an existence that is to the greatest extent possible free of cruelty from
others, then a troubling double-bind emerges. For as we use words to relate, we
unnaturally crystalize our relating in ways that are always, to some extent, violent. Rather
than offer a panacea in the face of violence, nonviolent histories offer an oppositional
politic of humility, meekness, charity, and most importantly good faith. This politic
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materializes human relating in important and transformative ways and, for the sake of this
project, it also represents the only ethical way to account for the linguistic forms of
mattering that symbolicity imbues into our lives.
I will begin with a discussion of the inevitability of violence (which in principle
sits at the very heart of the suspending nature of perception) an in the “The “undefined, if
not disingenuous” attitudes of “modern thinkers” (Tolstoy) and then explore some of the
practical solutions advocated by those mentioned above. In particular I will explore the
political practices suggested by Leo Tolstoy and Martin Buber. Both Tolstoy and Buber
situate the transformative potential of nonviolence within the practice of life – they argue
compellingly that unless humans take seriously the “commandments” 27 of nonviolence
then the atrocities of war and violent crime and hatred will continue. Put another way,
humans have the potential to live nonviolently if and only if nonviolence matters through
us. Nonviolence can, if we choose, form a sort of scaffolding – a perspective on
perspectives as Burke might say - which offers humanity the ability to remain cognizant
of the “new material” realities that language as contact imposes.
Human Nature is Violent, but Not Like That
Today, in an age when the call for Civil Rights appears to have an especially
global clamor, hardly anybody will willingly justify cruel treatment, neglect, or violent
behavior as a rule of thumb - and yet this kind of human relating persists. Why? The
answer, according to nonviolent doctrine and embodied-embedded symbolic thinkers
27 Used in Tolstoy’s sense with an explicitly Orthodox tilt and in Buber’s sense with a decidedly “spiritual
but not religious” sort of secular lean.
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alike is startlingly simple: We refuse to be sensitive to the ways that we participate in
violence and because we refuse to take the alternatives seriously.
Scientific libraries are full of texts depicting the “nasty, brutish, and short” nature
of humankind. According to these perspectives humanity is doomed to some degree of
violence because we are selfish and thus untrustworthy, deceitful, and (perhaps most
famously) because we are excessively emotional and therefore vulnerable to swings of
violent passion. Nonviolent advocates concede that there is a form of “natural” violence
inherent in our being, but it is not this kind of violence. The endemic violence in our
nature sits not in any competitive motivistic inevitability or even in some kind of
emotional flaw but rather in the very nature of our kinds of perception and in a stubborn
inability to recognize the power that our action in perception entails. The “undefined, if
not disingenuous” attitudes of “modern thinkers” to the phenomenon of violence are the
root of our ongoing tragedies, not some fatalistic human characteristic.
Despite the inherently violent nature of our symbolic reasoning that I will explore
below, and contrary to the popular beliefs that the world is growing more violent due to
“natural” human characteristics, Harvard experimental psychologist Steven Pinker (2011)
has charted the “surprising decline in violence,” throughout recorded history. Pinker
demonstrates that the linear increase in violence that humanity has experienced since the
dawn of traceable time is inconsequential when plotted against the exponential curves in
population growth and population density that have coincided with this increase. Any
exponential trend plotted next to a linear trend will result in a runaway effect, in order to
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keep up with the massively compounding densities of human settlements we would need
to see unmitigated slaughter to even sustain the argument that we are remotely violent.
Instead, we see a sterilization of violence as governments and non-state-actors alike
attempt to account for the growing transparency of their crimes in the face of a horrified
public.
If this more or less established fact of the benevolence of mammalian biology
(see Bartal et al. 2011; Waal, 2007; Langford et al. 2006) seems excessively idealistic it is
because it is not the common perspective that we put on our understanding of the
“nature” of humans. Contemporary Western thinkers are used to thinking of evolution as
a sort of “tooth and claw” process of naturally violent and destructive self-selection. This
is, of course, not the only perspective one can take on evolution. Many scientific thinkers
are re-examining the role of cooperation, co-existence, and pure symbiosis in natural
selectivity including a seemingly growing number who insist that kindness is profoundly
advantageous. One Harvard biologist and mathematician even goes so far as to suggest
that naturalists replace the conservative and well-trodden perspective of the “struggle” to
survive with a much more explanatory and representative notion of a “snuggle” to
survive (Nowak, 2012); and a New York University astrophysicist has argued that
evolution itself (observably governed by the acquisition of powerful technology)
“ultimately selects for wisdom” (Soter, 2005, emphasis added).
Despite the growing acceptance of nonviolent practice and nonviolent principals
there continues to be a lagging public commitment to the practices espoused by
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nonviolent thinkers. Today, as ever, typical liberal and conservative members of the
public alike will say they are “all for nonviolence, up to a point.” Tolstoy argues that
believing in benevolence “to a point” only reduces the question of force to “a question of
the definition of danger” (p. 26). Such a reduction prompts, an ultimatum: “Either [we
must] find a real unquestionable criterion of what is evil or [we must] not resist evil by
force” (p. 33). Many are too hard pressed to believe in the demonstrably transformative
power of human mattering to take the leap that this ultimatum requires, and so instead we
squabble over ever-changing and coldly indifferent kinds of criteria, and thus toll on the
bodies and in the lives of people “just like us” continues.
Violence is inherent in our perception placing exhausting and often frustrating
demands on the practices of our everyday lives. Sensation, perception, and even
consciousness itself are all rooted in wholly non-natural felt moments of suspension.
Chapter Two examined how the brain has to reconfigure the experience of time, shutting
off the here and now in many regards to display a “new and improved” experience of the
conscious moments leading up to and following, say, the connection of a baseball with a
bat.
The uninterrupted view of the present felt by a ballplayer who has achieved a hit
and turned to run towards first base is, in fact, a false history. As Campbell has pointed
out, if we were to see the perceptions in real time we would not see the ball strike the bat
until milliseconds after we had turned to run down the baseline. Instead, the brain
inscribes the vision of the moment of impact into our memory at the same time that it
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inhibits it from appearing when it should, at what would otherwise be a very “absurd”
moment in our lives. In this regard “now” is, in many ways, really, a then and the as of
yet unknowable future is always already inscribing itself in an active and receptive (but
by no means subjective) flesh. We never experience the present, and the present felt in
our symbolic thinking is no different.
An approach to language as articulate contact implies that the very act of figuring
(like all acts of perception) is inherently violent towards a dynamic and emergent reality.
Kenneth Burke routinely pointed our how integral negation is to definition. Butler
summarizes, “… marking off will have some normative force and, indeed, some violence,
for it can construct only through erasing; it can bound a thing only through enforcing a
certain criterion, a principle of selectivity” (1993, xx).
In Martin Buber’s ( words, symbols craft the ever-changing world into a
conglomeration of knowable Its.
[Humans] perceive … simply events, and actions as events; things consisting of
qualities, events of moments; things entered in the graph of place, events in that of
time; things and events bounded by other things and events, measured by them,
comparable with them: [humans] perceive an ordered and detached world. It is to
some extent a reliable world, having density and duration. It’s organization can be
surveyed and brought out again and again; gone over with closed eyes, and
verified with open eyes. (p. 33).
We must engage the world through these Its, they are in fact how we ourselves come to
be, but they are not reality. Reality is much too large, and much too fluid, to ever be
comprehensively accounted for through It. Language, even in its fluidity, is always
already detached from the present moment, because presence, itself, is an experience
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concocted as if by the brain. By working around and through language humanity is
endowed with the ability to characterize and thus transform the present, but we are still
not capable of living there. So while language does indeed possess incredible potential
for the future, each future that is linguistically concocted is going to be rife with new
challenges to which to become sensitive. The ethical problems with language are inherent
in language itself. This means there is no end product for nonviolent thinkers and
explains why the emphasis is always placed on attitude as opposed to form.
Each time we “make” an object for ourselves, either to experience it or to use it,
we rob ourselves of the present and persist solely in the past. Events, actions, qualities,
causes, even the sense of detachment itself are all rooted conceptually and biologically in
our affordance-driven embodied-embedded existence, none of these experiences are
necessarily fundamental components of the universe. Like rainbows, these experiences
are real in that they do matter, but they are not necessarily universally real in any
essential sense of the word.
For Buber, all of existence is a “meeting” and thus “relation is the cradle of actual
life” (Griffin, 2006, p. 241). Experience itself must be rooted in subjectivity, itself a
fiction fabricated and endorsed by our brains and minds, before it can ever be objectively
experienced. Buber endears himself to embodied-embedded scholars in this regard,
emphasizing not only that “a world that is ordered is not the world-order” (p. 31) but also
that “it lies with yourself how much of the immeasurable becomes reality for you” (p.
32). The meeting processes of existence are not organized to create the world but, rather,
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to assure us of our “solidarity with the world” (ibid). In emphasizing our role in relating,
Buber implicates us always-already as violating the “real” state of nature (a relation that
he terms Thou). In all of our voluntary and involuntary efforts to “make sense” we thus
become straddled with a very secular notion of original sin. “We have to be concerned, to
be troubled,” Buber implores, “not about the other side but about our own side, not about
grace but about will” (p. 76).
Unfortunately, more often than not, humans do not take the time to become
troubled or to become concerned. In 1884 when Leo Tolstoy wrote his influential treatise
on nonviolence entitled What I Believe he was frustrated by what he described as a
“persistent silence … as though by agreement” among “believers, and … unbelieving
liberals” alike over the seriousness of the question posed by nonviolence advocates
stretching back through most of recorded human time. Tolstoy charted the ways that most
people will dismiss conversations about the potential of nonviolent practice and
responded to each, demonstrating how more often than not they were rooted in
misinformation or other forms of careless misunderstanding. The seemingly willful or at
the very least negligent forms that misunderstanding about nonviolence takes, according
to Tolstoy, is the reason why human violence persists.
The most prominent response charted by Tolstoy was that in the cases where
violence was justified it was “only” because of extreme or extenuating circumstances.
“I’m all for nonviolence,” the saying typically goes “… up to a point.” Every act of
violence, from those of the genocidal murderers to those of the common gossip, in fact
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must be justified this way; “all [people] who happen to be in authority assert that their
authority is necessary to keep the bad from oppressing the good, assuming that they
themselves are the good par excellence, who protect other good people from the bad” (p.
161). The point at which any leader is seen by their people to be a “senseless” or
“wanton” murder or mere monster is also the point at which their reign – no matter how
mighty or glorious or influential – will come to a quick and unrepentant end. The most
powerful dictators the world has ever seen have all been forced into spending fabulous
amounts of money on tragically farcical propaganda due entirely to this simple fact.
The reality is humans (both ancient and domestic) deplore violence. It takes an
incredible amount of training and commitment to anesthetize the body to the many
biological agonies induced by causing harm to Others. And even then - when the
“soldier” has become completely objectified as an instrument of war - one cannot be too
certain that the commitment to do harm will hold fast if it is not always completely
“justified.” The longer one is asked to thrive doing the acts of violence that are not
“justifiable,” the more likely it becomes that they will defect.
For Leo Tolstoy, too, the question is one of will. Will the revolutionaries,
conservatives, positivists, or secularists take nonviolent practice seriously? Sadly, in his
experience and in my own, the answer tends to be no. Tolstoy testifies that the
conservatives refuse to consider nonviolence because “this principle would hinder their
[persecution and punishment] … as applied to the revolutionist” and in a strange and
tragic twist of revolutionary and conservative agreement the same applies for those
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standing in resistance. “Because this principle would hinder their resistance to evil as
applied to the conservatives and the overthrowing of them” most revolutionists ignore the
nonviolence conversation as well (78). What results is a human existence which at once
avows an equal right to “life and the good things in life” but which is also replete with
tremendous suffering and one cannot help but suffer from the “contradiction and [our]
share in it” (ibid). This suffering, for Tolstoy, is the suffering of a people who have defied
the single most important commandment of their God; the commandment of nonresistance to evil by force.
Tolstoy exposes three kinds of forms that the “exceptional” acquiescence to
violence takes: the first frames war and violence as an “incidental phenomenon” owed to
special political or economic situations; the second frames violence as something “cruel
and hideous, but at the same time fated and inevitable, like disease and death, 28 and the
third form views war “with a cool indifference” as something “beneficial in its effects
and therefore desirable” (p. 92). Notably for Tolstoy the reality of human violence rests
on attitude. “We are held fast in the toils of officialdom and red tape” Tolstoy argues “and
too rude a shock would be needed to set us free” (p. 105). Violence is inevitable in a
world where there are wicked people, and in Tolstoy’s view, wickedness comes from this
“cruel superstition” that only violence can end violence.

28 This frame in particular prompts me to recall a quotation by one of the many pacifists to serve in the US
Congress, Jeannette Rankin (R-MT) who famously argued “you can no more win a war than you can
win an earthquake.” Rankin notably stood alone in voting “nay” on the US’s involvement both in World
War I and World War II.
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This superstition is rooted in at least one gross misunderstanding of what
nonviolence requires. The misunderstanding is that nonviolence involves “doing nothing”
in the face of evil. Nothing could be further from the truth. The “oppositional” nature of
nonviolent action asks advocates to put their very bodies on the line in the face of danger.
Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr. both demonstrated this willingness when
they, along with their numerous followers, willingly walked into the blows of their
oppressors. Rather than advocating “nothing,” these individuals argued that we are in fact
obligated to name and to say “no” to violence – even it that means absorbing the brunt of
violence ourselves.
For Tolstoy it is rooted in scripture that Christians must “turn the other check” and
essentially allow the oppressors to demonstrate their wickedness. The example was set by
Christ, via the crucifixion - a penultimate act of sacrifice that could only elicit from
Tolstoy’s Savior genuine pleas for forgiveness on behalf of those who would so willingly
do harm. There is no vengeance in presenting oneself to be crucified there is only the
material example of good faith.
Such demonstrations will obviously inflict tremendous pain and even (all too
often) death. History is replete with examples of nonviolent advocates who willingly
gave their lives so that the brutality of their oppressors could be known. The visible
rendering of this pain that the nonviolent advocate represents eventually brings
condemnation. And for Tolstoy at least, no disciplining force among humans is more
powerful than societal condemnation. No force on earth, he argues, can normalize that
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which everyone in the community has agreed is “taboo.” Opinion governs our actions,
not the threat of violence, and Tolstoy, Gandhi, King, and many many more operate under
the good faith that public opinion will always (if only eventually) side with a
demonstrably nonviolent oppressed as opposed to with the oppressors. If nothing else
oppositional forms of “no” refuse to participate in rendering more violence. At the very
least these forms of resistance manifest less violence because instead of two sides
committing to oppression there is only one.
Both Tolstoy and Buber understand violence to be, to some extent or another,
inevitable. This is not because humanity is flawed, but because humanity has not come to
grips with its potential. This potential in both cases is rooted in life practice, which both
thinkers cast as profoundly material. Relationships, governed in large part by how we
will willingly cast Others via our symbolicity, matter. The fact that symbols are not
transmitted but rather selected, interpreted, and understood in good faith suggests that
while we may be inevitably violent in some regards, we are at the same time incredibly
creative at generating alternatives to violence. These alternatives themselves introduce a
whole host of new opportunities as well as (Burke would add) a whole host of new
embarrassments. The next section in this chapter takes on the alternatives and the
difficulties and promises that they hold.
Destiny or Fate – the Pursuit of Thou
Opposition, saying “no” through self-sacrifice and exposure, and naming but not
participating in the kinds of violence that human action entails are the first steps for
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Tolstoy. He quotes the signers of a 1838 peace convention who (in very Burkean terms)
“expect to prevail through the Foolishness of Preaching.” The ability to argue, to reason,
and to name and devise nonviolent practices in response to violence, according to these
delegates – even in the face of “insult, outrage, suffering, yea, even death itself” was the
only possible solution (p. 9). The Kingdom of God, therefore, is within us. All we have to
do is have the courage to make it matter.
For Buber the willingness or unwillingness to take such steps is the difference
between “destiny” and “fate.” Fate, in Buber’s eyes, is all that awaits a humanity that
dwells in the world of It. The best humans can hope for if they opt to live a life
monopolized by their own petty understanding is hell – we make our own fate by
insisting that we are in control. Destiny is, in many ways, unknowable – but it is no less
attainable. According to Buber, destiny stands “in need” of us. It does not drag us with
“leading strings” but instead “awaits” (p. 59). What, exactly, destiny entails is an
impossible question to answer – every effort one makes at defining and achieving destiny
is only time spent dwelling in It. As Buber puts it Thou may only be “addressed, not
expressed” (vii). The relation that reveals the face of Thou cannot be named or defined –
Buber tells us that “when Thou is spoken, the speaker has no thing; [but rather] nothing”
(p. 4). “Just as the melody is not made up of the notes nor the verse of the words nor the
statue of lines, but they must be tugged and dragged till their unity has been scattered into
these many pieces, so with the [relation] that I call Thou” (p. 9).
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Love is as close as Buber can come to naming Thou, but even here he is hesitant.
For love is often a fixation and a fiction, a motivated story we tell of all that we hold dear
and all that we desire in Others. Such desires and fascinations are the stuff of It, the love
of Thou is rooted in a reverence for the ever presenting moment and the never-ending
potential that it holds. There are no expectations or social economies in the realm of
Thou, expectations and economies are “fantasies” that we concoct and which lead only to
fate. In 1862 economist John Ruskin (2006) took the fanciful nature of economics
seriously and argued that humanity can chose to live either in an economy of taking (in a
world where a very few are enabled to benefit tremendously on the suffering of the many)
or in an economy of giving (a world where collaboration and charity lead to profits and
production that previously could not have even been imagined). Every moment lived in
Thou is “bound to become an It” (Buber, p. 33), “no saying of the Thou is able to yield
final reality” (Buber, p. 88), and therefore the project of destiny is never-ending, always
unfolding before us. Thus our lives of It and our lives of Thou are always “entangled”
and only a reverence for the Other that is continual and unyielding can tease the two
apart.
One of Buber’s more famous respondents was Emmanual Levinas. Levinas
characterizes a similar relationship between It and Thou as a discrepancy between the
said and the saying. In Pinchevski’s (2005) terms, Levinas critiqued the tendency in
communication scholarship to emphasize the said (the “contents conveyed in language –
logos, information and knowledge”) as opposed to the saying (“the giving of a said to
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another person; … the offering of signs to the Other”), which is the “primary mode” of
communication in Levinasian ethics (10). Davis (2005) translates the saying as “a
performative, an address that necessarily unsettles what is congealed in the already-said”
(193). The Levinasian model posits communication as interruption which at once reveals
or conceals Others and thus for Levinas, too, the project of philosophy ought to be
situated “not as a love of wisdom but rather as the wisdom of love” (Pinchevski, p. 20).
And this love cannot be codified in any form of said – it only exists in each iterative
moment of saying.
Hyde (2010) brings Burke into conversation with Levinas and Buber by
interpreting one definitive component of humanity writ Burke (that we are “rotten with
perfection”) as an over-reliance on the said. In Burke’s terms, through symbolicity
humans come to expect a “complete satisfaction” – “the mere desire to name something
by its ‘proper’ name, or to speak a language in its distinctive ways is intrinsically
‘perfectionist’” (1963, p. 507). This “rotten” nature of the “symbol using/mis-using
animal” can induce dissatisfaction not only with the inability of symbols to transmit
meaning, but also with the inability to live a life as we think it ought to be lived. Our
relationships with work, family and friends become wrapped in expectation that is, in
truth, mere fantasy. When this fantasy is not fulfilled it can all seem hopeless. Despite the
miracle that is our ability to ponder our lives, humans often end up bitter about the kind
of mattering such pondering brings about.
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In contrast, Rosenberg (2003) has described I-Thou relationality as “human
growth [that] occurs through a meeting between two individuals who express themselves
vulnerably and authentically” (p. 175); for Pinchevski (2005) it is “a discourse inclusive
of the Other rather than constitutive of the self, a relation that reaffirms the Other in his or
her singularity” which thus represents “the origin of communication: not merely … an
empirical exchange of signs but … an intentional awareness of the existence of the
Other” (p. 210). In all symbolicity is an inherent relationality, and the nature of that
relationality is the nature of our material existence. Remaining sensitive to this truth,
refusing to the extent that one is able the “economies” and expectations of sociality which
render Others as knowable, we can pursue destiny. Neglecting this task or, worse,
refusing it, dooms us to fate.
Tolstoy’s notion of Christian Love and Buber’s insistence that we live in Thou
each put the burden of peace on all of us, as opposed to on the Others in our lives. For
both this is because the ways that we render Others will ultimately predicate the ways
that we will treat them. Once Others come to be seen as “evil” while we remain “good,”
or once Others become understandable and predictable at all, they cease to be Others and
instead become trapped in the fictions that we have crafted for them. And from those
fictions we sense our way to all kinds of terrible treatment and abuse. Insisting upon a
reverence of Others, even in the face of their cruelty, plants the seeds for an alternative.
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Sensing Others – A Rhetoric of Nonviolence
A rhetoric of nonviolence is not a solution. There can be no truly nonviolent
rhetoric, because all symbolicity is ultimately a violation of what is real. And yet, through
symbolicity, we come to know what is real. Symbolicity is as real as the body that it is a
part of, but none of the sensations that the body makes could be said to be universally
true. From colors, to balance, to the notion that the “I” of the self is in one’s head,
sensation is a chorus of illusions sustained by a speculating and affirming and ultimately
solipsistic brain. Linguistic reality, like all embodied reality, is always perspectival.
The world gets stitched together in “because” statements and justifications; our
reasons work like glue to suture an experience out of constellations of sensation.
Memories, expectations (the acts of prediction that fundamentally transform what can and
cannot be “afforded” opportunities to be), causation, trajectory, even reason itself, these
are all kinds of “grasping” at the world. As one talks about Others they are in fact
tracing them like a blind person putting their fingers to the edges of a surface. From this
tracing details emerge, details that resolve “the bigger picture.” More often than not this
“bigger picture” is reliable, but it is always to at least some extent a lie. Forgetting this is
forgetting the present; it is forgetting to live.
The language one makes throughout life will afford them the opportunity to be, to
see, and to feel “as-if.” The conglomeration of these “as-if” sensations, somehow,
resolves into a “me.” Who that me is, the condition that it is in, the future it faces, and the
reality that it occupies is, of course, predicated on a myriad of other conditions that are
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well beyond the power of any one person to control. But at the same time the perspective
that the me can take matters. Perspective taking renders the difference between “villains”
and “fools,” which when it comes to human beings in particular can make all of the
difference in the world.
Conclusion and Future Directions
When communication scholars began to consider communication from the
perspective of articulate constitutive contact it prompted a conversation about “new
materialism” – the matter of symbolicity became very real matter. Rhetorical materialists
to this day continue to struggle to account for the ways that communication and symbolic
thought participate in rendering human life.
Foss and Foss (2011) have identified two “paradigms of change” which are at
work in rhetorical criticism - offering either a “constricted” or a “constructed”
potentiality as potential perspectives on how humans make sense. In the “constricted”
paradigm, “the potential for change is limited or constricted by the tangible material
conditions on which communicators focus…” – this “…dominantly conventional
paradigm of how change happens limits the options available to theorists and change
agents” (p. 206). The paradigm of constricted potentiality focuses on “material conditions
… elements that already exist and that must be discovered by communicators [which
include] people, places, systems, organizations, events, documents, and artifacts as well
as structures such as laws, regulations, and traditions” (p. 208). The primary strategy of
change within a “constricted” paradigm is persuasion, “the effort to reinforce or
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transform beliefs or behaviors” (Ibid). Persuasive efforts focus on the “external” world in
an effort to make a change in the sensed material conditions (210). For Foss and Foss, the
constrictive paradigm, “as useful as it is” has begun to function within criticism and
society alike as a “terministic screen (Burke, 1965, 1966)” (p. 206).
The “constructive” paradigm on the other hand takes a much more open approach
to the potentials inherent in the new matter of language. This perspective puts the “focus
on the unlimited symbolic resources constructed by change agents” (Ibid). Change agents
engage in a paradigm of constructed potentiality “when they choose to privilege
symbolicity as they engage the dialectic between materiality and symbolicity” (p. 213).
Rather than focusing on the material conditions which contextualize (or “constrain”)
potential, “constructive” agents lean on “spoken, written, and visual symbols as well as
the thoughts, interpretations, perceptions, and meanings represented by symbols” (Ibid).
Like “constricted” potentials, “constructed” potentials is a “reality created by humans”
but unlike “constricted” potential the “constructed” potential is “unlimited” (Ibid).
Humanity never runs out of ways to apply symbols to problems and thus, so long as the
focus remains on the symbols and not the “reality” of the trouble there is no end to the
inquiry that one can conduct.
Constructed paradigms focus on interpretation, instead of persuasion, and drive at
“self-change” as opposed to material transformation in the external world. This change
route remains forever unspecified, again due to the infinite number of symbolic
permutations that can erupt out of any known exigency. Foss and Foss do not attempt to

176

replace one paradigm with another – only to demonstrate the power inherent in switching
between them. The dualistic mindsets identified by Stewart continue to play a persistent
role in the ways that scholars understand communication, otherwise no such defense of
constructivism would be warranted. Foss and Foss see, perhaps, a “trained incapacity” in
the works of their peers, an over-reliance on a “constrictive” approach which insists that
if language “matters” it hardly does so at all. The “constructive” model is not a new
addition to communication scholarship, but it is a perspective that Foss and Foss suggest
is underutilized if not misunderstood understood.
The gap between these two models demonstrates nicely the range of material
scholars that I attempted to track in Chapter One. Rhetorical scholars have so far
identified and traced either transcendent mattering (the macro-scale governing structures
of thought provided by theorists like Cloud, McGee, Black, Charland, and to an extent
Greene) or embodied mattering (the immanent components of communication as
understood by Blair, Dickinson, Condit, Ott, and, to another extent, Greene). In the first
case I argued that the individual experiences of symbolic sense-making were accounted
for but under emphasized. In the second case I argued that the immanent experience had
been emphasized but, so far at least, under developed. A governing logic of sense-making
is missing that could explain all of the different ways that human beings made sense.
The need to explain the immanent stuff of communicative mattering was then
followed to a conversation about neurorhetorics (Jack & Applebaum, Mays & Jung,
Jackson, Johnson, Pryal, Pruchnic) to argue that a potent conversation between rhetorical
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materialism and embodied-embedded cognitive study was already beginning, a
conversation which could offer tremendous insight to rhetoricians and embodiedembedded theorists alike. This conversation was explored in Chapter Two first as a
discussion about the debate in embodied cognition between so-called “traditional” or
“cognitivist” approaches and embodied-embedded approaches (as represented in Noe,
Shapiro, Clark, Freeman, Blakeslee and Blakeslee) and then through dynamic,
emergence-driven logics of non-causal, “as-if” cognition (Protevi). This debate, I argued,
mimicked the discussion tracked in Chapter One between the transmission model and
language as constitutive contact model in that it abolished notions of dualism and
replaced them with a reality where language-use and understanding very literally
mattered.
Chapter Three took notions of symbolicity as embodied-embedded scaffolding
developed through Chapters One and Two and attempted to demonstrate how metaphors
(Burke, Lakoff & Johnson) in particular offered a convenient if not necessarily
comprehensive glimpse into the scale of symbolicity’s participation in rendering human
existence. I tracked how “post-race” discourses (as identified by Lacey & Ono,
Gallagher, Halualani et al., Herakova et al., Cobb, Squires et al.) engaged racism in a way
that made “non-sense.” If an individual relies on conversations of race like those rooted
in the “race card,” it could be possible to look at the pursuit and murder of an unarmed
black boy and not see racism. The denial of racism did not make the role race played in
the shooting go away, it was obviously felt by individuals who responded to the shooting
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and subsequent acquittal of the shooter with outrage, but it could make racism disappear
to those who insisted on wielding only these kinds of discourses.
Chapter Four attempted to explore how a sense-based approach to language
changes the pedagogy of public speaking education by replacing transmission-driven
understandings of great speeches (rooted in predictability, control, and essential notions
of speaking excellence) with “the gym” – an embodied-embedded based attempt to
provide constant, diverse, and active practice. Rather than attempting to execute a perfect
speech, embodied-embedded speaking students turn to familiarity and practice, to sensemade, for confidence, research, and personal development.
Finally, Chapter Five attempted to culminate the discussion of the “new material”
that is constantly produced through symbolicity by situating ethical communication
within the frameworks of nonviolence as understood by Buber, Levinas, Tolstoy, Ruskin,
and Sharp. Chapter Five argued that human violence is inevitable, but not because of
some characteristic flaw in human nature. Instead, the fact that perception grounds
experience in a suspended reality was cited as the source of inevitable frustration and the
attitudes which dismiss nonviolent practice and theory were identified as the primary
forces which allow that frustration to continue to manifest itself in actual violence. If
language is a form of contact, and if we refuse to consider how that contact can become
violent, violence will ensue. Relational approaches such as Buber’s I/Thou perspective
taking could not resolve the endemic problems of violence, but they could produce a kind
of sensitivity that, if properly practiced through oppositional nonviolence, could make a
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tremendous material difference. Nonviolence advocates from Tolstoy to Sharp have
argued that human beings are born with everything they need to make their lives more
peaceful, no future development or understanding is necessary for us to begin living in a
world where oppression and violence go unchecked. What is necessary is that human
thinkers, speakers, and symbolizers take seriously the challenges set before them in their
symbolically-motivated existence.
Future directions for interrogating the importance of the sense-making capacities
of language might include coupling functional magnetic resonance imagery, positron
emission topography, or any of the varied forms of functional brain resonance technology
that scientists are developing, with practicing public speaking students. How do
practicing speakers “make sense?” How does practice effect and affect the brain?
Framing discrete research questions in the ways that science demands proves to be
incredibly tricky, isolating the neural plasticity that results from pondering a question is
even harder than isolating that which occurs as we grasp with our hands, but such efforts
could be incredibly enlightening.
New scholastic models should be explored, including: how many forms of
“practice” can 20-30-100 students do in a 1-hour or 3-hour time frame? There is no upper
limit to this question; the creative exploration that it hopefully prompts ought to be
resiliently generative. Getting “set in our ways” as speakers can be useful. Familiarity
comes from tracing and retracing (and retracing) not only our steps, but also the steps of
others. However, new modes of symbolic sense-making practice bring new challenges
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encouraging us once again to cope with and confront the frustrations and anxieties that
speaking well entails. Remaining familiar with those affects, too, is profoundly
important.
The “affective turn,” as the renewed investment in the more psychological and
phenomenological components of symbol use amidst rhetorical scholarship has been
dubbed, too, might be an interesting place to extend the argument that language is a
sense. Brian Massumi (2011), an affect-inspired social theorist, describes language as
“open-range-abstraction” – he attempts to trace the free-flow implications of language
use within the confines of complexity theory. The notion of language as an “open-range”
form of abstraction draws on a navigational/explorative schema that language-as-sense
could supplement.
Communication is mattering constantly; the material it produces governs our lives
and our futures in very real often painful but frequently uplifting ways. The fact that all of
us, throughout history, have relied so heavily on this feature of human ability gives us
great hope, language can figure itself, it can figure racism, it can figure oppression of all
sorts if we decide to use it thus. At the same time language, like all human sensation, is
imperfect. The rockets humans made which put boot prints on the moon some 300,000
miles from Earth are practically identical to those which could deliver dozens of atomic
warheads to cities all over the world, the only difference lies in their justification. That
difference, itself just a thin margin somewhere on the continuum of cold-war induced
paranoia, determines the future of our species. Humans have the ability to self-annihilate,
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or the ability to literally travel to and step upon the heavens. The question is, in which of
these futures will we matter most?
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